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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM OF THE THESIS 
In a day when unrest prevails throughout the world, people are 
' 
' turning to various philosophies for answers to problems arising from 
various political crises. A philosophy having great strength in 
recent years was that of the ttmaster racett concept, Nietzsche, et ai. 
Another is that of the modern optimists who view man as climbing the 
ladder to full brotherhood. In recent years these philosophies have 
1 tended to overshadow a social philosophy of long historical standing, 
~.~., theocracy. 
By theocracy it is generally thought that God is literally the 
ruler of the group. However, the contention of this thesis will be 
that a government may be theocratic in more than the literal rule 0f 
God, i·~·' God's sovereignty .makes God the ruler over all mankind. It 
is also theocratic in that men, according to the doctrine of the agency 
of man, as Calvin sees it, as "cross bearerstt who follow in Christts 
footsteps, are ,ndelegatedn to be their own governors. For John Calvin 
the latter is based on the former. The sovereignty of God is the key 
note to all of John Calvin's teaching and will receive a great deal of 
emphasis in the study of his position regarding political matters. 
It might be noted that upon the subject of theocracy, its defini-
tion, its theoretical grounds, and its practical development there are 
1 
i 
few volumes that have attempted to outline sometlLing along this line. 
The most notable one is st • .Augustine's City of God. In his intro-
duction to the Modern Library edition, Thomas Merton says that as utruly 
as the Confessions are the autobiography of st • .Augustine, The City o:f 
God is the autobiography of the Church written by the most Catholic o:f 
her great saints.n1 In spite of this the first ten books do not deal 
with the specific issue of the ntheology of the ttwo cities' and o:f 
the intervention of God in human history.u 2 Acc~rding to the .Argument 
. at the beginning of the Eleventh Book, Augustine 
I 
here begins the second part o:f this work, which treats of the 
origin, history, and dest~es of the two cities, the earthly 
and the heavenly. In the first place, .Augustine shows in this 
book how the two cities were forlll$c;l originally., by the sepa-
ration of the good and bad ang~ls; and takes occasion to treat 
of the creation of the world, as it is d.~~:!Cribed in Holy 
Scriptures in the beginning of the book of' Genesis.3. 
· This continues into the Twelveth Book with further questions concerning 
angels and creation. Book Thirteen teaches "that death is penal, and 
had its origin in .Adam•s sin.n4 By treating ~the problem more fully in 
the Fourteenth Book Augustine reaches the definition of the two cities. 
This is: 
accordingly ~ecause of the separati~nof the good and bad 
angels and because of the sin of Ad.a:Iil, two cities have been 
:formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even 
to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, 
even to the contempt of self.. The former, in a word, glories 
in itself, the latter in the Lerd.. For the one seeks the 
glory :from men; but the ~atest glory of the· other is God1. 
the witness of conscience.5 · · 
..... 
1. Saint Augustine, The Ci~~ Q! God. (New York: The Modern Library# 
~om House, Inc., 1950 , P• xi. 
2. Ibid., P• x. 4. Ibid., P• 4J2. 
3. Ib.id., P• 345. 5. Ibid., P• 477. 
2 
In Beoks Fittefin to Eighteen .Augustine deals with the parallel 
histories o! both cities. Book Ninet~n discusses 
the end of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly. • 
• • Augustine reviews the opinions of the philesophers 
regarding the supreme good, and their vaill efforts to .mak~ 
for themselves a happiness in this life; and whil.e he 
refutes thes.-, he takes q!leasion to show what the peace. ~I¥i 
happiness belonging to the heav.e~ city, or the people ef 
Christ, are both now and hereafter.l . 
In Book Twenty there is a discussion uconcerning the. last judgment, 
" 
and the declarations regarding it in the OO.d Testament and New 
Testament. t,2 The last two books discuss tha ends of each of the 
. 
cities. Actuallr, therefore, there are few references to the 
subject of theocracy. ttle book lllOSt closely resembles a Christian 
j world history. As such then it does not lend itself to the argument 
1 
of this thesis. In view of this, one must see the need for a more 
' ' 
clear delineation of the scope of this thesis. 
B. DEFINITIONS 
. ' 
In an earlier paragraph it was mentioned that Ged is literally the 
ruler of the group. ln light of Calvin's doctrine of God's sovereign-
ty, see below, this is correct. However, in this temporal realm one 
must qualify suck a atateme.nt. Theocracy as defined above never 
existed in the sense that God llteraJ.ly ruled a nati0n. God did rul.e3 
however, in specific instances over individual.s, such as: Adam, 
Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and others. A !~ther illustration of this 
1. ibid., p. 669. 2. Ibid., p. 710. 
-
3 
literal rule of God is to be seen in His ruling the hearts of those 
who believe in the atonement and resurrection of Jesus Christ as 
efficacious for their salvation. But to prove these points is not the 
purpose of this thesis. 
For purposes of a more careful examination of the ter.m theocracy 
J three .. terms are introduced. They are~ the ttpure-tt theocracy, the 
ttinearnatett theocracy, and the «delegateQ.tt theoc~acy .1 In order to 
clarify the picture it is necessary to evaluate these forms to see 
whether or not they really have or can exist on the political. scene. 
' In the first form, pure theocracy, the meaning that is generally 
conceived is the literal rule of God9 In the word pure there is 
necessarily found such a limitation. Pure signifies by definition 
that which is ttseparate from all heteregeneou:s or extraneous matter; 
free from. mixt~e or combination; clear; simple; unmixed. n2 In other 
words, God litera.l.ly is the sol.e ruler of a group. .Add to this the 
definition of the word theocracy, ngovernment o! a state by the imme-
diate direction or administration ~f God, ·~.3 and one cannot but clearly 
understand the intent o! the use of the term pure theocracy. ~ere is 
in this political !orm no terti:wn quid between God and man. Generally 
this is considered to have become an 'impossibility, due to the !all of 
man; and it is as far as this creation is now concerned. The direct 
1~ R. ¥· Milla.l,"d. - Lecture in Social Pl4J:,.osopby, February 2.3, 1956. 
2. Webster•s New International Dictionary. (Springfield, Mass. G. & c. 
M~rriam~Co., 19.32), p. 17'37.. . : ·. 
,3. Ibid., p. 2140. 
---- . 
4 
intervention of God in history to individuals occurred during those 
periods of history in which Divine Revelation prevailed, assuming the 
validity of the Holy Scriptures. Beginning ip. Genesis, it continued 
down thro'llgh the lives of the Biblical patriarchs Abraham., Isaac, 
Jacob, Moses, the prophets and the Apostles. There will be only one 
more occurrence in which God will rule directly. The appearance of 
this will be in the end times and will last throughout eternity. In 
. this instance God's rule will nE:>t extimd. solely to individuals within 
a group, state, or nation; but it will encE:>mpass all who have ever 
· lived. It is only in these explicit instances that one can say that 
there ever did or will exist a pure theocracy. What then does E:>ne do 
J with that age in llhich Moses, the ~dges and Samuel ruled ~srael?. It 
' is the contention of this thesis that one may more adequately li!t 
this form. of government under the term "delegatedtt theocracy. 
' 
In the second form of theocracy, the «incarnaten theocracy, one 
+ 
finds an extreme claim of theocracy. Using the distinction advocated 
by Dr. Millard in his lecture, above mentioned, one may find this term 
to mean that some Divine being, or descendant of him, appears in the 
human flesh and rules a people. Such views have been held in several 
cultures, and even still exist as a live option in one portion of this 
present world. The most clear use of such a social concept of the 
ruler can be found on the banks of the ancient Nile. The god :Re was 
incarnate in the ruler or Pharaoh of Egypt.l As long as the Pharaoh 
..,· .... 
1. ~~International :Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. (New York: Dodd, l!ead 
and Company, 1918}, Vol. XIX, 578. 
5 
:had a son~ Re was still the God of Egypt. SUch a theory, as can be l 
easily seen in its present day counterpart, runs amukwhen either the 
Pharaoh does not have an heir or he is defeated. There were in many 
cases competitive contests between two gods as is found in Greek and 
In the Shinto conceptl there were also many similar Roman mythology. 
I 
1 situations. Immediately following World War ll many of the Japanese 
·had witnessed the loss of ttfacett by the emperor and left their faith • 
... 
In this they acknowledged that he could not have been a descendant ot 
a God. several. very serious criticisms come to the fore to oppose 
this form of theocracy. The first is that there seems to be little 
evidence that any man is infallible, totally just, or righteous on his 
': own merits; and is~ therefore, ·not capable of completely true or right 
I 
decisions. If there :is one sign of error or falsity evidenced in the 
wa;ys of a ruler, the fact of his deity is open to serious question. 
The second problem is that of polytheism. As there are so .many diverse 
rul.ers that claim such deity, and the~e have been many down through 
history, is it possible that all have their deity from the same 
Divine being? It is quite evident in the writings of the various 
. . . . . . . . ~ . . . . 
peoples, !.•!.•, the Islamic claim that ttla ilaha illa•llah; muhammad 
rasulu•llah - ''!here is no God but Allah; Mehammed is the Messenger 
of ill~; rn2 or the Hindu belief that "in the beginning this universe 
. ' , .. 
was Self alone~ in the shape of a person •••• This Sell was indeed. 
1 • .A. R. Chandler, The ciash of Poiit:i.ca.i Ide~s (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949). . Excerpts from documents of Shintoism 
give a good analysis of . ~hl:-~ . ~l:}.eory '! . . . 
1!. Henry R. Luce, et al, ~World•s ·Great Religions (New York: Time 
Inc., l95?), pp. 101-2. .. . 
6 
·Brahman in the beginning. It knew only its Self as, •I am Brahman. • 
Therefore It became all; 1.1· that there is no one div~~ being at th; 
source, but there are many such beings. On the basis of this evidence 
one would wonder whether or not there could be one that could substan-
tiate his claim to deit.y. As these claims are clear}3 conflicting it 
is thus doubtful that any ruler has ever or ever will have the right 
· to claim that his government is based on an ttincarnatett theocracy. 
The final form of theocracy is that of ttdelegatedn theocracy. 
·.According to Dr. Millard's lecture this is that position which views 
all government officials as ordained,. empowered and appointed by God. 
To this John Calvin adheres. The basis for this definition is the 
1 thirteenth chapter of Romans t 11the powers that be are ordained of GOd.'" 
As this is to be expounded in detail it need have no further intro-
duction. 
C. METHODOtoGY OF THE THESIS 
In order to view this remaining concept of theocracy as it appears 
in John Calvin•s writings in particular, one must delve into his Insti-
'., ....... . 
tutes and Commentaries. From these sources it is necessary to draw the 
basic doctrinal foundations which influence Calvin's interpretation of 
the world around us. Then upon this basis one can view and understand 
Cal.vin•s position in regard to the form. of government which he would 
adopt and advocate. .llso one will be able to find out what his stand 
was in regard to the existing forms of government. Following a careful 
'' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1. Ibid!, .P• .Jl. A quotation from Brihadaran,yaka Upanisha~ A<ibyaya b 
Brahmana IV. 
7 
! study of his basic concept of civil government, a contrast will be 
demonstrated between Calvin•s point of view and what was the nature 
of that early form of theocracy, so called, which was found during the 
time of Moses down to the time of Samuel. The contrast.;; exists in such 
matters as the theological differences of the nature of Revelation,l 
the covenantal difference, the nature of the magistrate and some other 
points. Yet in both it will be found that the form of government 
rests explicitly upon the ordination 9f God. 
In order to broaden the scope and to get a more general evaluation 
of Calvin's position of delegated theocracy, not limited to a certain 
form of government, it has been deemed wise to contrast his position 
j with two other views. For ccmvenience, and probably not without va.-
' 
lidity, these two views will be called monarchical theocracy and demo-
cratic theocracy. 2 This does not mean that they cannot be listed as 
delegated theocracies. But what is meant is that they are specific 
expositions of particular forms of government which certain authors 
believe to be more favorable to the political scene and are definitely 
ordained by God. In the first, or monarchical theocracy, there will. 
be a consideration of Aquinas•, or the scholastic, form of monarchical 
government. This will be expounded and evaluated; and in the final 
section of the third chapter there will appear a study of the contrast 
of st. Thomas • position with that of Calvin. 
1. It must be understood that Calvin in no way- cancels the validity of 
the Old Testament revelation or covenant, but finds in the New Testa:-
ment a more full unfolding of God t s revelation, thus necessitating 
The fourth chapter will be a study of John Lockets theory of 
,> 
government by t1Natural. right.n For the purpose of this study this 
has been termed a study of democratic theocracy. It has been so 
termed because of the fact that in his basic approach, Locke fads the 
form of government by consent, or the general bases of all demacratic 
government, to be ordained in Nature by God. ThUs it is that he 
ideclares this form of government which he advo~ates to be government 
by ll}latural right.u A section will be given to contrasting this 
.. 
position with John Calvin's position • 
.. 
Upon the completion of this study there will be a final chapter 
in which will appear a summary of the thesis, and an evaluation of the 
jvarious views, and finally an evaluation of Calvin's position. As 
1 ,. 
·there seems to be little that would bring these various views to one's 
. attention it is hoped that this study will at least make clear 
Calvin•s definition of theocracy, based on th~fact of the sovereignty 
'of God. 
a slightly di£ferent view of man's relation to God, self and his 
fellowman as will be seen in a later sectione 
• 2. These terms are probably not original, but have not been secured 
from any source lmown to the author. 
9 
CHAPTER II 
.JOHN CALVIN'S DELEGATED THEOCRACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In unfolding the study of .John Calvin 1 s outlook on the preblem of 
the civil government, it is prerequisite that some consideration be 
given to the major presuppositions that lie behind Calvin•s theory of 
·government. These will be briefly outlined in a section on the doc-
1 trinal foundations of this position. Following the viewing of these 
! foundations, the thesis will turn immediately to a consideration of 
i the theocratic viaw which is expounded by Jahn Ca1. vin throughout his 
works. This will be contrasted with the example of a theocratic 
!government as it is found in the Old Testament. 
B. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS 
1. The Doctrine o:f Creation 
.According to Calvin, the Church, the ttbody o:f Christ,n has 
been given a history of creation upon which it might place its 
:faith in the God of Creation. This God is that 
l.O 
one which is described as the Creator of the worlQ.,l This is also that 
record which the church knows as the Bible. Within its pages, the Chris-
tian also .finds the history of the chosen people of God. This is speci-
fically written down in order that the church might be able to see His 
"lively imagen which otherwise cannot be depicted as God is invisible and 
His wisdom, power, and justice are incomprehensible.2 It is also insisted 
:by Calvin that what is written therein is all that is need.ful for the in-
dividual to know. It is in his eyes an o.ffence against "God to inquire 
for any cause of things, higher than His wm.n3 John Calvin makes this 
remark especially in regard to such persons who have attempted to con-
'template reasons why God did not create the world any earlier than He 
did,. and such like questions. 
'I Not only do the non-christian and the Christian have the opportunity 
to read and investigate the special revelation of God in the Bible, but 
they also have before them the •tt~orks of Godn wherever they turn their 
eyes. Some of the great examples of the Creation of God are the stars 
·of the heavens in their ordered paths and the constancy of the ordered 
·rising and setting of the sun.4 H<mever, if one were to turn solely 
to the wonders of nature aroung him, he would not actually discover 
for himself the fact that the God of the Scriptures was the creator. It 
is therefore necessary to turn one's attention back to the written record 
1. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, tr. John Allen 
(Philadelphia:: Presby. BO"a.Fcrof Christ"lan EdUcation, 19.36)), I, 177• 
2. Ibid., P• 178. 
3.. Idem. 
4. Ibid., P• 179. 
ll 
II 
1to find the actual source of all existence. From this record, the reader 
finds that by the ttpower of His Word and Spirit God created out of no-
thing the heaven and the earth.nl According to Calvin, it follows that 
.from them He produced all things, animate and inanimate; dis-
tinguished by an admirable gradation the innumerable variety 
of things; to every species gave its proper nature, assigned 
its of.fices, and appointed its places and stations; and since 
all things are subJ-ect to corruption, bas, nevertheless, pro-
vided .for the preservation of every species till the last day; 
that He therefore nourishes some by methods concealed from us; 
from time to time infusing, as it were, new vigor into them; 
that on some He has confered the power of propagation, in order 
that the whole species may not be extinct at their death; that 
He has thus wonder.fully adorned heaven. and earth with the u t-
most possible abundance, variety, and beauty, like a large 
splendid mansion, most exquisitely and copiously furnished; 
lastly, that by creating man, and distinguishing him with such 
splendid beauty, and with most numerous and great privileges, 
1 
He has exhibited in him a most excellent specimen of all His 
·1 works.2 
(All of this creation is so much beyond the comprehension of man, as 18 
:also the inestimable "wisdom, power, justice, and goodness of God, n that 
! 
~o ~splendor or ornam~nt of dictions will equal the magnitude of so great r subject.~) But Calvin :finds lll ~ this inestimable glory a leason £or 
\he reader of the Bible. He points out that faith in this revelation of 
God as the Creator of heaven and earth can be apprehended when he, in 
the first place, follows the universal rule, not to pass nover, with un-
grateful inattention or oblivion, those glorious per.fections which God 
manifests in His creatures, and secondly learn to make such an appli-
cation to themselves as thoroughly to affect their hearts.n4 The il-
l. Ibid., P• 198. 
2. Idem. 
3. Ibid., P• 199. 
4. raem. 
l.ustration of the first principle lies in the fact of the observability 
of the perfection of the order of the heavens above, the symmetry of the 
smallest crystal. or snow-flake, etc. What Calvin means by the second 
principle is that when the order which is seen is ca~efully considered, it 
. is found to be so ordered that one can see that UGod has appointed all 
things for our benefit and safety,n and that this order and grace which 
also appears within us and which He has conferred upon us ought to be so 
felt that it would excite *ourselves to confide in Him, to invoke Him, to 
i 
,praise Him, and to love Him.tt1 This is considered by Calvin to be the 
I 
full. meaning of God the Creator. 
2. The Doctrine of the Sovereignty of God 
a. In regard to ;kature. One of the attributes of God is supremely taught ~ readers of' tile Bible by this specific relationship of' God to His cre-
rtion. That attribute which .is seen is that of' His omnipotence. Divine 
pmnipotence rests in the fact of divine omniscience. Calvin relates these 
attributes when he says that 
of his wonderful wisdom, both heaven and earth contain innUlllerabl.e 
proofs; not only those more abstruse things, which are the sub-
jects of astronomy, medicine, and the whole science of physics, 
but those things which force themselves on the view of the most 
illiterate of mankind, so that they.cannot open their eyes with-
out being constrained to wi t.ness them • • • • • • Ignorance of 
• Ibid., P• 200. 
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those sciences prevents no man from such a survey of the work-
manship of God, as is more than sufficient to excite his ad-
miration of the Divine Architect •••• Since the meanest and 
most illiterate of mankind, who are furnished with no other 
assistance than their own eyes, cannot be ignorant of the ex-
cellence of the Divine skill, exhibiting itself in that end-
less, yet regular variety of the iQnumerable celestial host,--
it is evident that the Lorf abundantly manifests his wisdom to 
every individual on earth. 
1It is however, to the reader of Scriptures not as much a problem as it is 
I 
only a step from the fact that God created to the fact that God, in His 
omnipotence, sustains all that He has created. He is the "perpetual gover-
\nor and preservertt of all things that He bas createdQ2 One of the writers 
I 
• o:f the Bible makes; this clear in a very succinct statement. The Apostle 
'Paul so stated this principlet in God ttire live, and move, and have our 
being.n3 Apart from this, what is one to say to the persen who speaks 
of' fortune or fortuitous acts~, As has' already been stated, there is 
little room in the mind of Calvin f'or any doctrine of' chance. Calvin can 
find no room f'or such a consideration 'as he looks at the ordered rising 
of' the sun and the continual cycle of the seasons. God, Himself, governs 
such procedures within nature, not •t.he blind instinct of nature."4 
b. In reg~ to ~ individl:lal.. Within the doctrine of' the sovereignty 
lof' God there is also to be found the doctrine of the providence of God. 
:This is actually another form of the attribute of the omnipotence of God. 
i,John Calvin in interpreting the meaning of' the providence o::f God, turns 
:1• Ibid., P• 64 - 65. 
1
1
2.. Ibid., p. 218. 
J. Acts 17::28, as quoted by Calvin in the Institutes on P• 218. 
4. IbiG. .. , P• 220 .. 
I 
to the picture tba t the Psalmist David depicts in the eighth Psalm. 
David states tbat the goodness of God and the fact of His providence is 
to be seen in the very act of a mother•s nursing.l Two considerationB 
reinf0rce the fact of God's omnipotence in that He has ample ability to 
bless th0se in His service, as He is the possesor of the heavens and the 
earth; and, secondly, these also receive His protection.2 A very clear 
example of God•s providing power is to be found in the incident of 
Abraham and Isaac upon Mount Moriah. When they were climbing the Mount, 
iisaac asked where the lamb was for the sacrifice, for they were carrying 
:~11 the necessary implements for the act of sacrifice but did not have 
,what G9d did. One other thing that could be said about the providence 
!of God is that it is not only a special providence for His chosen people, 
I 
but it is also the fact of His general providence for all mankind. All 
men are given this form of His sovereignty as a service to them in the 
I !fact of common grace. That is, that all men receive equally their share 
of the rain or sunshine. It is received by all without distinction between 
those who are good or evil. ·This general providence is to the individual 
1. Ibid., P• 221. 
2. Idem. 
3. Geii'esis 22~8 as quoted by Calvin in the Institutes on P• 222. 
! who is not ttsavedttl a constant reminder that there is a God and that some 
day he must meet His maker. 
e. Predestination. :U: one is to be able to view properly the nature of 
history, he must discern a certain plan that seems to run throughout the 
I l course of history. Many are convinced tbat there is no such plan and 
view li:fe liith a pessimistic twist.. Such a negative view of hi.story can 
be seen in two ways. First, one may look at li:fe as Plautus says, ttThe 
. condition of our affairs is inconstant; men are governed by the caprice 
·of the Fates J I will betake myself to a precipice, and there destroy my 
.life and every. thing at once. u2 Or one may say tlGod was the cause~ I 
' i 
believe it was the Divine ldll. For }'l..a.d it not been so, I know it would 
not hav~ happened.n.3 'ihe second negative statement of fatalism would be 
drawn out to its very last conclusion by asking very pointedly such ques-
tions as: tJWhy, there.fore, shall a tliie.f be punished .for having pi1-
1laged hlm whom it has pleased the Lord to chastise with property'l Why 
I 
·shall a homicide be punished :for having slain him whose life the Lord 
! terminated~ If all such characters are subservient to the Divine will, 
;why shall they be punishedZ'~ Such a negative approach to this problem 
l. Calvin defines the term ttsavedtt as the state of being reconciled to 
God. cf. Ibid., P• .368 - "For it has been a common opinion, in all 
ages and nations, that these who are alienated .from God, and pro-
nounced accursed, and children o.f wrath, cannot please him without 
a reconciliation•" 
2., Ibid., P• 236. 
3. Idem. 
4. Ibid., P• 238. 
can only be answered by the positive considerations that are to be ~ound 
in the Scriptures. One is to search the Scripture, trto learn wba t is 
well pleasing to God, that by the guidance o~ the Spirit they may strive 
to attain i t .. nl Solomon in wri t:ing the book o~ Proverbs included this 
'saying, ttA mants heart deviseth his way; but the Lord directeth his 
steps, tt showing that man finds in the eternal decrees o~ God no imped.i-
.ment to providing ~or hemself. Calvin makes this clear by saying that 
He who has fixed the limits of our life, has also intrusted us 
with the care of it; has furnished us with means and. supplies 
~or its preservation; bas also made' us provident of dangers; and, 
that they m&iY not oppr~ss us unawares, has ~urnished us with 
cautions and remedies. 
iit is now quite evident that the predestination o~ God is one o~ the 
}basic tenets o~ Calvin. Within the concept lies the great ~act of man•s 
~ree will. This concept will be discussed in the immediately follewing 
3.. The :Dootrine of Msn 
a. The nature of man at the creation. 
l) 11le immortal and eternal soul. 'When man was created, God not only 
took of the dust o:f the earth and breathed into that earthen vessel the 
preath of life, but He also chose to make it the residence of an immortal 
Ibid., P• 236. 
. • Ibid., P• 237. 
.. 
!/ 
I 
sou1.1 Within this immortal soul, one finds resident the indubitable 
proof of its immortality. When one considers his own conscience and 
finds that it lies within his power to discern between goad and evil., to 
answer to the judgment of God, he tends to grant that he lloverarches1l 
time and concepts in his spirit and intelligence.2 In fact, it was the 
nature of Adam to be eternal as long as he should eat of the tree of 
lii'e.3 This factor of eternalit,r not only resided, and still does re-
!side, in th.e:nature of the soul; but also was true of Adam1s boay before 
'he alienated himself .from God. This leads us to the other thought that 
·in Adam rested the ttimage o.f God..n 
2) The Imago Dei. The nature o.f man at the time o.f creation also in-
cluded another .factor which still p:ervades his nature, although it is 
. considerably dimmed in its present .for:m. This was the .fact that God 
I 
;:created man i1i His image.4 One thing that is net to be included in the 
i idea o.f the image o.f God in man is the .fact that the body of man al.sG 
i 
lbears in it the .form o.f God. Calvin declares that ii' one is to ,hold 
!this position he has made, as Osiander did, a con.fusion of the di.ff'er-
• ences that lie in the concept o.f heaven and that o.f earth-.5 To avoid 
this mistake, Calvin posits the image o:f God to lie in the soul o.f man, 
in the .fact o:f his intelligence. In so doing one can see that the image 
1. Ibid., P• 203. 
:2. Ibid., P• 204. 
:3. Ibia., P• 269. 4. Ibid., P• 206. !5. Idem. 
! 
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· o£ God Wincludes all the excellence in which the nature o:f man surpasses 
• all the other species of an:imalso";I. With such a concept be:fore the 
; reader o:f the Bible, it is natural for him to conclude tha. t this man had 
! 
all the "uncorrupted excellence o:f human naturenr that could have ever 
. be~n his.2 With this nature as his own, then it was also his to have a 
good understanding and will. 
3) The intelligence and the ~will. With the creation of man, God 
.furnished him with a mind capable of discerning good and evil, just and 
;unjust; ttand of discovering, by the light of reason, what ought to be 
,pursued ~d avoidea.n3 These faculties were so ennobled that these pos-
sessions of understanding, prudence, and judgment "not only provided for 
,the government of his life on earth, but also enabled h:im to ascend even 
to God and eternal felicity .. nh In spite o:f this ability which was pos-
sessed by Adam, he :fell merely by his own will. He could have stood if' 
he would, but "because his will was flexible to either side, and he was 
not endued with constancy to persevere, n he so easily fell.5 Yet it was 
his own free choice between good and evil tba. t remained his while he re-
p!Sined obedient to God. Freedom of choice changes when man's nature 'is 
Viewed after the :fall. 
1. Ibid., p .. 208. 
2. Ibid .. , P• 210. 
a. Ibid., P• 21.4. 4. Ibid., P• 215. 
' . fbi<l., P• 215. 
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· b. The nature of ~ after the faJJ • 
l) The cioctrirle o! 0ri.g¥18i sin. When .Adam fell, "there is no doutt 
that Adam was by this defection alienated from God.nl At the root of 
that defection on the part of Adam. was infidelity e 2 . But the develop;::. 
. ment of it covered a goodly number of what were called sins in the 
terminology of Cal vine Out of this infidelity ttsprang ambition, pride 
and ingratitude, since Adam, by coveting more than was granted, offered 
an indignity to the Divine goodness, which had so greatly enriched 
him.rt3 What Adam's ~was, was not only to possess a si.mllitude to 
,, God but also to b~ equal to Him. 4 This is the analysis of what hap-
' 
pened to .Adam, but it does not limit itself to Adam alone. .After the 
·death sentence had been passed upon him, the guilt and curse of this 
; sin was imputed to all who were to come after him in the world. This 
puts Adam at the head of the world as its progenitor and root. st. 
·Paul shows this when he says, n As by one man sin entered into the 
world IJ.dam•s acfl, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, 
for that they all have sinned,tt so in like lii8Jlller Christ is considered 
to be the head of the elect as-He restores grace t0 the sinner.5 This 
state of those who follow in the steps of Adam is that state of being 
....... 
·which is called original sin. By this Calvin means 
the depravation of a nature previously good and pure; on 
which • • • all are criminated on the account of ~he 
guilt of one, and thus his sin has become common • 
. . . . 4. Idem. 1. Ibid., p. 208. 
2. Ibid., p. 269. 
. 3. Idem. 
----
5. Ibid., PP• 271-2, Romans 5:12. 
6. Ib:id., P• 270 • 
1 
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nother passage that gives a full picture of the problem of original sin 
is that which describes original sin as appearing as an ''hereditary de-
ravit,r and corruption of our nature, diffused through all parts of the 
~oul, rendering us obnoxious to the Divine wrath, and producing in1~us 
I (hose works which the Scripture calls 'works of the flesh.' "1 
2) The Imago~· What then happened to that wilthin man that m0st 
closely resembled God'l Calvin states that the rtDivine image in him was 
obliterated, and he was punished with the loss of wisdom, strength, 
sanctity, truth, and righteousness, with which he had been adorned, but 
hich were succeeded by the dreadful pests of ignorance, impotence, im-
purity, vanity, and iniquity.tt2 However, the "Divine image was not ut-
terly annihilated and effaced in him, yet ~'fwas'-'S.O corrupted that whatever 
remains is but horrible deformity.n3 It is therefore, possible for the 
non-Christian, on the position of Calvin, to find a certain amount of 
truth and do seemingly good acts. The grace of the Lord did not pe:rnd.t 
an so to deface himself tba t there was no semblance of good within him. 
But C-od permitted man to go only so :far and by this t.oken man still had 
enough reason, though much darkened, that God gave him to be able to 
choose good values and to seek after G<Ddo 
l. Ibid., P• 274• 
'2. Ibid., P• 270. 
3.. Ibid., P• 208. 
3) The intelligence and the free rlri. What happened to man•s 
faculty of understanding has been touched upon, but the matter of the 
will is to be considered in this instance. As far as the will is con-
cerned, Calvin was not willing that any should say that it was any 
longer free_ to choose between good and evil. .Anybody that was said to 
do the will. of God first had tG know the wi1..l of God as found in the 
scriptures. So it is that he who disobeys the laws of God as found in 
the Scriptures does not serve the will. of God. tJFor he who is influ-
-. 
enced by a wicked heart,n acts in accordance to the dictates of his 
The nature of the heart is the result of the will~ for 
when the will was overcome by the sin into which it fell, 
na.ture began to be destitute of Liberty. .Again: that man, 
having made a wrong use of his free will lost it and him-
self. _Again: that free will is in a 1state of captivity, 
so that it can do nothing towards righteousness. 
alvin is inclined to agree with .Augustine «that the actual. ta1ents in 
have been corrupted by sin, but that of the supernatural ones he 
s been wholly deprived. n2 This leaves the final state of man to be 
• 
• 
The nature or _man B.fter. reciellretion • 
t h t the person who has received the l) Regeneration. :Calvin says a 
u~\;;.1\.o.u,..o.J. .• ,.. Spirit by raJ,th in Christ, «to the living soul ful;.which 
created, celebrates the degre~ of grace displayed in 
• Ibid., pp. 287-8 • 
• Ibid., P• 292. 
,, 
i 
Ire generation as superior to that manifested in creation. ul Neverthe-
i 4 
less, this is the restoration o:f the image o:f God in man. 2 One :finds, 
however, that there is not one individual that is free :from committing 
a sin. This is true as the restoration o~ the image of God in man has 
yet to be completely :fulfilled. Calvin declares that nit is new partly 
visible in the elect, inasmuch as they are regenerated by the Spirit, 
1
bu.t it will obtain its full glory in heaven.u3 
2) Christie .Aton~ment. Christ's atonement is that work which ttre-
' stores us to . true and per:fect int~grity. n4 This is possible as uehrist 
. 
'is the most perfect image of God, to which being conformed, we are se 
restored that we bear the Divine image in true piety, righteousness, 
,purity, and understanding.u5 It is to be understood that Calvin de-
I 
i clares that this is the sole approach to God and His righteousness; 
and, there:fore, is the ground of many of the changes that come about 
not only- in the lives of individuals, but also, in so far as those 
t 
individuals touch society, the ground of Jll8.llY of the ref0rm movements. 
' . . . - . ~ . 
3) The intelligence and ~ ~ will.. Again it has been seen that 
' the position o!the Uiaderstandingha.s returned to its original cendition 
, upon the acceptance of Christ by faith on the part of the indiYiduale 
1. Ibid., P• 209. 
2 .. raem .. 
J. Ibid., P• 210. 
4. Ibid., p. 208. 
5. Ibid., P• 209 • 
. -
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lin regeneration, the will is liberated by Divine grace.l Yet it is lib-
erated and guided to the willing of the good by the Spirit of God and in 
that sense is not free from righteousnesse2 If this be the case, then 
nthat .man obeys God, who, being instructed in His will, hastens whither 
God calls him.n3 The source of instruction is declared by Calvin to be 
1the Word of God, the Bible.4 In conclusion, it can further be said that 
:the will which has been regenerated is seen by ttfaith, love of God, 
charity towards our neighbors, and an attachment to holiness and 
righteousness~ All these things, being restored by Christ, are esteemed 
'adventitious and preternatural; and, therefore, we conclude that they 
\had been lostn at the fall of man.5 
' 
C. THE SYSTEM OF CIVIL. GOVERNMENT 
l. Introduction 
According to John Calvin, there are two types of government. The 
' ' 
lfirst of these is the spiritual governmeht under which all men fall. In 
ithis J;ba.se of government uthe conscience is :formed to piety and the service 
;l. Ibid., p. 2$$. 4. Idem .. 
1'2. -Id~m. 5. Ibid., p. 292. 
:; 
Ibid.' 3. p. 23$. 
I 
of God.n1 When Calvin uses the term spiritual government, he has in 
mind that government which pertains to the life of the soul.2 
The second phase of government, which is the primary concern of 
fhis thesis, is that which is termed the political government. Under 
rhis fOI'llt of government man is "instructed in tho duties of humanity 
and civility which are to be ob~erved in_ an intercourse rith mankina.tt3 
I -
This latter concerns itself with the present state of things, nnot only 
to the provision of food and clothing, but to the enactment of laws to 
regulate a man's life among his neighbors by the rule of holiness, in-
tegrity, and s~briety.n4 These two realms do not coincide as some have 
~ried to show, !·~,those who have defended the divine right of kings. 
i 
However, Galvin makes it clear that these two governments are not at 
variance with each other as the one is cencerned with the spiritual 
and internal reign of Christ.5 
In his chapter on the civil government, John Calvin outlines his 
1study in three phases. He states that the first phase will be under-
/ 
'stood as 
the function of a magistrate, whether it be a legitimate 
calling and approved.by God, the nature of the duty, and · ..
the extent of the power; secondly, by what laws Christian 
government ought to be regulated; and lastly, wh~t advantage 
the people derive trom the laws, and what obedience they owe 
to the magistrate. 
1. !bid., n, 89 & 90. 
2. Idem. 
C3. Idem. 
4. Idem. 
5. Ibid., P• 772. 
6. Ibid., P• 773. 
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·I 
2 • The ).{agistrate 
i 
Ia. Ordained !?z Q££. In considering the nature of the magistratel 
alvin naturally begins at the place of appointment. In so doing, he 
remembers his doctrine of the sovereignty of God and finds that it here 
, lays a:n, important role. Actually, herein lies the nature of all theo-
1 
'cracies. From whence do the various forms of government arise? In the 
Old Testament, Cal.vin finds several instances in which God announces 
the theocratic foundation of government. Through loses ~d Jehosha-
phat God declared to the judges whom they appointed that they were to 
«judge not for man, but for the Lord.n2 SOloman in a proverb from the 
~ook of Proverbs declared that God had said that "by me kings re~, 
and princes decree justice. By me pr~ces rule, and nobles, even all 
the judges of the earth.u3 In another place in the New Testament, 
Calvin cites another statement of the delegation of power by God to 
. . ~ . . . . ' . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . 
all wlx> rule. Inh.is Conmenta.ry 2!! the Epistle ~ ~ Remans he explains 
.the first verse ofthe thirteenth chapter tv saying that 'the phrase ttfor 
there ism power butcf Godtt can refer solely to the fact that magistrates 
.are "constituted by God's ordination.n4 st. Paul, as Calvin sees it, 
'contlnues to describe these as higher .po~er~.5 By so .doing, Calvin de-
1. This term is used for convenience and is to be thought of as repre-
senting all those who hold any office as a law maker, and an executor 
<?~.P~~~nt, or a~ ~-~~eq~tqr of protection as.a_judge, etc. 
12. Deuteronomy 1:17, II Chronicles. 19 :6,, ~E?. quoted ~., p. 774. 
i3· Prvverbs 8:15-:-(>,. <!-5. q~ot~d .l?Y .Gal$., .Idem~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
:4 • .Jo4n Galvin, Commentaries ~the ~istle ~Paul. the Apos.tle to ~ 
Romans, tr. Jehn. Owen (Gi-and Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdm.a.ns Pl:lb. Co., 
1948), P• 478. 
5. Italics are not the authors. 
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clares, Paul showed that they are not to be considered as supreme, for 
· only God can hold that position, but such as excel other men.1 This 
then is the point which makes them different from other men. They are 
"called with regard to their subjects; 11 and as such, therefore, they 
could not have "ascended by their own power into this high station, but 
; have been placed there by the Lordfs hand. 112 If' it is that one is called 
and ordained of God to hold office, then the concluding thought is an 
; encouragement. Calvin states that, since we have the witness of so many 
men who have been His true servants, there is trno doubt ••• that civil 
: magistracy is a calling not only holy and legitimate, but far the most 
. sacred and honorable in human life. u3 .Another encouraging factor to the 
one who undertakes to hold any office is that, if that individual will 
commit his office to the instru.:e:tion in the will of God, he will receive 
in return some form of assistance for the arduous tasks that are his 
• f~om that Div:ine power which instituted him in the office.4 This is 
· true of one who holds office in any of the three major forms of govern-
ment. Calvin divides them :into 11monarchy, which is the dominion of one 
person, whether as a king, or a duke, or any other title; aristocracy, 
or the dominion of the principal persons of a nation; and democracy, or 
popular government, in which the power resides in the people at large.u5 
It is very easy for all of these forms of government to become corruptedQ 
t L Ibid., p. 478. 
1 2. Nelii. 
3. Op. cit., p. 775. 
4. Ibid., p. 776. 
5. Ibid., p. 778. 
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Calvin points out that from a simple monarchy one can descend into a 
despotism, from aristocracy one descends into an oligarchy, or from 
.democracy one can descend into sedition.1 Calvin states his pre.fer-
ence for democr~cy as it is safer for the government to reside in the 
hands of the .many since man is stibject to vice and imperfection as a 
result of his nature since the fall cf Adam. In this form of govern-
ment, men can get mutual assistance, admonition, and the necessary 
censorship on one's tendency to ambition.2 
b. Extent of power. To open this discussion it would be wise to get 
a general statement out in the open. Calvin says that 
this civil government is designed, as long as we live in 
this world, to cherish and support the external worship 
of God., to preserve the pure doctrine of religion, to 
defend the constitution of the Church, to regulate our 
lives in a manner requisite for the security of men, to 
.form our manners to civil justice, to promote our concord 
with each other, and to establish general peace and 
tranquillity.3 
Calvin makes it clear from the start that magistrates who woidd 
rule with preeminence over all ought to submit to ttCbrist the power 
with which they are invested.tt4 By this Calvin me~ that, as the 
individual has received his duty to rule from God it is his duty to 
so use it in the execution of his o.f:tice as to c001ply with the will 
of God as seen in God's Revelation • 
.. 
Several efthe specific duties which magistrates are supposed to 
2S 
~dminis tra te are:: 
l) "They are constituted the protectors and vindicators of the public 
age, defense, vindication and liberation of the innocent;tt and the 
judgment, which imports lithe repression of the audacity, the coercion of 
the violence, and the punishment of the crimes, of the impious. n2 In 
the first place, that is concerning the working of good, the magistrate's 
not endbif~ with unbridled power, but is to be restrictea to the 
well being of his subjects. In light of this, therefore, it is 
1 
ecessary for them to exact tributes for' the protection of their subjects.3 
~lso, in this matter of tribute they ilaave the power to exact enough to 
rupport their off'ioe in a dignif'ied manner.4 ~ only caution which should 
ibe brought to bear on this phase of the magistrate •s power is that the 
se of these funds is to be cared for cautiously.· These funds are not 
he magistrate's, nor are they a personal income except that which 
so designated. They are the funds of his subjects~5 The second side 
f this power, that of judgment is to be handled with care. They, the 
budgments, are not to follow in any respect the impulse of the passions • 6 
kt the ttk:i.ng tr.at sitteth on the tbrorie of judgment, scattereth away 
I 
I 
~: 8. 
Ibid., P• 781 .. 
Ibid., P• 782. 
commentaries ~Romans, p. 483. 
4. QE• ~., P• 786. 
5. Ibid., P• 787. 
6• Ibid., P• 786. 
.all evil. ~mth his eyes.n1 Calvin elaborates up0n this speci.:fically in 
dealing with the thirteenth chapter o:f Romans. ttHe beareth not the sword 
!in vaintt re:fers speci.:fically to the :forcible repression o:f those who 
will not su:f:fer themselves to be governed by laws. This sword o:f the 
magistrate is not to be an empty sho;1, but an actual power tc smite evil 
doers.2 One o:f the roost bi~ter duties that a migistrate has to do is te 
fbe the executioner o:f God t s wrath in that he is ~ avenger and the one 
to execute wrath.3 This carries itsel:f over into the matter o:f war and 
its validity as an avenging or protecting use o:f power valid in the hands 
o:f the magistrate. 
3) In the third place they are to stand as judges between their breth-
ren and they are to 
judge righteously between every man and his brother, and the 
stranger-that is with him::: ye shall not respect persons in 
judgment; but ye shall hear the small as well as the great; 
~e shall ~ot be a:fraid o:f the :face of man; :f9r the judgment 
l.S &od•s.4 
Such is the extent c:f their power except :for that in regard to the church 
which is to be considered below. 
c. The magistrate's responsibility ~ God. It is only a little ~top 
:for one to take :from the ordination o:f the magistrate to the fact o:f their 
responsibility to God. Calvin says that as they are ttdeputed by God to 
do His business, they must give an account to Him.u:S' Any use or abuse 
1. Ibid., P• 783. 4. Op. cit., P• 781. 
2. Op. cit., P• 481. 5. Op. cit., P• 481. 
3. Idem.-
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'o.f the discretion of' a ruler will be brought into account by him as that 
' 
1 iruler is ultimately responsible to God alone. The section which speala! 
! 
most definitively of' such a responsibility is to be found in the Dedi-
cation to Francis, the King of' Franc:.~. 
But it shall be YOlmi Sire, not to turn away your ears of' 
thoughts from so just a defence, especially in a cause o.f such 
importance as the maintenance of God's glory unimpared in the 
world, the preservation of' the honor o.f :Clivine truth, and tbe 
continuance of' the kingdom of' Christ uninjured among us. This 
is a cause worthy of' your attention, worthy of' your cogni-
zance, worthy of' your throne. This consideration constitutes 
true royalty, to acknowledge yourself in the government o.f 
your kingdom to be the minister o.f Ood. For where the glory 
of' God is not made the end.of government, it is not a legiti-
mate sovereignty, but a usurpation. And he is deceived who 
expects lasting prosperity in that kingdom which is not 
ruled by the sceptre of God, that is, lii~ holy word; for that 
heavenly oracle cannot fail, which declabes that :nwhere there 
is no vision, the people perishQfl2 
In a later portion of the Institutes, Calv:in declares that if the 
rulers execute their of.fices with justice they shall receive the praise 
o.f God. 3 One of the acts :for which they will be connnended is that o:f 
restoring the worship o:f God and seeing that religion might flourish in 
'purity and safety under their reign.4 · However, he that opposes Goa 
'opposes God's very authority and will be. judged accordingly.5 Tw<:> of' 
;these abuses of' the magistrat~~office are a lack of' diligence in their 
!constituted right to be the guardians of the peace and that of' taking it 
6 
upon themselves to change the £orm o:f the government by revolution., 
i 
:2. 
i 
3. 
4. 
Douglas Nobbs, Theocracy and Toleration 
University Press, 19jE), p:-a. (Cambridge: The Cambridge 
Calvin, Op. cit., I, 22. 
Calvin, Op. cit., II, 774. 
~., p-;-7so;-
Ibid., P• 770. 
Ibid., p .. 779· 
. . 
p.. The magistrate's respom!ibili ty to ~* .Actually, as has been men-
~ioned, government is ordained by God tt.for the well being of mankind. ul 
,~n light of this Calvin draws the surmise, attached to the fact that . 
'kwers are ordain6d of God, that the tt~stration which God has com-
~tted to them has a regard to the suojects, they are therefore debtors 
l~o to them. •2 We have seen already in the section ori the extent of 
lfthe power of the nagistrate the development of this responsibility. One 
phase of the matter of tribute, however, comes up again in that whatever 
the magistrate receives ttfrom the people, is as it were public property, 
and not to be spent on the gratification of private indulgence.u3 
. . . . . . . . . ' ~ . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . ' . . . . . ~ 
e. The magistrate's responsibility to the church. John Calvin shows 
by a quotation from Isaiah that one of the chief titles of the magistrate 
~epicts him as the patron and protector of the pious worshipper of God. 4 As 
this is a duty of the magistrate it has specifical.ly to do with the fact 
of establishing and ordering o.f the rights of all that "there may be a 
public form. of religion among Christians:, and that humaiiity maybe main-
tained among men.n5 'lhe only power that the magistrate has over a church 
:is that in which he maintains himself as a member of a specific church 
and then only as it is in accordance to the Word of God. 6 This position 
of the magistrate in respect to the churcl1 could be summed· up by saying 
that in Calvints position the ttChurch and the state were institutional 
i. 
l. Calvin, Commentaries £!!Romans, p. 479. 
'2. Ibid., P• 2fS1.. 
J,. Ibid~, P• 483. 
4. QE_. eit., p. 775. 
5. Ibid., P• 773. 
'6. Nobbs, 2£.• cit., p. 23. 
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forms of this social unity in the relation of the body and soul to each 
I 
I 
other. The state alone was sovereign, but that sovereignty served the 
of the church as· well as political union .. n1 I . urpose 
'•' I 
3. The Utw 
The foundation of the magistrate t s office is that which finds its 
ground in the fact of law. As it is delegated by God it necessarily 
I' 
rests upon the laws of God as specifically illustrated in the tttwo tables 
I 
of the law" or the Decalogue. Not only does it rest thereon, but it also 
I 
ust execute these laws.2 Calvin makes the picture very clear by saying 
I 
that Uthe law is a silent magistrate, and a magistrate a speaking law.n3 
~bove, it was declared that the magistrate is the executor of the Deca-
logue. One wonders what is the actual constitution of the law. Speci-
ically the Decalegue was only the concise summary of the whole aav which 
as given to Moses. Within the Decalogue one must realize that there are 
very particular types of codes. The one is the moral, and within the 
oral lies the ceremonial; and the other is the judicial. Calvin sees that 
rhe 'l!Dral code concerns itself specifically with the matter of worshipping 
(Ucdlfith pure faith and piety" and the embracing of men "with sincere love.n4 
The problem of the ceremonial law arises only in that it was the pupilage 
the Jews until the "fulness of timett should come.5 
Ibid., P• 1. 
car-vin, op. cit., P• 779• 
Ibid., p-;-78'77' 
• Ibid., P• 788. "For this is His eternal and immutable will, that He 
ru::iiiSelf be worshipped by us all, and tba t we mutually love one another. tt 
• ~., P• 788 • 
In regard to the matter of the judicial, er political law, the 
Lord gave the Jews a specific constitution and rules of equity and 
justice.1 It was also related to the ceremonial in that it was for 
the purpose of implementing those ceremonies. The one consideration 
that is perplexing is that concerning the problem of the laws of vari-
lous peoples who had not the laws of God. Calvin thinks that wherever 
there is to be a writing of any law there has been, is and will be a 
matter of expediency in regard to the specific problem of any given 
nation. But judgment must be pervaded by the perpetual rule of love 
which remains the constant obligation.2 
The law has l:een e:xa.mi.ned as .far as the specific centent is conce:mad., 
but what is that to which law is to be guided? Equity is the answer 
• given by Calvin. He says that equity, being natural, is the same to all 
mankind; and consequently all laws, on every subject ought to have the 
. same equity fer their end.3 This equity is considered to be that final I . 
! 
position of all.men before God as they receive either His condemnation 
for disobeying the law, or His commendation for having fulfilled the law 
by having faith in Christ the Redeemer. The particular case .may be en-
'
' acted, but it must be in conformity and equally directed to the same 
object of equality. 4 Not one other concept of law is necessary to the 
• picture, for Calvin concludes that neq.;.~~t,ty must be the scope, and 
. rule, and end, of all laws.n5 
i 1. Idem.. 
i 2. Ibid., p. 789. 
3. Idem. 
4 .. Idem. 
5. Idem. 
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4. The Individual 
As far as the individual is concernea, there are two attitudes 
'which can be taken. These are either a negative or a positive attitude 
1toward both the state and Ged. _ 
. - . . . 
a. The negative attitude. 
1_) M&inst the state. one attitude, that is strictly an offence to 
_God is the open misinterpretation of ohe's liberty. one of the gravest 
ierrors that ever arose in the world was the An.tirwmian heresy. The sup-
_porters of this point-:_~ of view 1tliftedtt the text which speaks of the 
! 
!act that •twen are no longer und~r law but Ullder grace.l What they 
failed to see was that in the context there was the specific reference 
to the accomplishment of the ceremonial law in the sacrifice of Christ • 
.Another negative form of thought is that of the extreme separa.ti.onists. 
These individuals, proceeding in a similar manner as do the Antinomians, 
w.ou;ld have all .men under~tand that they are no .longer under the stat-
utes of men, but are solely in subjection to God. 2 Calvin surmises 
_
1
that, on the basis of Romans 13 :3, such d.evi.ation is :implied proof of 
1
an evil conscience, and of one that is devising some mischier.u3 In 
'light of the foregoing it is natural enough to see that there could be 
only one result and that would be anarchy.. "lie who introduced anarchy, 
,1. Romans 6:14, King James Version of the Bible (New Yorkt The Uni-
. varsity ~ess,_n.d.). 
i2. Calvin, ~'-~~,-~l,.$9.&.77Q. 
iJ • Cal. vin., Commentaries 2!!. Romans, p. 400. 
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/violates love, for what immediately follows anarchy, is the confusion 
I rf all thinga • .,l '!Ilia is the actual situation which reslll.t.ed llhen the 
people of Israel forsook the leadership of Goa and His judges.2 
2) AgainSt GOd. .As God bas established the government by His 
'ordination it is a foredrawn conclusion that "he who attempts to invert 
the order of God, and thus resist God Himself, despises His pewer: 
since to despise the providence of Him who is the founder of civil 
power is to carry on war with Him. 113 What then becomes of the problem. 
,of tyra.IlDY? Calvin emphasizes the fact that it is not the specific 
duty of the «individual to take away authority from him whom. the Lord 
! 
'has in power. set over us. n4 This could be seen in the matter of ~ssas-
sination, as one approaches it from. the principle that nvengeance is 
mine saith the Lord.u5 It was David th~ King of Israel.who ran from 
' 
King Saul as he knew that Saul was still the anointed of the Lord, 
I. . • 
untll the advent of Saul•s death. One who rebels against the state 
when the state has not abrogated God 1 s laws, then rebels against God. 
. . '.' ...... . 
b. !£!positive attitude. 
. 1) Toward the state. Calvin sets about in his discussion of this 
I • 
II . 
·present life and the proper usage of its supports by describing this 
11. Ibid'!, p .. 484. 
2. Jlidies 21:25, ttin those days there was no ld.rig in Israel: every man 
~d thc;l.t which~was right in his own. eyes.t1 
3. Qp_'! .cit9, pp. 478-9. 
4. Ibid'!_,p. 482. 
'5. ROmans 12:19. 
' 
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present life of Christ • s servants as a pilgrimage. "To His servants 
'the present life is like apilgrimage, in which theyare traveling towards 
the celestial kingdomff ani that as they pass through they are to make use 
of its ttblessings as -vdn rather assist than retard us in our journey. nl 
1 Such a journey does have some guide posts far the pilgrim and these are 
actually£~ rules which the Lord has given in His word. They are:-
a) ttMeditation on a heavenly immortalityn and a bringing in of all 
earthlY relations into its light.2 
b) The pilgrim should learn nto bear penury with tranquillity and 
patience~ as well as to enjoy abundance with moderation.u3 
i c) The pilgrim should always regulate his life and the treatment of 
1 othe~s on the basis of the precepts of charity.4 
d) Lastly, the pilgrim is to be loyal to GGd • s collll'.llallda and regard 
his life as his vocation..5 On the basis of such a rule, therefore, 
ione who lays hold upon the tyrant is not observant of the fact that he has 
I 
:his office as a vocation from the Lord no matter how he abuses it. 6 
In actuality, even though one is to make a distinction between 
;the spiritual and the civil government, <ne is not tG permit the ci.vil. gov-
[ernment tore so polluted that Christians ought to have no~ in it. 7 
i 
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True, the civil government may be definitely pervaded by evil; but this 
~be tempered by the influence of the Christian who assists, admonishes, and 
lets as ~.censor with others under 1he same lead.;..,,... of the Lord.~ On this 
:1 .· .A.U& . 
basis that government will become mare happy where liberty is so regulated 
I 
With moderation, and properly established on a durable basis. 2 
! 
In bis Commentary on Romans, Calvin shows that when st. Paul. made 
rtlw statement in the first verse of chapter thirteen, nlet every sail be sub-
ject unto the higher powers, n he removed eve1.y exception, tt].est ai\V should 
claim an immunity :fhm the co~on du.ty of obedience. u3 ~e this re true, 
.then the individual ought to consider the state • s uti.U.ty for the pilgrim. as 
:a. great value inthis life. Itissetq>,as has been said, to ttprovide 
-for the tranquillity of the good, and to restrain the waywardness of the 
wicked.u4 In m.ak1ng this explicit, Calvin shows that the Apostle, in the 
s;:evtenth verse c£ this same thirteenth cha.pter, declares that the duties 
[Gfthe subjects t.othemagistra.tes can be summed up in the word obedience. 
They are to hold the magistrates in esteem and honor, nthey are to obey 
the1r edicts, laws, a judgments, they a:re 1:oP8l'tribute~ and customs.n5 
.Calvin declares that Paul used the word fear as a synonym of obedi~nce. 6 
;The actual basis, a.s'WaSthe case in the resp<)nsibility of the magistrate, 
Gf the respe:>nsibility of the subject i.s that of the Lordts command. of 
iloveasfeundinihelaw.7 Calvin points, out, narxiitisdo~tless true, 
that the whole law is fulfilled when 1e love our neighbors; for true love 
1. Ibid., P• 778. 
2. Ibid., P!.779! 
; 3. GaJ,.~., Romans., P• 478. 
! 4. ~., P• 480. 
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I 
! towards man dc2s net flow -except from the love fi1f. God. n1 Obedience to the 
!magistrate is a sign in the individual that this prlnciple of life, that 
of brotherly love, is his as it nourishes. peace .. 2 The net result is that 
mt ~willJ:ea,ce 1:e secured in that land that observes sueh prineiples3 
. but also the rights of the individual would thereby be secured. 3 
2) Toward God. If cne does all that is required of him in tlds pil-
l grimage, then it will be his reward to hear the words of the Father, 
. ttwell done, 1:hcn gad and faithful servant.•.4 Actually Calvin ~s that 
I ttwe ought to obey kings and governors, whoever they may be, not because 
;we are constrained, bit because it is a service acceptable to e:xi, for 
:He w:Ul have them not onq to be feared, but also honored by a voluntary 
. . 
, respect. u5 He makes this stand out very clearly by saying that charity 
•states 
that while all these things are given to us by the Divine 
goodness, and appointed for oilr benefit, they are, as it 
were, deposits, intrusted to Gur care, of which we must 
one day give an account. We ought, therefore, to manage 
them in such a manner that this alar.m may be incessantly 
sounding in our ears, uGive an account of tey stewardShip.u 
Let it be remembered by whom this account is demanded; ~ 
that it is by him who has so higbly recommended abstinence, 
sobriety; frugality, and modesty; who abhors profusion, 
pride, ostentation, and vanity; wbo approves of no other 
management of His blessings, than such as is connected. 
with charity; who has With his own mouth already condemned 
all those pleasures which seduce the heart from ghastity 
and purity, or tend to impair the understanding. 
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D. CONTB!ST WITH THE OLD TESTAMENT THEOCRACY 
1. Old Testament Theocracy Described 
John Calvin's position has been careful.ly ou.tlined in the fore-
i 
_going sections of this chapter. The following section will contain a 
consideration of the differences that are to be fou.nd between the 
;example of the Old Testament theocracy of the times of Moses through 
: Samu.el and John Calvin's position. 
. . . ' . . . ~ . 
. a. The framework £f. ~ theocracy. The first thing that is in order 
is to set before the reader the description of the Old Testament theoc-
racy that is to be considered. The general. concept of the commonwealth 
t as seen by Behrends liaS that it ttwas based upon religion.. The state was a 
~ . . 
:church, and theocracy whose palace was the Tabernacle, whose basic law 
:was the Decalogue, and whose princes were prophets.u1 This view of 
! ~ 
i the nature of the theocracy is, therefore, basically one that is relig-
: io11s. ttThe basis of both the religion and awards in Israel found ex-
f pressio~ in the idea of the Covenant. u2 The content ~f the covenant 
j is that it was between Yahveh and His~ eho~en nation, Israel • .3 Tsanoff 
• con-t:.inues to describe the covenant by showing the particular demands 
and blessings which were imposed upon the people. 
'1. Adolphus J. F .. Behrends, SoeiaiiSID. and Christiani.t;r (New York: 
Baker and Taylor, 1886), p •. 21. ~ . . . . . . . ..... . 
: 2. Ra4Slslav A. Tsanoff, Moral. Ideals ~--QE£. Civilization (New York: 
· · ~. :P.· Dutton and Co., Inc., 1942), p • .37. 
,3. ~· 
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The demands which it imposed on the people emphasized ritual, 
external observance. The blessings. which Israel could expect 
from its fidelity to God were· ~lessings of. visible prosperity: 
political, economic, domestic$ 
In its more explicit fruework one finds that the 11or:igina.l 
tenure of property was tribal, incapable of permanent alienation. The 
state was designed to be agricult-ural and pastoral; every fam.ily was 
to have its plot of land~tt2 As far as the political and economic 
' ' 
'framework of the nation of Israel was concerned it was to be a 
democratic theocracy, a fraternal community under God•s 
paternal guard and care. Its citi~ens were not to re-. 
gard themselves as competitors in an open market, but as 
members of a great and loving household, and their jus-
tice w~ to be tempered with a rational and habitual 
mercy. 
·b,. The magistrate. Within the scene, as portrayed above, the magis-
: trate was instituted by God as an aid 'to M<>ses. The actual instance 
i occurs in the Book of Exodus in the eighteenth ch~pter. The Israelit-
ish people had just succeeded in fleeing the land of sorrow and bondage. 
<As the people were passing southward int0 the wilderness of Sinai 
; through the land of the ).{idianites, Moses• father-in-law, Jethro, came 
eut to meet him and bring his wife and two sons back to him. There was 
a .happy reliilion and on the following dq as Moses sat in the seat of 
l 
i 1. Ibid., p .. ?$. . .. 
; 2. J?~~ends, ~· cit., 
: 3. IbJ.d., P• 28. 
! -
p. 27. 
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' 
,\ 
il' I. 
'· 
I 
judgment1 as the people came to him to inquire o:f God, Jethro observed 
that Moses was ttchained to his post" :from morning to night. That 
even±ng __ Jfithro asked, 1'What is this thing that thou doest to the people? 
why sittest thou by thyself al.one, and all the people stand by.thee 
:from morning until even?1t Moses answered that he did so as they came 
to him seeking G<i>d and asking :for his judgment and :for his teaching of 
the La:~1 o:f the Lord. Jethro cautioned Moses that he wouldn't last 
long at that pace., He counselle<i Moses, 
Be thou :for the people to God-ward, that thou mayest bring the 
causes linto God:- and tP-ou shalt teach them the ordinances and 
laws, and shalt show them the way wherein they must walk, and 
the work that they must do. Moreover thou shall provide out of 
all the people able men, such as fear God, men of truth, hating 
covetousness; and place such over them, to be rulers of thousands, 
and rulers of hundreds, rulers of :fifties, and rulers of tehs: 
and let them judge the people at all seasons:: and it shall be, 
that every great matter they shall bring unto thee, but every 
small matter they shall judge: so sha~l it be easier for theyself, 
and they· shall bear the burden with thee.2 
iMoses accepted the suggestion and at the direction of the Lord so insti-
tuted judges, all able men, and "made then:~ers oflundreds, rulers 
of thousands, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens.n3 The actual 
, 1. It was with Moses' appointment that day at Mount Horeb when the Lord 
commanded him to bring His people up out o:f the land o:f Egypt that 
he was endowed with the duty to rule. (Exodus 3rl0) 
2. Exodus 18:19-23. 
3. These were judges throughout the nation and tribes, even down to the 
level of the family. 
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:Jcharge which was given them by God as to the method of judging is to 
ibe found in Leviticus and Del!tter.onow. The essence of the charge is 
that they were to hear cases between the brethren and the strangers 
with them; they were not to be respecters of persons and that they 
'should hear every case of the ttsmall as well as the great. u; If there 
-r1as a hard case they were to take it :first to Moses; and then, secondly, 
to God through the priests, the Levites.1 '.!hey were to judge their 
neighbors in rig~teousness, they were not to be tale bearers, nor were 
they to make secret judgment in their hearts in hatred of their neighbor, 
nor were they to use their power of judgment for revenge. The actual 
laws of the L.ord which they were to enact can be fonnd in the books 
of Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy. The scope of the ·law 
:covered all phases of life and were to be taught to people by the judges. 
IAll of this was, as has been mentioned, from the hand of God. The or-
dination, the charge, and the law all came from God, through Moses, to 
the people and their judges. Moses was the highest judge of the land, 
!but the Supreme Judge was the "God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacoba" It 
.was to Him that Moses often turned when the people would forget the 
law and turn to their own ways. On one occasion the Lord showed 
that He was still using Moses as the leader of His people by re-
• turning Moses to them, after the giving of the Law the second time, so 
' 2 
i brilliantly agloil that they were not able to look upon him. In this 
relationship there was, therefore, a direct leading on the part of God. 
I 
! 1. 
2. 
Deuteronomy 17t8 & 9· 
Exodus 34 ::· 29= 35. 
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c. The Individual.... The people had only wo tasks to do, to keep the 
ilaw and command of the Lord, in the first place; and, in the second 
I 
. place, they were to inhabit the Promised Land. Neither of these should 
have served as stumbling bl0cks to this people for they had God on 
their side. It is quickly ascertained, however, that this was not the 
case. In the first taSk they failed miserably. Even though Moses 
brought to them the Word o:f God and acted as their intercessor on many 
occasions, they insisted on rebelling against the delegated authority 
given to Moses. ,As one reads the record one finds that Moses only once 
considered that the people were rebelling against him. He was con-
'tinually turning to the Lord, beseeching Him to :forgive the iniquities 
and rebellion o:f these His chosen people. Moses realized that in the 
isight o:f God this reaction of the people was a direct attack upon the 
I 
·authority o:f God to rule. The greatest instance of this comes at the 
close of this particular era when Samuel was the leader of the people • 
. The Israelites were not satisfied with the leadership o:f Samuel, and he 
. was growing old, so they came to him and demanded him to make them a 
king like the other nations had.1 Samuel took the matter directly to 
the Lord. However, he did not have the insight of Moses in this matter 
• and he :felt he was being rejected by the people. But the Lord said to 
him, ttHearken unto the voice of the people in all that they say unto 
thee:: :for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that 
. I should not reign over them. u1 In all the record e! their history, 
·they are seen to be constantly turning their backs on the law of the 
! Lord and going off into the adulteries of the people of the land of 
i 
: Canaan. Each time the Lord brought them back from their sorrow by 
I 
:raising up a new leader, they would only turn and sink back into their 
:sins. This was the nature of the history of these people even down to. 
' . . . 
, the time of Christ, up to the great diaspez:~· 
They fared not one whit better in their second task. This was 
'that the,y were to go into the land of C~ and possess it for their 
seed. The Lord promised them His aid in this enterprise. He had prom-
ised them the land, flowing with milk and honey, a prosperous peace, 
and rich blessing. They could not even .take the responsibility of going 
. into a land swarming with giants and walled cities. They trusted too 
much in the might of the ttarm of flesl1 .. " The Lord had said that a 
~ ~ ,. 
swarm of hornets would proceed them ani erive these people out or the land 
as they went in and took the land. Their obvious reaction:was that this 
was too fantastic for them to believe. The net result was that thatgen-
eration was doomed t0 fQrty years of wilderness travel.. Even when they 
did go into the lan:i to possess it they never completely carried out the 
: co.!IBiland of the I.prd to smite all. In light of this, the people never 
possessed the land. .Allofthe above pr0mises were to a nation of people 
in which the individual was a person in that he was related to the law, 
'1. I Samuel S:7. 
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; 
to fulfill it, and to the ceremonies of worship, to commemorate them 
with a broken and contrite heart in or<iler to secure to himself the 
promise of the Lord to the individual to be freed from the burden of 
·sin. In all the history of the nation of Israel, there was only a 
predominant minority which ever res111 understood the law of God and 
served it to the best of their ability. As a nation, they never ful-
filled their part of the covenant and all they could do was to complain 
:that the Lord was continually getting them into impossible situations 
·and :forsaking them. This then is the pieture presented by the Old 
Testament theocracy. It is now the ti~k of this paper to bring out 
the points of contrast betl'Teen the Old Testament theocracy and Calvin's 
position. 
2. The Bontrast 
a. The sovereignty 2! God. There are two points of view which can be 
taken regarding this phase of the philosQpby of theQeracy. One can 
view the state and its position in connection with its relationship to 
· Ged from God's point of view. Or one can view the relationship from 
:the earthly side. In the first view, one finds that there are nG dif-
r ferenees, but only a similarity which, as has been seen in the second 
i i section which dealt specifically with this problem., is also true for 
' ' 
any point _of view as to the form of government. God as the ontological 
i trinity /jy this, ''when God is contemplated as active within himself, 
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we speak of the ontological trinitJr."~ is sovereign over all for.ms of 
government as He has established them all in His grace to impart His 
1 mercy upon men·. 2 This sovereignty not enly is that pewer exerted by 
i 
! God over all of nature, but also is the governing power over men as 
both of these positions ~ould declare. It is from the relationship of 
the economical trinity ~ this «is meant the distinction of persons 
Within the Godhead in so far as this distinction has . bearing on the 
·works of God with respect to the created universe.u~ that the dif-
ferences are to be seen* As one examines these difter~nces, it is 
necessary to remember that because of a change in the :modes of govern-
ment, eeonemieally speaking, that this does not necessitate a change 
in the relationship which God bears to the world ontologicall.y speak-
ing. Therefere, it is not to be conc+uded that God in His persen 
changes as man changes his outward relationship. 
The first explicit difference that can be seen is that in the 
time of the Old Testament theocracy, God had a more direct relation-
. ship with His people. He revealed Himself, according to the reeord,4 
directly to Moses in the spoken word. In Biblical theology, this age 
• 1. Cornelius van Til, Apologetics (Chestnut Hill, Pa.t westminster 
Theo1ogical.Seminary, 1951), p •. Se 
I . -- . • . -
i 2. Romans 13:1, ttThere is no power but ef .Gc?4J .t~e powers that be are 
! ordained ef God. 11 Quoted by Calvin, Institutes, II, 774. 
; 3. Van Til, 5?£.• cit., p .. 8. 
4. Hebrews 1:1-2. This specifically states the fact of Divine reve-
lation by showing. that uaod, wno at sundry times and in divers manners 
spake in time past unt0 the fathers by the prophets, etc.n In the 
Mosaic period :Moses says .>:;:-.; that the Lord »spake these words te 
me't or some other such formula. 
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is generally termed the time of ldesaic Reve~a.tion. Yihat this means is 
. that as man's history grew more complex, · GGd revea.le<l in a growing process 
i a more complete set of written records. As .man•s history grew is re-
i spect to time God continued to give man more of His .Revelation. This 
Revelation that MOses received was the earliest written record that the 
Lerd gave. However, there always was the record written on the lleart. 
It was, according to lloses• writings, .within the power of Moses to have 
'direct fellolTship with God, in or<ler to learn what His will was within 
the context of a certain situation. This however, was recognized by 
. Calvin not to be within his realm. It was his opinion that if the 
~ . ' . . . . . - . 
Epistle to the Hebrews was considered careful.ly, it shewed that all 
. speei.ai revelation has c~a.sed. ~ Now this in no wise slackens the re-
• sponsibility of the individual and the magistrate to find the will of 
. . . . - . . . . 
God. In this era, since the close of special reve~ation, being Cop1plete 
in that one has all that is necessary for him to govern ~ife, there 
have been other provisions made for the finding of the will of God. 
Man is under the responsibility, now, to seek the will of God in the 
·pages of His Word. Then the next thing that one does is to seek the 
guidance of the Comforter, the Holy Spirit and the third person in the 
1 
Trinity, who has been sent to man by the Father and the Son. The .ma.in 
i difference that appears, therefore, is strictly that of the economical 
I 
' 
' expression of Godts sovereignty. The sovereignty of God stm remains 
. the s~e as far as the content of instruction as to what is His will, 
since the special revelation is ccnsidered by Calvin to be one canplete wllale. 
l. Hebrews 1:2, "Hath in these ~ast days spoken unto us by His Son.n 
b. The covenantal. relationship. The dif:terence that lies in this re-
• lationship is both a theological and economic differen~e.l 
1) The theological difference. In the first case, theologians 
speak of the Old Testament theocracy as being under the covenant of 
. . . . . 
works, of ceremony. This is true as the Lord wrote an agreement with 
the people of Israel that if they would choose Him as their God, He 
would be their God and promised He would protect them; that if they 
:would keep His commarWm.ents they would be rewarded with not only 
earthly prosperity, but also heavenly tranquillity;2 and that if 
they observed the sacrifices to do them with a "broken and contrite 
-
hearttt they would be forgiven their sins. On Calvin's side, the 
covenant is referred to as the new eovenant,3 or the .. covenant o:f 
..... 4 
grace. When one understands this in all its ramifications 
one realizes, as Calvin did, that the political scene 
would be different. No longer was God dealing specifical.ly~~ 
1. In this reference this latter ter.m is reduced to the strictest 
~ of the specific era and its manifestation of temporal 
powei<_~s embodied in the magistrate, the law and the individual. 
. . ..... 
2.. Exodus 2.0:3-17. .Also Deuteronomy 5:7-21, 30-33. 
l3. New covenant is here adopted by Calvin in light of Christ's state-
ment at the last supper, "This cup is the new testament in my 
blood; which is shed for y:ou.u (Luke 2.2:20). 
4. Under no circumstance is the reader tQ _nU,.~~g.~rstand that there was 
no grace under the old covenant, aJXl vice-versa, works under the 
new covenant. It is only that works portrayed the grace o:f the OO.d 
Testament covenant; while because o:f grace the New Testament 
believer does the works required by Christ. 
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the ttchosen people of Israel, tt He was now dealing with the true Jt>eed of 
Abraham•"' In the covenant of grace, it was no longer by faith in a sign 
!that one would be forgiven his sins, but by faith in Christ was one to 
lbe saved. As was mentioned, this was no longer restricted to a national-
listie concept. Calvin restressed Paul's emphasis that it was now a uni-
versal covenant, 1 a covenant to all peoples in that it is open to all 
who will believe by faith in the death and resunrection of Christ.2 This 
• then is the theological difference within the covenant. But there also 
exist other differences within the economic realm. 
2) The economic dif.ference. There are several ways in which these 
two delegated theocracies differed. In order -to. get a clear picture, 
several of the principles of the theocracy -will be examined. 
a) The Law. This is the first of the matters to be considered. 
In the Old Testament theocracy the law consisted of two parts, as was 
pointed out above, the moral and the judicial. Within the moral law 
was the ceremonial la~ which concerned itself specifically with the 
!problem of the worshipping of God. The judicial also had a bearing 
upon the. ceremonial law in that it was that which implemented the cere-
monial law as well as the j~dicial or political constitution which God gave 
to His people. But it is this ceremonial law which is the differential 
1. Calvin, Comm. ~Romans, pp.l23-4. 
2, Ibid., p:-ob. 
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factor between the CUd Testament's and Calvin•s theocracy. In the Old 
Testament, the ceremonial law was necessary as it was the sign to the 
• people of God's forgiveness and mercy. Also, but usually forgottell, 
this form of the law was the representation of the promised Savior or 
Lamb. It is then this that was abrogated by Christ, as He was the ful-
fillment of that law. One~ then wonders what becan.es of the other phases 
of the law; as Paul reaffirmed them, so does Calvin. The lilOral code 
and the judicial code are still to be applied to the present life. 
As the magistrate is the implementer of the law, it would be wise 
to consider this matter under the heading of the law. Ia the Old Testa-
ment, the magistrate was ordained of God; he was responsible to God to 
teach and administer His law: again, he had the job of carrying out the 
law in the spirit of loving ttthy neighbor as Thyself.n1 There were 
cautions against the abuse of the office and there were rewards promised 
for fulfilling the job to the letter nof the law.n Of all the features 
! 
·of the political constitution of the two theocracies, this is almost 
1
the only point of agreement, besides the fact that the doctrinal foun-
.dation remains the same. As has been seen, Calvin held that all. the 
above specifications were still applicable in his day. This thea 
remains as a unifying factor between the two positions, as far as the 
political constitution is concerned. 
b) The material benefits. The first benefit that accrued to the 
nation of Israel was that of the promised land all its own. The 
1. Leviticus 19:18. 
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term nation is emphasiZed at. this point because ·it is here that the two 
I 
lheocracies differ.. The difference that arises at this pomt is that 
lin the Old Testament theocracy, the contact that God had with the people 
bould be tangibly realized in that economy. Following the advent of Christ, 
lhis principle was transferred to a spiritual concept~ The actual "land 
granttt that the .descenei?nts of Abraham were to receive was a tangible 
i 
gift from God~1 On the other hand, in the New Testwnent, as.the nature 
of the covenant changed, so also the nature of the promises • Calvin 
points up the fact that the Len~ has .admonished us to 
L~y not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, wher.e moth 
and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and 
steal:: But lay up £or yourselves treasures i..ll heaven, where 
neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do 
not break through and stea1.2 . 
On the one hand, out of the promise of the land there arises great 
riches and prosperity, but in Calvin's scene, we see only that we are 
to apply ourselves to the ministering for God and He will supply all 
!our needs~3 To be sure the Christian may possess great wealth and 
. much property, but he can do so only as he uses it according to the 
la-c-v of the Lord. There is only one more thought that arises in t~ 
context that would cause a contrast to be seen. This is the fact that, 
1.. Genesis 12::7 - ltAnd the Lord appeared unto Abram, and said, Unto 
Thee and thy seed will I give this land•" 
2., Matthew 6:19-20. . 
3.. Matthew 6~33 - ttBut seek ye first the kingdom of God, and F.ri.s right-
eousness; and all these things shall be added unto you.", 
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whereas, prosperity was promised to the people of Israel, of cours~, 
based upon thei.r obedience to His commandm~nts; tribulation is to be 
the constant part of the Christian.1 
I 
c) The relationship 0f ~ church and state. As was seen above, 
the Old ~estament theocracy was a church. The judicial laws were 
enacted :for the purpose of establishing the ceremonial law. The state 
,itself was eo constituted that its very :form was an expression of 
I 
!worship to God. The ceremonial laws were established for the sole 
i 
!purpose of teaching and guiding the people of Israel to worship God in 
inspirit and truth.» In turning to Calvin's position these two i.nsti-
'tutions have been separated. The church, representing the body of 
Christ, was established by Him as the fellowship of believers apart 
from the world. The other institution is :for the sole governance of the 
:Political and judicial phases of life. Yet, there remains to Calvin two 
' 
threads of connection. The first is that which is possible in that the 
.Christian is a member of both governmental bodies. This is true in so 
• (far as that t:erson then applies his Christian principles, learned in 
, the church, to his law making or enforcing powers. The other cord is 
that in Calvin's view the state is to maintain that peace and order anci!. 
that amount of :freedom that is conducive for all Christians to worship 
. God in peace. 'nlese differences, that are pointed out in the above 
i 
/paragraphs, are only a few o:f the more essential points of contrast. 
i :1. John 16::33 - "These things I have spoken unto you, that in me ye 
might have peace. In the world ye shall have tribulation: but be 
of good cheer; I have overcome the world.tt 
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In conclusion, one must see that the Old Testament theocracy was 
ordained by God solely for that period. In light of this, Calvin's 
position was only the development of that which God has tempor~ 
used in His overall plan of salvation. The first part having been 
accomplished, Calvin saw by the growth of God•s revelation in the New 
Testament a fuller approach to the matter of government and a social 
philosophy .. 
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CHAPTER III 
.ST. THOMAS AQUINAS t MONARCHICAL THEOORACI 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to clarify the nature of Calvin's ttdelegatedtt theocracy., 
.one must go beyond the immediate study of his position. In doing so 
I 
the best procedure is to compare his position with various other posi-
tions. Thus it is that the next two chapters will contain an analysis 
· ef two different views of the nature and source of government. In the 
·first chapter, which will deal with the argument for .monarchy, it was 
:deemed wise to view the classical argument for monarchy. As this is 
:viewed it will be analyzed and developed from the main political works 
:of .Aquinas as they appear in an anthology edited by A. P. D1Entreves. 
Following the analysis the closing section will be given to a compar-
ison of monarchy with the position of Calvin. In this manner one will 
. be able to see clearly the distinctions that are to be found between a 
.monarchical position and that developed by Cal. vin. 
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B.. DOOTRIN.AL FOUNDATIONS 
l $ Introduction 
Before an extensive survey of Aquinas' position, it is necessary to 
understand the nature of his works as sucho D'Entreves, in his intre-
duction to his anthology sets forth some precautions to the one who 
,would attempt a careful and detailed analysis of .Aquinas• political 
views. nrt has been said that there are no 'politics• of st. Thomas 
1 Aquinas. ;l He recounts this statement for tw~ very sup~rb reasons. The 
. ~ 
first is that as Aquinas was a theologian, he gave little room to the 
subject of polities, ~ ~· In all of his works there is not one complete 
treatise, even including~ :R.e&iridne Prlxicipum which is not wholly 
• attributed to his authorship, that gives an;r detailed study of the 
subject. 2 Another reason is that ia the light of the present definition 
of the subject of politics there is to be found little that parallels it in 
· Aquinas t thought. Today• s approach i~ basically empiricism. Whereas, 
Aquinas • views on nstate and government were a deduction from meta-
: physica.i premises.~3 Likewise, as his position was based en metaphysieal 
. 
: principles instead of empirical views, so was the place for the study 
of politics subsumed under another more general study. ttPolitics were 
to St ~ Thomas a branch of Ethics. tt4 This fact is demonstrated 
1. Thomas Aquinas, Selected Political Writings, ed. by D•.Entreves, tr. 
1?Y. .Pawson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948}, p. viii. . .. 
2. Ideme 
3. Idem. 
4. Idem. 
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I 
11 I: 
I( 
i 
'by an analysis of the purpose of St. Thomas' study in Poli\tics. 
It deals with the choice of means~ but the means are dependent 
on the end, and the end is a moral one. This end is the 
common good, and an end which is higher in value than that of 
the individual end and that of the f~, and which consti-
tutes the proper object of poll tics.1 
1In other words 
the art of politics is anything but a mere techniqueo It can-
not and must not. be measured solely by its achievements, by 
standards of efficiency and success. And the reason .for this 
is that politics always imply2a moral responsibility, a delib-eration, a willing, a choice. 
1 Thus it is clearly seen not to be a purely pragmatic science. Yet 
again it must be stressed that there is no system to be found in Aquinas' 
study. Rather ttJ..t looks as if, instead of' providing us with a complete 
and elaborate system, he has been concerned with setting .forth the 
principles from which such a system can be constructed. "3 
I The final reason for the lack of' a clear cut study of politics is I I . 
• that Aquinas' studies in. this .field were t•bui!u one aspect of his great 
enterprise of reconciling Aristoteli.anism and Christianity, of grafting 
; on to the teaching of the Church the old and yet new discovered wisdom 
of Greece.n4 ·Therefore; with these cautions in mind an attempt will be 
made to fabricate from the scattered references some sort of system as 
: ndght be propounded by Aquinas~ 
I 
i 
~1. Ibid., P• xii. 
'2. Idem. 
3. Ibid., P• xxxii. 
4. Ibid.J' p .. xi.. 
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2. Basic View of Cosmos and Ya.n 
, a. Cosmic nature. When one begins the study of a.ny medieval phllosophy, 
! 
:he has to change his perspective quite radically; for the medieval 
writer viewed his presuppositions first and then correlated his facts.1 
One such first principle in .Aquinas• thought is that of the Revelation 
of GGd.. tttin the beginning was the Word: • the sapreme value, the stand-
ard of go~d- and evU.n2 From this he derived the nature ef the standard 
; for truth. However, in st. Thomas• thought ttthe revealed truths of 
Christianity are not in contradiction to the testimony of reason. • 
• • 
Reason and faith, human nature and supernatural values are fundamentally 
· in harmony. n3 This goes beyond human nature to nature itself. 
st. Thomas • assertion that Grace does not abolish Nature 
but perfects it implies that human values and truths are 
not necessarily obliterated by the revelation of higher 
ones; however modest and low, they deserve to be considered 
as possible tools for the great task of building up a 
Christian civilization.4 
In the development of Aquinas • position, it is also important to 
note that Divine providence plays an important part, not only in nature 
: 1. This is equally true for Calv:i.n. However, emphasis is given here 
bece~.use of Aquinas t period of writing. · 
t 2. Ibid., p. viii. This is most evident in .Aquinas• writings in that 
~material is liberally sprinkled with Biblical quotations and 
a.J,.lusions. 
3. Ibid., P• xiii. . .. _. . ...... . 
4. Idem. Cf. Alexander P. D'Flltreves, The Medi~:val Contribution to 
Pcl'iticai _Thought. (~ord: Oxford University'"l>ress1 1939), ·P• 24. 
From Summa.. Theologica 2a 2a.e, q. x, a. 10. D•:gntreves qu9tes, UKow 
the divine law which is founded on grace, does not abolish human law, 
which derives from natural reason.n 
'I I but also in the analysis of civil government. In fact, -it is from this 
'principle that Aquinas draws the universal principle in his argument 
for the universal and particular form of government. 
The universal is that by which all things find their place 
under the direction of God, who, by His providence, governs 
the universe. .. •• Just as the divine control :is exercised 
ove~ all created eodies and over all spiritual powers, so 
does the control of reason extend over the members of the 
body and the other faculties of the soul: so, in a certain 
sense, reason is to man what God is to the universe~l 
Another principle which :is likewise to be derived from the nature 
' of di vise providence is that of order. Vlhen viewing the matter of Rev-
, elation and nature together, .Aquinas finds in nature a certain order 
, which is spoken of in Revelation. "So it is clear that providence im-
poses an order on all things and maniiests the truth of the Apostle's 
saying: tAll things that are, are set, in order by God • (Romans 13 :1) • tt2 
Along this same line of thought one is able to discern a certain lack 
, of order in the world. For .Aquinas tlsuch laclc of order is not incom-
_ patible with divine providence. It comes about by divine permission, 
and because of defects in subord~te agents. tt3 It is from this fun-
damental principle of absolute divine providence that Aquinas found 
i that government by one person to be the best. It was his point that 
it must be admitted that the universe is governed by one 
person. For the object ci the government 0f the universe 
is what is essentially good, or the best result, so that tlle 
government also .must be the best. But the best form of 
government is that which is carried out by one person.4 
1 .. Ibid .. J p .. 67. 
2. Ibid.J P• 101. 
'. 3. Idem. 
4. Ibid., P• 107. 
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The final basic principle which had influence on Aquinas t polities 
iwas that of natural law.. ttThe doctrine of natural law is the pivot of 
:st. Thomas• treatment of politics.nl However, thisis not that which 
I 
~ 
• is considered today as natural law. Aquinas did not have in mind any 
doctrine of natural rights. According to D•Entreves Uit is not frem 
• the individual that we ar~ asked to make our start, but from the Cosmos, 
from the notion of a world well ordered and graded of which law is the 
• highest expression. Natural law is like a bridge, thrown as it were 
across the gulf which divides man from his divine Creator.n2 In a 
later place the actual influence of natural law upon the nature of 
· Aquinas• political theory will be viewed. 
'' 
b. Man's nature. Net only does one find the foundation of government 
in the well-ordered universe around us, but one finds the justification 
of the state in the nature of man. In demonstration of this, Aquinas 
declares that 
man is naturally a social animal; and in consequence, men 
would have lived in .society, even in the state of inno-
cence. Now there could be no social life for many persons 
living tQgether unless one of their n~er were set in 
authority to care for the common good. 
, Aquinas continues to describe man as subject to a triplex ordo. 
:1. 
• 2. 
; 3. 
There is a threefold order to be found in man. The first is 
that which derives from the rule of reason: in so far as all 
our actions and experiences should be commensurate with the 
guidance of reason. The second arises from comparison with 
the rUL.e of divine law, which should l:e our guide in all things. 
And, if man were actually a solitaFY animal, this double order 
~., p • xiii. 
Idem. 
Ibid., P• 105. 
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would suffice: but because man is ~~W'~ .a social and 
political animal., as is proved in I Pelities, chap. 2, it 
is necessary that there should be 2: third order, regula tin~ 
the conduct of man to his .fellows with whom he has to live. 
What, in man• s nature, makes the above necessary? It is the prob-
lem of sin. In his Summa Theologica St. Thomas Aquinas treats the 
matter of sin in light of the contrast of .Aristotle's study of virtue 
• and vice. He reasons that 
-.-- .. -- . . . 
man • s good . is . to be . in . accord ~.reason, and his evil 
is E.£ ~ against reason. • • • Therefore, human virtue, 
which makes a man good, and his works good, is in accord 
with man• s nature, .for as much as it accords with his 
reason: .while vice is contrary to; man t s nature, in so 
far as it is contrary to the order of reason. 2 
In view of his relationship w.dth the church he expands this by quoting 
Augustine who 
includes two things in the definition of sin: one pertain-
ing to the substance of a human act (sin is nothing else 
than. a bad human act), and w~c~.is.t~~ matt~~, sq to 
· speak, of sin, when he says, word, deed, or desire; the 
··other pertaining to the nature of evil, ~nd .~l:l~~h. ~ . ~}?.e 
~€>I.'IIl, ~s .it were, of sin, when he says, contrary to the 
eternal law .3 , 
. . . ' . . 
As Calvin did, Aquinas also touched upon the matter of original sin. 
He says "the sin which is thus /Jy none comnwn nature, tt p. 40Y trans-
mitted by the first parent to his d~scendants is called original.n4 
This, however, is a strict explanation of sin on the level of the indi-
vidual from a theological aspect. 
l. Ibid., p. 109. . ...... . 
2. St. Thomas :Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, tr. by Fathers of the 
English Dominican Pi'ovince, 25. vols. (London: R. & T. Washbourne, 
~td~, 1915), v, 262. 
3. Ibid., P• 2?1. 
4. Ibid., P• 402. 
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When viewing this problem in the light of mants broader relation-
ship, the state, Thomas views the relationship in light of knowledge 
and/or the lack of it. He says that nthrough negligence, ignorance of 
iwhat one is bound to know, i.e a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin 
:to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know .. ttl This is con-
!ditioned in another place when Thomas says that there is a specific re-
ilation.ship between law and h'UIIIB.Il acts. 
There are three kinds of human acts: ••• some acts are 
good generically, viz., acts of virtue; and in respect_of 
t~~s~-~~e-~~t_q~ ~~~.l~W ~~-~-precept or command, for the !2: commands all~ 2f virtue (Ethic. vi). S<::lme actsare 
evil generically, viz., acts of vice, and.in respect of 
these the law forbids. Some acts are generically indif-
ferent, and in respect of these the law permits; and all 
acts that are either not distinctly good or not distinctly 
bad may be called indifferent.2 
In light of the above, one finds that as a result of man•s being 
'subject to some political authority, there is another phase of his life 
i that would be impossible without this situation, that of the collmlon 
; good or a state of perfection.3 Perfection, entailed in «the control 
I 
, of one over another who remains free, can take place when the former 
, directs the latter to his own good or to the common good. n4- ~ de-
scribing .man, D'Entreves finds that Aquinas never forgot the writings 
of the church fathers, especially st. Augustine, and remembered that 
God ttmade man, the rational man, to be master of animals, not of his 
I 1. Ibid .. , P• 347. . _. . _ ....... .. 
2. ~Thomas .Aquinas, Treatise 2!!. Law, from Summa Theologica (Ann Arbor, 
Mich.: J ... w~ -~arq.s, I?-·4·}, .P~ .25~. 
3. Aquinas, Selected Po.litical Writings, p. 105. Cf. above quotation 
marked by footnote 3, p. 60. The arranging of a variety of ends in 
qi?-e.direction being the fulfillment of life. 
, 4. Idem. 
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; fellowman, thus showing by visible signs what is the proper order of 
1 nature and what are the consequences of sin. tll Nevertheless, Aquinas 
! finds that the ~ubi.ectio ci.Vrii~ type of dominion (:man to man for the 
i . 
:good of all or a common end) would have existed for two reasons. 
ttFirst because .man is naturally a social animal; and in consequence 
;~n would have lived in society, even in the state of innocence.u2 
Nor yet does it in the state of innocence exclude a certain inequality, 
even among men. This is true for .Aquinas in the light of the matter of 
I '•' • • • • • 
the two kinds of subjection. The first of these is slavery (subieetio 
~errllls), in which man ttis ordered about solely for the benefit of the 
1 
ruler;n3.and the other i; the above mentioned subiectio civilis. 
All of the foregoing, however, is not the ultimate root of the 
nature of man. According to .Aquinas, uthe right of dominion or govern-
ment may, however, with justice be abrogated by order o£ the Church in 
virtue of her divine authority.rt4 But :Aquinas does find, when the 
rtgovernment or dominion is already established,tt that these 
depend from human law; but the distinction between the 
faithful and infidels is from d.i.vine law.. The divine law, 
however, which is the law of grace, does not abolish 
human law which is founded on natural reason.5 
1. Ibid., p. xvi. Cf .. p. 105 - nsuch dominion lifia.ster-slav~ then, 
cannot occur without the accompanying penalties of subjection; and 
for this reason could not have existed between man and mart in the 
state of innocence.n 
2. Ibid., p. 105. 4. Ib:l.d., p. 155. 
3. Ibid., p. 103. 5. Ibid., pp. 153 & 155. 
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· The reason for this according to D1Entreves, is that as ends in 
; themselves 
politics ..... are not the last word in hl:l.Dlan wisdom and 
in. h~.q. l:?t?~~q~ ~ (For) the ultimate end of man, the 
perfecta beatitude, is only to be attained in a future 
life, and will consist entirely in contemplation.. In 
this life also the practice of virtue and the enjoyment 
of human fellowship are but the handmaids to the pursuit 
of truth .. l 
To climax this analysis of the nature of .man one must find what is 
the guiding factor in this position.. .According to .Aquinas tlman • • • 
needs guidance for the attaining of his ends. Now, ever,r man is end£wed 
with reason, and it is by the light of reason that his actions are 
directed totheir end .. n2 Not only is this the guiding factor, but it is 
also the factor which provides .man with the tools for cl.efending himself, 
for securing fellowship, and for securing provisions to satisfy his wants. 
Also, it guides him into companionship with his fellows which is neces-
sary to his preservation.3 To man, unlike animals and their factor of in-
1. Ibid., p. xii.. Of .. pp. 43 & 45 - This is so stated by .Aquinas in that 
tilere 11is a firm conviction in the minds of all who think rationally 
that blessedness is the reward of virtue. • • • Blessedness may be 
defined as the final aim of all desires; for the mo:ving power of desire 
is not without limit •••• For this reason blessedness is called the 
perfect good, as though containing in itself all that is desii-able.n 
2. Ibid .. , p. 3.. The height of the importance of this is to be seen in 
Aquinas• statement that ttas the divine control is exercised over all 
created.bodies and over all spiritual powers, so does the control of 
reason extend over the members of the body and the other faculties of 
the soul: so, in a certain sense, reason is to .man what G<:>d is to the 
universe~ (p. 67). 
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stinct, there is a nnatural knowledge of his life•s necessities only 
in a general way.1J.. In light of this~ man, ttbeinS gifted with reason, 
••• must use it to pass from such universal principles to the knowl-
edge of what in particular concerns his well-being.n2 It is thus ~t 
· the htunan soul's general 11apprehension of the order of divine provi-
. dencell is given explicit knowledge. Yet, reason has its source in the 
senses. It is for this reason that the human ttsoul must rely on bod.ily 
organs to acquire knowledge from the sensible ~orld.n3 This again is 
not perfect knowledge and therefore must be "enlightened by higher 
spirits.n4 Aquinas continues to elaborate on the source of man's 
. 
knowledge by saying, 
since man has both intelligence and sense and also bodily 
strength, these, by the disposition of divine providence, 
are subordinated to one another on the pattern of that 
order which is found in the universe·. Bodily strengtbl 
being suborcl.inate to tre sensitive and intellectual powers 
and ready to obey their co.mma.nds, while the senses are 
subject to the intelligence and follow its dictates.5 
But what has this to do with the nature of politics? In one place, st. 
Thomas says that tthuman intellect is the principle of all things created 
by art, and, at the same time, itself derives in a certain sense from 
the divine intellect which is the principle or natural things.n6 In this 
sense, if the human intellect gleans its principles from the divine 
1. Ibid .. , P• 5. 
2. idei. 
3. Ibid., P• 99. 
4 .. Id~m.. 
5. Ibid., PP• 99 & 101. 
6. Ibid., P• 195. 
intellect as seen in the natural order, it can be said that the prin-
ciples of the state, as they tGo are drawn from the natural order and 
are developed by the human intellect, are a work of art. That is, the 
' state, still having its basic root in the order of nature, has its sec-
ondary root in the human intellect. This is seen to be true as nmants 
' 
reason must be concerned not only with what is useful to man, but also 
~ 
with men themselves, in that it governs their actions, it proceeds in 
both these cases from the simple to the complex. nl In other words, it 
proceeds from nature to society• As a result, one cannot help but see 
1 how closely the nature of the cosmos and the nature of man is tied up 
'· in the development of Aqui.nast form of civil government. With these 
principles clearly established one is prepared to begin the study of 
the nature of the civil government as expounded by st. Thomas. 
C. THE SYSTEM OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 
1. The State 
BefGre investigating the nature Gf the fGrm of government advo-
cated by Aquinas, one ought to examine the nature of the state. Arising 
from the immediately preceding section one can easilY see something of 
the nature of the state .. 
1. ibid., p. 1.97. 
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When we consider all that is necessary to human life, it 
becomes clear that man is naturally a social and political 
animal, destined more than all other a.ni:mal.s to live in 
community •••• The fellowship of society being thus 
natural and necessary to :man, it follows with equal neces-
sity that there must be some principle of government with-
in the society .1 
From this principle Aquinas sh0wed that, as Aristotle thought the state 
to be the fulfillment and end of human nature, the state has as its pur-
pose the recognizing within the natural order a higher order, or the 
eternal law of God. In other words, the state had to make plain the 
aims of human life as they found them in the divine law. D•mtreves 
points out a question to be asked whether ttthe medieval writers had 
a notion of the state which may be said to correspond even approximately 
· to the moderntt conception.2 The new and modern e:x;perience of a n.umber 
of independent communities, gradually becoming aware of their inde-
pen.dence was not known by medieval writers. St. Thomas• teaching con-
' ..... . 
ceives the state to be a communitas perfectae and this is intrinsically 
different from all other concepts of co.mmunities. ttThe difference 
consists in the state's capacity for making laws endowed with a 
.. . . , 
potestas coactiva and its possession of a sufficientia ad omnia neces-
........ 3 
saria vitae.tt With this, one finds that Aquinas felt that such a 
l. Ibid., PP• 3 & 5. 
2. I"Pid .. , p. xx.iv .. 
3. Ibid., p. xxv. cr. p. 119 - "Ail mea being part of the city, they 
cannot be truly good unless they adapt themselves to the common good • 
• • .. So it is impossible for the welfare of the community to be in a 
healthy state unless the citizens are virtuous. • • • It would be 
sufficient for the common well-being if the rest were virtuous to the 
extent of obeying the commands of the ruler.u 
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state is fulfilled by two main types of organizations, «the civitas and 
the regnum, which thus deserve the name of e~mmUnitas p~rfeciae.nl 
,Arising from the principle of sovereignty and from the natural law, 
! ia which one sees that nthe bees have one king, and in the whole universe 
there is one God, Creator and Lord or all, n one finds that ttthe best form 
of government in human society is that which is exercised by- one person. u2 
But what of the scope and aim of the state? As for the scope of the 
state, Aquinas tur-ns: to the principle of comm.unitas :e_erfectae and 
finds "government is the more perfect the more universal it is, ani the 
.furthe; it extends and the higher it aims.n3 Likewise, perfection is 
the aim of the state. .Among ncommunities there are different grades 
an::l orders, the highest beipg the political. community., which is so 
arranged as to satisfy all the needs of human life; and which is, in 
consequence., the most perfect.H4 
In spite of all the advantages of human government, Aquinas finds 
that, due to the fact of mants frailty in securing the highest blessedness, 
the state ttmust fit into the scheme of hierarchical and graded societyn 
1. QE.· cit. Cf. p. 9 - nrn a city, however, there is a perfect community. 
The eity is, in fact, .. the most important thing constituted by human 
reason, • • • providing all that is necessary for the fulness of 
life. • •• "Whoever, then, rules a perfect community, be it city or 
province, is .rightly called a kingV (p. 197}. 
2. ~., p. 13& 
3. Ib:i,.4., p. 163. 
4. Ibid., P• 197. 
which was the basis for medieval theocracy.1 wnat is meant is that, since 
those that lead men to that final state of blessedness are the church 
.fathers, the civil government f'alls under the authority of' the church. 
However, D'Entreves cautions us that t~t. Thomas does not conceive of' a 
relation between two diff'erent so:m.eties5 between State and Church in any 
modern sense, but of' a distinction of' functions.tt2 In all of' his writings 
there is 
1. 
2. 
3 .. 
no mention of' the plenitude potestatis, of' a direct sovereignty 
of' the Pope .in temporal matters. 'The subordination or subiec= 
tio of' the civil to the spiritual power of' which :Ste Thomas 
speaks, is such only with regard to the end .... j The spirit-
ual and the temporal spheres are not independent. 
In theory the power of' the 'Church is purely spiritual. Her 
l;Veapons are not temporal weapons • · But they carry a temporal 
weight because of' the subservience of' the State to the 4 higher direction of' the Church in all temporal matters. 
Ib;ld. p • .x:x:.. Cf'. p. 109 - "Not. all that a man has or ishis subject 
to political obligationt hen~e it is not necessary that a of his 
actions be considered worthy of' praise or blame with respect to the 
political community. But all ihat a man is, and all that he has or 
can be, must bear a certain relationship to God.tt' 
Ibid., p .. xxio 
Idem. Of. p. 167 - "The temporal power is subject to the spiritual 
as the body to the soul •••• Theref'ore, there is no usurpation of' 
power if' a spiritual Prelate shQuld interest himself' in temporal 
affairs with respect to those things in which the temporal power 
is subject to hl1n or in matters which have been Jef't to him by the 
secular po;1e;r: • ••• Just as it f'alls to temporal princes to enact 
legal statutes. • • which concern the connnon welf'are in mundane 
affairs; so also it is the province of' ecclesiastical prelates to 
regulate by precept those matters which affect the common interest 
o.f the f'aithful to their spiritual well-being.n 
Ibid., P• xx:iii. C.f. 75 & 77 =Aquinas, after showing that an 
Individual's ·end and a society's end - ttnot merely to live in virtue, 
but ~C~ther. through virtuous life to attain to the enjoyment of God" = 
are the same., goes on to state that u gover:mnen t is of' a higher order 
according to the importance o:f the ends it serves • • • • But the 
enjoyment of' God is an aim which cannot be attained by human virtue 
alone • • .. • Such government belongs only to that King who is both. 
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prime example of this is the extent sf power in the form. of excom-j . 
munication. This is of great importance because arising from the teach-
ings of the Roman Catholic Church is a peculiar interpretation of the 
ture of Christ t s kingdom. Not onlY is there the problem of leading 
,, 
men to the state of blessedness, but also there is the problem (S)f the 
administration of Christ's kingdom. It is in the administration sf the 
!ldn'gdom that excommunication comes into usee Concerning the kingdom, 
the general. orthodox view is that Christ will rule His kingdom when He 
returns in the second advent. However, according to .Aquinas, this 
~gdom is already literally present. For this reason he develops the 
thought of the royal priesthood. .According to .Aquinas' teaching the 
prsphecy of Jeremiah 23:5 - »A king sha.l.l reign and shall be wise, u and 
I the fact that Jesus was the ;priest forever after the order of Mel~his-
edec,n portrays the foundation of the royal priesthood. 
It is from Him that the royal priesthood derives • • • and 
what is more all the faithful of Christ, being members of 
Him, become thus, priests and kings.. The ministry of the 
kingdom is entrusted not to the rulers of this earth but to 
priests, so that temporal affairs may remain distinct from 
those spiritual: and, in particular, it is delegated· to the 
High Priest the successor of Peter ard Vicar 0f Christ, the 
Roman Pontiff; to whom all ld.rlgs in Christendom should be 
subject, as to the !.ord Jesus Christ Himself .1 
man and also God. u This was entrusted to Christ and as a result was 
entrusted uin pariiicular ••• to ••• th~ successor of peter and 
Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff; to whom all kings in (}hristendom 
should be subject.n 
1. supra, p. 69. 
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However, one might question the validity of the subjection of kings te 
priests. Aquinas admits that ttunder the Ol.d taw we read that the 
priesthood was subject to king;.nl He answer~ this problem by point-
ing out that ttunder the New Law there is a higher priesthood through 
which me.n are led to a heavenly reward! and under Christ•s law, kings 
must be subj~ct to priests.n2 So it is that the nature of the state 
is thusly portrayed by Aquinas. 
2. The Magistrate 
a. Autherity. What then is the nature of the government in ,Aquinas• 
position? Society is part of nature and the state is the basic part of 
society. Yet, «society would not be possible without authority, and 
· witheut those wh~ are mere wise and righteous having command over the rest. u3 
Therefore, in studying the nature of the magistrate, one must first view 
the source, nature and extent of his authority. Aquinas could find no 
source of authority which based itself on •original• or the •natural' 
.· .. jight of the peopl.e. .As a result, ttthe acknowledgment of the human 
!source of authority is qualified by the fundamental Christian idea that 
1. Op. cit. 
2. Idem. 
3. Ibid., p. XVJ.l.. Of. p. 5 - liThe fellowship of society being thus 
na:tU'ral and neces~ary to man,. it follows with equal. necessity that 
there must be some principle of government within the society.n 
·r 
'• -
Ill power is f'rom God, and that authority theref'ore bas always a divine 
nd sacred character.~1 Yet, these two elements (the human and the 
tlivine) of' authority are reconciled, 
in typically scholastic manner, in the distinction between 
the !form' and the •substance' of' authority. The ult:il!late 
divine source of' all authority (its causa formalis) does not 
exclude, but on the contrary requires (as its causa mater-
ialis), an intervention on the side2of man in the setting up of a particular form of government. 
D•Entreves views st. Thomas' development of the theory of the foundation 
i 
jo·f· power thusly! 
It is the .Aristotelian doctrine that, since poli tiea>l rela~ 
tionship is natural to man, the real foundation of the ordo-
inter homines must be sought in the different capacities-of 
men, in theJ.X tnatur.al' inequality. Political authority is 
based on that inequali:ty~ Lack of' order arises from the f'act 
that somebody is in control, not because of his superior in-
telligence, but because he has seized power by physical vio-
lence or ~s been set up to rule through ties of' sensible 
;af'f'ection .. 
D'Entreves also points out that one of' the basic aspects of authority 
is sovereignty. usovereignty is an attribute - and indeed the essential 
l. 
'2,. 
Ibid., p. xxvi.. Of .. p. 183 - ttBut. such obligation derives from the 
order of authority which carries. with it the power to constrain not 
only from the temporal, but also from the spiritual point of view, 
and in conscience; as the .Apostle says (Romans JCITI) : and this 
because the order of authority derives from God, as the Apostle says 
in the same passage. For this reason the duty of obedience is, for 
the Christian, a consequence of this derivation of' authority f'rom God, 
and ceases when that ceases.u 
Idem., Ci'. p. 183 - "Since authority derives always, f'rom a f'orrnal 
point of view causa formalis, f'rom God (and it is this which pro-
duces the duty of obedienceJ, their subjects are always obliged 
to obey such superiors causa materialis, however unworthy they may be.n 
Ibid., p.. xxvii. 
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ttribute - of political po-wer, its exercise can and must be subject to 
careful delimitations.n1 The two limitations of sovereignty which receive 
' uch emphasis are those of the international relationships, which have a 
gneat deal to do with the problem of war; and the limit of sovereignty with-
?-n the internal sphere wbieh is found in some constitutional limitations of 
I olitical authority. The scope of authority is again limited when one views 
it as it arises from nature. Aquinas declares that in 
nature there is to be found both a universal and a particular 
form of government. The universal is that by which all things 
find their place under the direction of God, who, by His pro-· 
vidence governs the universe e The particular is very s :im:ilar 
to this divine control, and is found within man himself; "~Vho~ 
for this reason, is called a microcosm, because he provides 
an example of universal government. Just as the divine con-
trol is exercised over all created bodies and over all spiri-
tual powers, so does the control of reason extend over the 
members of the body and the other faculties of the soul:: so, 
in. a cer~in sense, reason is to man what God is to the 
un~verse. 
Earlier it vvas pointed out that the nature of society arises from 
the very nature of mano This is also true as a basic source for authority. 
!fJ.quinas :finds that 
control of one over another who remains free, can take·place 
when the former direc:bs the latter to his own good or to the 
common good. And such dominion would have been found between 
man and ma.TJ. in the state of innocence for two reasons. First, 
because man is naturally a social animal; and in consequence 
men would have lived in society, evem in the state of innocence .3 
With the basic sources of authority set before the reader one can 
row pass on to the scope of authority. "There are two major considerations 
l. 
2. B. 
Ibid., pp. xx:viii and xxix .. 
Ibid., p .. 67. 
Ibid .. , P• 105. 
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hat must be brought out. First, it is. necessary to see the limitations of 
uthority in regard to the political scene. Secondly, Aquinas finds that I . 
ue to the aim of' a true state, the state of' blessedness, there must also I• the lilllitation of the church. The second lilllitation is not primarily 
fue to the aim of the state, but due to the fact that the :rr..agistrate, not 
j eing a priest, is fallible and one who cannot perfectly lead men into 
j hat state of blessedness. In delineating the first limitation, Aquinas 
tates that ttlaw ••• regards the coiTlll}on welfare. u In other words 
laws can be considered just, either with respect to their object, 
that is when they are directed to the common welfare; or with 
respect to their author, that is when the law which is enacted 
does not exceed the powers of him who enacts it, or again with 
reference to their form, when the bUrdens they impose upon the 
citizens are diitributed in such proportion as to promote the 
common welfare .. 
This then is the limit of authority as far as nature is concerned. 
The other limitation that is impinged upon the state is that of the 
churchQ It is Aquinas' position that 
unbelief is not in itself incompatible ~i th dominion since_ d.omin-
~ion derives from the law of nations which is human law. Whereas 
tlie distinction between believers and unbelievers follows from 
divine law, which does not abrogate human law •••• But it is 
not the province of the Church to punish infidelity in those who 
have never embraced the faith •••• But the infidelity of those 
who have once embraced the faith, She may punish by judicial 
sentence; and it is just that they.be pUnished by loss of the 
right to rule believers •••• ·Therefore, as.soon as a ruler 
falls under the sentence of excommunication for apostasy from 
the faith, his subjects are ipso facto absolve€!. from his rule.2 
Another problem which arises is that of the difference between the 
faithful and the infidel; and more especially as to the infidel's place in 
1. Ibid., p. 135. 
2. Ibid., PP• 157 & 159. 
. I 
gevernment over the faithful.. Normally nthe distinction between the 
~aithful and the infidel, considered ih itself, does not invalidate the 
:!government and domirdon of infidel over the faithful. n But such ttright 
i/ro dominion or government may, however~ with justice be abrogated .by 
order of the Church in virtue of her divine authority; for the infide~"'' 
'on account of their unbelief, deserve to lose their power over the 
lfaith:ful, who are become the sons of God .. nl In other words, the church 
:by its right to excommunicate may, and in .macy instances has, outlaw a 
ruler who does not believe as it does. In fact, it has been used as a 
weapon in the battle for political supremacy. With these last consid-
erations, it is seen that from the nature Gf man and from nature itself 
· authority is feund to be a necessary. part of societ.y. This is also a 
point which rises from the fact of sovereign-ty. Yet, in the political 
. arena there are certain limitations which have been enumerated. 
: b ~ Monarchy. It is now possible te push on to the basic .form of gov-
' emmentwhich is expounded by .Aquinas. For one thing, Aquinas finds that 
»monarchy is the best form of government because it best corresponds to 
the government of God .. n2, This ~s in accordance with Aquinas• procedure 
: of thought; :i.. e., deduction. 
. --
,. 
This signifies, on the basis of God•s 
sovereignty which is seen as the one root of the .many, that the monarch 
being one is over many. However, there are times when the best form of 
l. Ibid., P• 155 .. 
2. Ibid., p. xxvii. Cf. p. 107 - ttit must be admitted that the universe 
is governed by one_person ••••. The best form of government is that 
which is carried out by one person. u 
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:government is for st. Th<:>'.mas some sort of constitutional system in 
which the princip~es of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy are co.m.-
bined, and the prince is dependent on the rule of ~aw as the expres-
sion of the will of the community.~ Aquinas finds ttit is quite c~ear 
that it is the nature of kingship that there should be one rulerand 
that he should do so with a view to the common go0d without seeking 
private gain. n2 He bases his position on the passage written by 
So~omon, ttThe king commands over al~ the lands which are subject to 
, him.n3 
This may be true, but what about false governments under tyrants and 
i other peop~es? It is Aquinas t position that the first form of corrupt 
:government is that. of the tyrant. This is ngovernment .... unjustly ex-
; ercised by one man who seeks profit from his position instead of the g:>od 
: of the community subject to him. n4 Opposite aristocr~cy tl!lere is that 
unjust government of o~igarchy~ This is that ttgovernment exercised by 
several banded together in a c~iqueu for the purpose of oppressing the 
rest of the peop~e for their own pr~fit •• 5 Finally, ttunjust government 
can be exercised by a great number, and it is then called a democracy: 
~. Ibid., pp. 13~ & ~33. A ttform 0f mixed government, constituted from 
all the elements just me}:ftioned, and this is the best form of govern-
meni;.. In this, ~aw is enacted according to the definition of Isidore 
(~. V, 10) : •by the common sanction of nob~es and peop~e.' n 
2. Ibid., P• 9. 
3. Idem. This statement is quoted from Ecc~esiastes 5 :S. 
4. Ibid., P• 7 • 
5. Idem. 
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such is mob rule when the common folk take advantage of their numbers to 
oppress the rien.u1 Aquinas in another place states that ntyranay is 
~ 
more harmful thanan oligarchy, and an oligarchy is .more damaging than a 
democracy •.••• Tyra.nny, then, is the most unjust form of government.n2 
Then it would seem that democracy might be advocated by Aquinas. On the 
corttrary, .Aquinas says that ttof all forms o.f unjust government, democ-
racy is the most tolerable ~ tyra.ru:zy- the worst. n3 Yet, this last form 
of government, though unjust, is only a step from being the most intol-
erable. Aquinas makes this clear by showing that, 'When democracy becomes 
unbearable, it is only a tyranny that can grow out of it and this is 
generally tyranny at its ~rst. 4 Therefore, all that is necessary to 
consider is the matter of tyranny. What are the causes of tyra.nnT? One 
of the first andnmt fundamental causes is that which is the ttconsequence 
of the sinfulness of ••• kirlgs.n He uses as his illustration the 
history of the nation of Israel and its resulting defection from ttthe 
worship of the true Godrt ~hieh finally reduced them to captivity.5 ~ 
mere expl.ieit development of thls is seen in the quotation .Aquinas takes 
'I from the wa:ks or Aristotle!' ~A ~prince w00 is not satisfied with his hen.or 
, and glory becomes a tyrant. • • •. • For there is within the soul of all 
i the urge to seek their own satisfactio~.u6 .Aquinas sees in this seeking 
of human glery one of the most grave errors of kings. For it is his 
opinion that the glory that is to be attained unto ultimately is the 
1. I.dem. 
2. Ibid., p. 15. 
3 .. Ibid., p. 17. 
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glory of God, secured to one in eternity. The other cause f'or tyranny 
is that of deceit. "It is a dif'ficult task, and one in which few sue-
ceed, to practice true virtue, which alone is honorable: but because many 
desire glory they are led to simulate virtue. ,,l 
Finally, since this is the nature and cause of tyranny, what, in 
Aquinas' position, can be done to avoid this error? Also, what is to··be 
gained by the monarch who rules wisely? Firat, UAristotle's description 
of' the magnanimous man, in the Ethics, pu-ts the matter very clearlyt 
Such a one does not seek honor and glory as though they were 
complete and sufficient reward for Yirtue; yet he is content 
to receive nothing more from men. For of all eart.hly rewards 
the highest, perhaps, is that a man•s virtue should be pub-
licly attested by his fellows&? 
'The second point, or the reward expected is shown in .Aquinas' statement 
that 
unhappy is the king inflicted by God in His wrath upon His 
people •••• For the rule of a tyrant is hated by all, so 
that he needs a numerous bodyguard to keep him safe f'rom his 
people; and this costs him far more than he can wring from his 
subjec-ts. A king's government, on the one hand, being 
pleasing to his subjects, is guarded by the citizens them._ 
selves, for no love of' gain; indeed, in times of' necessity, 
they will give freely to their king far more than any 
tyrant can exact ..... Thus Solomon says (Proverbs 10::7):: 
'The memory of the first (just monarch) is with praises: and 
the name of' the wicked shall rot.' Either he is forgotten 
or only a stench remaina.3. 
quinas concludes that to the monarch tba.t is just God ttpromises not an 
I " earthly, but a heavenly reward; one which is to be found in God alone.n:4 
1 .. Ibid .. , P• 39. 
2. lbid., P• 41. 3. Ibid., pp. 59 and 61. The parentheses are added. 4. Ibid., p .. 43. 
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c. Purpose.. One of the most basic purposes for any government, as at-
tested to by Aquinas, is that of the ucare for the common good,.n1 In 
other words 
the aim of any ruler should. be to secure the well bei.:rig of the 
realm whose government he undertakes. $ ... So the most im= 
portant task for the r~er of any community is the establish-
ment of peaceful unity. 
Around this basic aim of the magistrate revolve several otber purposes 
. rlhich have their root in the basic doctrine of nature.. From an examina-
tion of nature one can find that purpose which is to be imitated. As God 
:is the all-wise ruler of the universe; so the king, among men who are by 
nature social animals, is to rule with intelligenceo This is not only 
a principle derived froiJl the nature of God, but also is to be found in 
nature itself~3 Neyertheless, to govern intelligently is not the sole 
purpose of the magistrate.. From the nature. of God one again finds a 
second purposee This is that that is derivative from the fact of God's 
creatorsr.d.p, and governance of the creation. The magistrate, before he 
i 
settles down to the problem of ruling must create a city ln which his 
. subjects may be ruled.,4 By example o:f this principle, .Aquinas quotes the 
stories of Ninus who founded Nineveh and Romulus who established Rome. 
In this task the ruler must find the most suitable location, arrange for 
'its protection and provision, and any other activity that goes on within 
· a kingdom.S Then follovrs the matter of sustaining it as a kingdom., These 
then are the purposes of the magistrate. 
4. Ibid., P• 69. 
5. Ibid., p. 71. 
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... f· Advantages of m.onarcbz. As the .monarch is to strive for the estab-
lishment of peaceful utrl.ty, ttit is clear that that which is itself a 
unity can more easily produc~ unity than that which is a plurality. -ul-
In this same vein ef thought one finds that ttwhen a choice has to be made be-
tween two courses of actiontt itis easie~ for a mona.rch.2 And, even if 
the monarchy should degenerate into tyranny, it is accompanied ttby less evil 
consequences then the government of many becomes corruptu because of 
dissensions) In another section, Aquinas lists some checks which are 
an advantage to monarchy. He says that 
in the first, it is necessary that whoever of the possible 
candidates is proclaimed king shall be of such a character 
that :it :is unlikely that he will become a tyrant ..... Next a 
monarchy should be so constituted that there is no opJX'rtunity 
for the king, once he is reigning, to become a tyrant. .And, 
at the same time, the kingly power should be so restricted 
that he could not easily turn to tyraruxr. 4 
. . '. 
e # The result. In conclusion, before passing on to the .aature of the 
law, .Aqui.nas points out two results. From·all the precautions, and from 
the very nature of the source of authority, which have been expourlded, it 
' is quite «evident, that stability in government, riches, and honour, . .and 
glory, are all more su:re:cy attained by kings than by tyrants; and that a 
prince mowould €fUn these ends by dishonesty risks becoming a tyrant.n5 
.Another factor is that unity will be achieved. nrt is in fact evident 
that a number of individuals could not unite and bring others to harm 
~they were themselves in sone way united.116 This listing of results 
.. 
1.. Ibid., P• ll.. 
2. Ibid., p. 25. 
3. Idem.. 
-
4. Ibid., p. 29. 
5. I~}d., P• 63. 
6. Ib~d., p. 107. 
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only partial but where unity is, it is supposed to breed good results 
d these could be unnumbered in such short space .. 
3c The Law 
l:t5 na"lii.ure. Passing on from the discussion of' the magistrate it is 
ecessary to examine the nature of' the law which is the foundation of the 
overnment ruled by the monarch$ By definition Aquinas has :in JPind law as 
eing Unothing else tban a rational ordering of' things which concern the 
ommon good; promulgated by whoever is charged with the care of' the com= 
unit,r."1 In developing this subject, St. Thomas finds that ultimately 
ln law-derives from the Eternal Law. 
I 
! 
Since the eternal law is the plan of' government :in the sup~ 
reme governor, all schemes of' government in those who direct 
as subordinates must derive from the eternal law; Consequently, 
all laws, so far as they accord with right reason, derive from 
the eternal law.2 
clarify the nature of the eternal law, Aquinas briefly declares that 
tthe eternal law is nothing other than the ideal of divine wisdom consid-
.red as directing all action and movement.n3 On the human level, the 
I atter of' sovereignty again comes in. In this legal conception, it was 
• 
• 
ought that if "law proceeds from the will of' the lawgiver, then surely 
Ibid., P• ll3~t 
Ibid • ., P• 121 .. 
Idem. 
la:w. n4 Likewise, there being natural law, one 
Ibid., p. xxviii.. Cf. p. lll - llBut will, if it is to have the au-
thority of lciw, must be regulated by"reason -when it commands. It is 
in this sense that -we should understand the saying that the will o:f 
the prince has power of law ott ' • 
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)fi'iildS that the prince is no doubt subject to law.1 So it is that law is 
)bstablished upo~ the principle of eternal law by lawgivers who are them-
,j 
t:~v::s~:::::::::·::::::~:~::::.t::~:~:::~o:ft::•.:::i:::::::.soHe 
!finds that as the parts bear a relation to the whole f'or the perf'ection 
! 
)of' the whole, so each man bears the saine relation to the community. It, 
rtherefore, ttfollows that the law must have as its proper object the well= 
being of the whole commllll..ity •••• Law, strictly understood, has as its 
first and principle object the ordering of the common gooo.n2 The last 
matter in regard to the nature of the law as it is seen by Aquinas is 
that of the relationship between law and reason.. For him, 
reason has power to move: to action from the willl: for reason 
epjoins all that is necessary to some end, in viitue of the 
fact that the end is desired. But will, if it is to have the 
author~ty of law, must be regulated by reason when it com~ 
mands. 
Having established the basic nature of law and some of its various rela-
tionships, it is now possible to view some of the types of law that are 
important to _Aquinas. 
b. fYpes of _law. In general, Aquinas has three types of law, which are 
extremely important to the nature of the state.. These three types are 
! 1.. Ibid .. , p. 141. llSo, in the judgme~t of God, a ruler is not free from 
the directive of the law; but should voluntarily and without constraint 
fulfill it.n 
2. Ibid., P• lll. · 
3. raem. 
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the natural, the human and the divine or eternal. law. 
1) Nat"Lll-S-1. law. For Aquinas, one a! 'the fundamental. principles is that 
the order of the precepts of the natural law corresponds 
to the order of our nat-ural inclinations. For there is 
in man a natural inclination to good which he has in 
common with all substances.l 
This includes such inclinations as the 1tpreserva.tion of human life,tt 
the inclination to more nspecific endstt than what the anjmaJ s enjoy, 
" 
and the inclination, proper to man only, to the ttgo<Xi, corresponding to 
. 2 i his rational na. ture. tt Bas cally, this is understood by the idea that 
nall actions connected with such hlelinations: namelY, that a man should 
-avoid ignerance, that he must not give offence to others with whom he 
must associate and all actions of like nature • • • come under natural. 
law.n3 
Natural law itself is u.rUversal in scope in that as far as the 
ngeneral principles are concerned, whether speculative or practical, 
there is one standard of truth or righteousness for everybody, and this 
is equally knewn by every one.n4 Once the basic trgeneral principles are 
discovered, it :is found that these· are unehangeabie for all times.n5 
2) Human !!!.• In addition to natural law there is human law. Brie!cy', 
this is that which guides .man in the particular case to fulfill the 
natural aptitude to virtuous action. 6 lR this relationship law is a 
1. Ibid., p. 123. 
2. Idem. 
3. Idem. 
4~ Ibid., p. l25. 
5. Idem. 
6i Ibid., P• l27. 
" 
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mutual happenstance and is for the encouragement. of all men.l In its 
relationship to natural law it is strictly subordinate. .As was pointed 
out, the natural. law establishes the basic principles, ani then partic-
ular principles are drawn from them.2 
It must be noted at this point that the idea o.f sin in light of a 
political context is colored by the thought that Jtpunishm.ent is a species 
of evil,n3 due to the fact that "human virtue • • • is in accord with 
man's nature: ••• while vice is coatrary to man's nature ••• (and) 
the .order of reason.n4 Aquinas, therefore, reaso~ that when 
a person is in. immediate danger of pb.ysical. privation, and 
there is no other way of satisfying his need, • • • then 
he may take what is necessar,r from another person's goods, 
either openly or by stealth •• ~ • (.Also,) human laws allow 
certain sins to go unpunished because of the imperfection 
of man•s condition which brings it about that much which is 
useful .wo~d be prevented if all sins were separately pun-
ished by explicit penalties.5 
Within the human law, there are certain basic divisions. Aquinas 
viewed these as various essential characteristics. In the first place, 
he states that 
human law is derived from natural law. From thi.s point o:t 
·view positive law may be divided into the law of nations 
.... pertains to all those conclusions which are directly 
derived frml. natural. law as immediate conclusions ••• and 
civil law ••• those norms w~ch derive from the natural 
law as particular applications. 
The second division is that which arises from. the aim of providing .for 
nthe common welfare of the city. n Technically, this is seen in the 
1. supra, p. 62. . . 4. Supra, p. 6).. 
2. D'Entrev~s, 2£~.cit~, p. 129. 
3. Aquinas,~ 'lheelogica., V, 4ffi. 
5. rt~n~reves, ~o cit .. , p. 171. 
6. ~., P• 131. 
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division of offices which «are especially charged with the commonwel-
fare:n such as the priest, the ruler, and the soldier.. The third 
characteristic is nthat it should be promulgated by the ruler of the 
civil. community.nl. This finds different forms in that there are 
different forms of ruling bodies. Finally, human. law is ttdirective of 
'human actionsn in regard to their different objects.2 
Beyond this .Aquinas finds that human law, to a certain degree, 
should be so established that its provisions should not be confined to 
one period of time. Likewise, they should take into account the con-
ditions of men who are to be subject to them.3 In this light, Aquinas 
clearly sees that there is the possibility of changes within human law. 
liRe finds that there can be only two causes for this. One, on the part 
of reason - «to proceed by stages from the imperfect to the .more perlect. 
••• is natural;tt and second, tton the part of men whose actions are 
regulated by law : •• justified on account of altered circumstances.tt4 
The most important factor is that all human laws have an obligation, 
arising from the nature of the eternal law, to be just.5 
3) Eternai law. Finally, the ultimate foundation of law is that of 
eternal. law. Aquinas finds a cert.i.in necessity for this law. First, 
because it alone can direct .man to his final end; secondly, »because of 
the uncertainty of human judgment; • • • thirdly, because laws are 
1. Idem. 4. Ibid., p. 143. 
2. Ibid., P• 133. 
,3. Idem. 5. Ibid., P• 135. 
I 
enacted in respect of what is capable of bieng judged; • • • and 
finally, because • • • human law can neither punish nor even prohibit 
all that is evilly done.-ul In an earlier place, in the regard to 
the source of law, it was seen that the major importance· of the 
eternal lawwas that it is foundational as it is the expression of 
the eternal order of the supreme government .. 2 Thus it is that the 
ruler is to be able to establish a form of government which is for 
the welfare of the people. 
4. The Individual 
As has been repeatedly stated, Aquinas• uemphasis is not on 
rights, but on duties, not on the single individual, but on the 
common good.u3 It is from this principle that he gets his teaching 
as to the place of the individual. This shows, in the first place, 
that there is a difference between the common welfare and the 
individual welfare of one person. It is 
1. Ibid., PP• ll5 & 117. 
2. Ibid., P• 121. 
..... '..... . .. - ... -.-
3. Ibid
0 
.PttXlPP-~ ... Cf. D•Entreves, The Medieval Contribution~ 
Political Thought, p. 27. ttSince therefore, eac~ man is a.part 
of the city it is impossible that any man should be good unless 
he is .1'!~1+-p:r;qpq~:i:,o~ed to the common good.n This is a quotation 
from Su.mma Theologica J.a 2ae, q. xcii, a. I. 
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distinguished not only by a quantitative but also a formal 
difference: for the common welfare is different in nature 
from that of the individual, just as the nature of the 
part is different from that of the w.hole.l 
One of the problems that Aquinas faces is that of na.tlll'al ine-
quality. It is his theory that even before the fall there Uhad to be 
so~ disparity among men, • ~ • at least with respect to th~ sexes~u2 
Also, there would have been a ttdifference of spiritual capacities alse, 
with respect beth to justice ~ knowledge.u3 A third distinction that 
Aquinas points out is that of the difference of bodily powers as they 
are subject to the laws of nature~ 4 €1n.e other problem is that of the 
nature of the individual's aim in life. ttMany individuals are, as 
. 5 individuals, interested in a variety of ends.n It is on this basis 
that Aquinas asserts the necessity of the state~ He states that "he 
. 
who has charge of supreme ends must take precedence over those who 
are concerned with aims subordinate to those ends, and must guide 
them by his authority.n6 
In light of the above paragraph, then it is easy to see that Aquinas 
found it necessary for the individual to be in subjecti0n to the ruler 
of the city or state.. This matter of subjection was already known 
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to man before the fall.. Else, according to .Aquinas, "it would argue a 
lack of reasonable order in human society if it were not regulated by 
those -who are more wise .. n1 He continues by saying that 
i 
in the same vtay as in the natural order created by God, the 
lower :must remain beneath the direction of the higher, in 
human affairs inferiors are bound to obey their superiors 
according to the order established by natural and divine law.2 
Wevertheless, Aquinas is fully aware of the problem of tyranny., As a 
result, he declares that obedience has its limits and goes on to show that 
rebellion is even possible. One of the things in which this is most 
clearly seen is in the fact that ttslavery, by which one man is subject to 
another, exists in respect of the body, but not of the soul, which remains 
free.u3 Explicitly, Aquinas points out several reasons why there are 
limits to obedience. "First, in virtue of the command of some higher 
power. tt-4 In other words, one, who is under the command of an authority 
·which is higher than the :immediate so1,1I'ce of authority, is in certain 
instances free from the :immediate authority. A second case ttin which the 
subject is not obliged to obey his superior occurs when the latter 
. c01mnands something in matters in which he has no authority.,tt5 Speci-
fically, Aquinas has in mind such a situation as might occur when the 
secular ruler attempts to order the spiritual life of his subjects. This 
alone is the right of the church.. On the other hand, ttin those matters 
1. Ibid$, P• 103. 
2 .. Ibid., P• 177· 
3. Ibid., P• 179· 4. Ibid., p .. 177· 
5. raem. 
I 
I 
:I 
which regard the ordering of human affairs and actions, a subject iB 
bound to obey his superiors in v.irtue of their particular authority.n1 
In this same vein of thought, Aquinas studies this from a more con-
I 
troversial situation. He compares the thought found in st~ }1atthew 
17:25: tttherefore, the children are free.,n -with that of the "first 
Epistle of St. Peter 2tl8:: 'Servants, be subject to your masters:• and 
'that of the Epistle to the Romans 13:2: 'He that resisteth the power, 
resi.steth the ordinance of God.' u2 From the first passage, he finds that 
ttit would seem that Christians ~e not bound to obey the secular pO'wers.n3 
According to his findings 
servitude began in consequence of sin. But men are cleansed 
from sin by baptisme • • • (Also) a greater bond absolves from 
a lesser, as the new law absolved from observance of the old. 
• • • (And) man is by baptism bound, to God: and this obliga-
tion is a greater bond than that by which one man is bound to 
another by {>ervitude.. 'Therefore, man is freed from servitude 
by baptism.4 
Going on from this principle, Aquinas posits that 
any one is permitted, if opportunity offfers, to take back 
what had been unjustly taken from him. •••• Therefore, when 
the opportunity of rebelling occurs, their (tyrani!s) subjects 
are not bound to obedience to them• Furthermore: -there ·can 
be no duty of obedience towards a P5rson whom it is permis-
sible or even praiseworthy to kill. 
On the basis of the secon€1 verses, quoted above, Aquinas posits a 
; solution of these seemingly opposite views. He states that "because the 
i 1. Ibid., PP• 177 and 179• 
2. Ibid .. , P• 183. 
3. Ibid., P• 181. 
4.. Ide:niG Parentheses added. 
5.. Id.eiii. Parentheses added. 
--
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order of authority derives from God, • 0 e the duty of obedience is, for 
the Christian, a consequence o:f this derivation of authority from God, 
and ceases when that ceases .. n1 Yet, n~uthority may fail to derive from 
God for two reasons: either because of the way in which authority has 
been obtained, or in consequence of the use which is made of it.,n2 This 
comes about through the fact tba t ther13 may be a "defect in the person, 
i 
:if he is unworthy; or because of some defect in the way itself by which 
power was acquired, if, for example, through violence, or simony or some 
other illegal method.n3 ln.other phase that Aquinas examines is the abuse 
of authority.. This comes about in two ways. 
First, when what is ordered by an autfuority is opposed to the 
ObJeCt for which that authority was constituted •••• Secondly, 
when those who bear authority4command things which exceed tbe competence of such authority. 
As a result, Aquinas draws certain conclusions. These are:; 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
'· 
le That a-uthority, which is instituted in the interest of those 
subject' to it, is not contrary to their liberty. 
2. That the fact that a man is bavtised it does not necessarily 
follow that he should be freed from servile condition, even 
though this is a consequence of sin. 
3. The bond with which one is bou:p.d in baptism is compatible 
with the bond of servitude, and does not in consequence 
absolve from it ... 
4.. The subjects ••• of those who attain power by violence 
• • • are not bound to obey th13m except in the cases already 
noted. · 
5~ That one who liberates hi,s country by killing a tyrant is to 
be praised and rewarded.5 · 
Ibid .. , P• 183. 
Id.eiii~ 
idem. 
Ibid., p .. 185. 
Idem .. 
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evertheless, !:rom Aquinast own description of the nature of the t;ypes of 
government, one can see that one must be particularly careful of an ex-
tremist reaction.. He states tba t tyranny 
is unjust government because it is directed not to the common 
welfare but to the private benefit of the ruler. & • o Conse-
quently the overthrowing of such government is not strictly 
sedition; except perhaps in the case that it.is accompanied 
by such disorder that the community suffers greater hann from 
the consequent dis~bances than it would £rom a continuance 
oi: the £ormer rule. 
I 
As.a restut, Aquinas develops the argument for political prudence that 
should be resident in each individual. It is irrt.mediately based upon the 
teaching of qbedience. In fact, obedience is the first condition of 
authority. Yet, as D'Entreves suw.marizes, "in all such cases obedience 
conditioned by the ri~htful exercise of authority.t;2 In the light of thi.s 
;principle, it is to be £ound that "irhoever promotes the common weli'are of 
. 3 
the community, promotes l:1is own weliare at the same ·tim.e.,tt This is true 
for two reasons~ 
because individual well-being cannot exist without the welfare 
of the family, or city, or realm •••• Secondly, because man, 
being part of the family, or of the city, it is right that :be 
should consider his personal well-being in the ligh4t of what prudence advises with regard to the common welfare. 
In concluding his thoughts on the; problem of the indiv~dual's rela~ 
i 
'tionship to the government, Aquinas f:Lnds tba t "with respect to the right 
ordering of power in a city or nation, two points must be considered: 
1. Ibid .. , p .. 161.,' 
,2. Ibid .. , P• XXX. 
3. rbi.a., P• 161 .. 
:4. Idem. -
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the first is that all should in some resrect participate in 
government. It is this, in fact, that ensures peace within 
the community, and ••• all peoples prize and guard such a 
state of affairs. The other consideration refers to the form 
of government or of regulating affairs.. .Among the various 
forms of government • • • the more important are the kingdom, 
in which one alone governs according to virtue; and aristoc-
racy, that is govermnent by the bes-t elements 3 in which 1'ew 
hold office according to virtue. Sb the best ordering of 
power within a city or a kingdom is~ obtained when there is one 
v'..LTtuous head who commands over all; and who has under him 
others who govern virtuously; and wl'!en furthermore, all par~ 
t~cipate in such gover11.ment, both because all are eligible, 1 and because all participate in the election of thosewho rule. 
Thus it is that Aquinas concludes that this is the most "judicious ad-
:~'tm-e of the kingdom, in that there is one person at the read of it, 
of aristocracy, in that many participate in the government according to 
virtue; and of democracy or popular rule, in that rulers may be elected 
rom the people and the whole population has the right of electing its 
rulers.n2 
l. lbi.d.; p. 149. 
Idem,. 
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D. CONTR.!\ST 
1. Of Presuppositiolls 
Some of the basic points of either Calvin.•s or Aquinas• position 
have a great deal to do with the development of their respective 
systems of civil government. For instance, their thoughts on Divine 
Revelation and its value, the nature and purpose of man, and the 
fundamental source of principles described as »Nature. tt When these 
are examined one finds that without such there is no real logical 
1 
system of government. It is only as these are granted that the matter 
of civil government can be described. In such an examination, it is 
1 
only possible to take each .matter, evaluate it ill t.he light of some 
. - ... 
other position to find if it relates a true weltanschauung according 
to fact and experience • 
. . 
, a. ~nature of Revelation. The first matter to be considered is 
that of Divine Revelation. ealvints view of Revelation is that which 
holds that 
God always secured to his word an undoubted credit superior 
to all human opinion •••• And that no mall can have the 
least knowledge of true and sound doctrine, without having 
been a disciple of Scripture. Hence originates all true 
wisdom, when we embrace with reverence the testimony which 
God hath been pleased therein to deliver concerning himself • 
.. • • For, if we consider the mutability of the human mind, 
- how easy its lapse into forgetfulness of GGd; how great 
its propensity to errors ef every kind; • • • it will be 
93 
easy to perceive the necessity o£ the heavenly doctrine 
being ~dll.md..tted to writing, that it might not be lost in 
oblivion, or evaporate in error, or be corrupted by the 
presumption of men.l 
In comparison, Aquinas £eels that nthe revealed truths o£ Christi-
anity are not in contradiction to the testimony of reason.u2 In order 
to bring this to a more full interpretation one must remember that 
.Aquinas recognized that nright reasonrt derives £rom the eternal law, 
that being the rtideal of- divine wisdom, considered as directing all 
action and movement. tt3 .Aquinas f equation of the testimony of reason 
and divine wisdom is ·not hard to see. Herein lies an unusual situa-
tion. Where does one find room £or that which is not ttright reason?u 
Or, again, if one assumes the Thomistic theory of-supplemental 
reasoning4 one must see the dualism that arises from the relationship 
o:f the natural and supra-natural realms. This dualism of standards 
for the state ani the church shall be viewed later. But at this point 
l. Calvin, Institutes, l, .83~ .. 4 :further note should be considered. Cf. 
Van Til,.De:fense o:f the Faith (Phila.: Presby. & Ref. Pub. Co., 19551 
p. 132. 1'1 truly Protestant method of reasoning in~ves a stress-
upon the fact that the meaning of every aspect or part of Christian 
theism depends upon Christian theism as a unit. 1' 
2. supra, p. 58. 
3. Supra, p. Sl. 
4. Van Til, Apoi0~~ties (Chestnut Hill, Pa.: w_estminster Theological 
Seminary, 1951 , p. 25. This is Van ~l's term for the Thomistic 
epistemology. _.In other words, na, _solution of the problem as to the 
relation between theology and philosophy or science might be found, 
it wil.l be argued, if theology is based on authority and philosophy 
or science is based on reason. By the employment of reason, science 
and philosophy may make certain assertions about reality, and by 
means of revelation theology may make additional assertions about 
reality. Thus the relation would simply be one of supplementation.u 
94 
1the matter of revelation and human reason shall be viewed. One must 
admit that in reading the Holy scriptures one finds the ttrevealed 
truthstt speaking on various spiritual matters. Al.so, they touch upon 
various temporal and practical problems. The fact that human reason 
is supposed to cleal only with the problems of this present life is not 
born out by the tendency of philosophic studies to delve into nother-
worldlytt f)roblems. For Calvin the Holy Scriptures contain all that is 
I necess~ as a guide to the pilgrim in this life.1 Also, for the 
borderline areas where revelation and reason do overlap, not accounted 
for· by Aquinas, Calvin finds much that is in contradiction between 
revelation and·reason. Allowing the idea of supplementation, episte-
mologically speaking, one should find little contradiction. As has 
been seen, Calvin believes that reason, however supreme in man, can 
never find God or the answers to spiritual. matters except that that 
person be regenerated first.2 
. . . . b. The nature of ~~ .As was intimated in the last sentences, much 
depends on man's state of being before God. Because Aquinas does not 
touch on the natlll'e of man before the fall in this context, it will be 
assumed that he is speaking of man as he is after the fall. To the 
reader this may not seem a fair assumption, but for the sake of clarity, 
.Aquinas could have made the distinction. To certain degree, he seems to 
l. Supra, pp. 11 & 37. 
2. Supra, PP• 21 & 23. 
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confuse the two states, pre- and post-fall. Contrary to Calvin's 
teaching, .Aquinas holds ttthat there is in man a natural inclination 
to good which he has in conmon with all substance.nl Therefore, 
granting, as one can concerning things, that nothing of itself is evil, 
1
' Aquinas, by analogy, finds that man is good. But this would seem to be 
in conflict with some Scriptural evidence. As Calvin points out, with 
plenty of quotations, all who follow Adam are in that state of being 
which is called original sin.2 This rthereditary depravity» has 
ttdif'fused through all parts of the sou11t making each individual an 
~bominable sinner) JlJJy amount of good to be had or found in man is 
not a result of a ttnatural inclination to good.tt .Also, no natural. law 
or human law, as far as Calvin understands man, will ever h.elp any man 
nto fulfill the natural aptitude to virtuous action.u4 Openly, then, 
~ 
there are two opposite opinions. This contrast seems se evident that 
it shall not be further burdened. 
Beyond the problem of the nature of man is the. fact that Aquinas 
and Calvin disagree heartily as to the difinition of sin. On first 
analysis this may not seem to be so. However, it must be noted again 
that .Aquinas drew upon Aristotle's difinition of the problem of virtue 
. . 
and vice. Even though Thomas did acknowledge the fact of original sin, 
.. 
1 .. SUpra, p. 83. 
2. Supra, p. 20. ttThe depravation of a nature previously good and pure; 
on which ••• all are criminated on account of the guilt of one, and 
thus his sin has become common.« 
3. Supra, p. 21. 
4. Supra, p. 83. 
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even to the point of Adamts headship of the human race,1 the ~lica-
tions upon his system were in no wise as far reaching as Calvin's. 
Coupling .Aquinas' thoughts of the theological realm. and the political 
context is necessary. In the latter realm the concept of sin definitely 
undergoes a strict limitation.2 In Calvin's view there is no such 
limitation, i.e., circumstance, knowledge, etc., put upon the concept 
of sin. 
2. Of Systems 
........ -.. . . . . . . . ' 
a. The nature of the relationship of church and state. In the state 
one finds only temporal values espoused. Aquinas holds that this is a 
limited rea.lm. and only the church has the right to dispense spirit~al 
values. .As this is a higher plateau of value, it is therefore evident 
that the church is superior to the state) This results in the postu-
late that political obligation cannot avoid being subordinate to the 
religious obligation. 4 To say that the church is superior is ultimately 
based on the problem of ends. Without a supreme end, man finds no value 
for life. Aquinas states as his conclusion that man must be seeking a 
1. Supra, p. 61. 
2. Supra, p. 6.2. 
3. Supra, pp. 6S & ff. 
4. Supra, p. 63. 
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state of blessedness ,.1 That man must be seeking this with fallible 
means, as he is fallible, opens the path for Aquinas' conclusion that 
the priest must be the final authority in all matters. The simple 
. conclusion of this matter is that the church is superior to the state 
I 
and can dictate even in matters not spiritual.2 
In contrast, Calvin declared that neither one was superior over 
I 
i the other. He declares that the 
I 
i 
' 
Church and the State were institutional forms of this social 
unity in the relation of the body and soul to each other. 
The state alone was sovereign, but the sovereignty served the 
purpose of the church as well as political union. 3 
He also believes that it is the duty of the magistrate to assure the 
people the right to worship puhlicly.4 In other words, the rights of 
worshipping are to be maintained by the state, but the content of 
worship is nowhere to be dictated by the state. In fact, the only 
relationship of the magistrate to the church is that of member. Only 
then can he influence the church and likewise the church the state • 
. . -- . . ' .. 
1. Communitas perfectae. 
2. H. Dooyeweerd, ! New critique of Theoretical Thought (Phila.: Presby. 
& Ref. Pub. Co., 1957), III, 220-1. JT'Ihe supremacy which .... is ascribed 
to the Chureh-~itutic:n_ :implies tbat to the!. state is in principle denied any 
Canf6tence of interfering with ecmesiastical affairs. But in additim, the 
final judgment concerning the question whidl affairs pertain to the natural and 
which to the spiritual sphere, can only belong to the Church. Since 
in the Thomistic view the autonomy of natural reason is only of a 
relative character and. human nature is in need of its supra-natural 
perfection, it is the supra-natural ecclesiastical institution which 
alone can establish the Christian principles of government.H 
3. Supra, pp .. 32-3. 
4. SUpra, P• 32. 
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The contrast is clear, but what bearing does it have on the nature of 
the civil government? Suppose the church is a higher authority, what 
.,is the actual purpose of the state, what would be its chances of sur-
li 
''viving the church if it made a decision contrary to the church? There 
seems to be a purposeless vacuum and the church itself could become 
subject to political rancor. Actually, therefore, the Popel could be 
concluded to be the sole ruler of· the world. Calvin t s conclusion seems 
more sensible. It allows for a realm of' interplay, the magistrate in 
the church, and he and several other members wh0 hold office in the 
local, or higher, level of the political scene as they are influenced 
by the preaching of the Word in the church. This ulti.lnately permits 
'the state a free hand in matters of government, even though it be 
corrupted. Due to God 1s sovereignty this has to be. 
. . . . 
b. The magistrate and the individual. If the two paragraphs under the 
heading of the contrast of the nature of man are coupled, as far as 
Aquinas is concerned, it is possible to see an optimistic view of mants 
nature. Ultimately this bears on the development of the theory of 
civil government. As .Aquinas bases his on an optimistic presupposition,2 
so his governmental form may be one of over-trust in the powers of man. 
Therefore, his reliance upon the people to select able and virtuous 
1. Or aQY other prelate in like position. 
2. This is possible because of Aquinas' dualistic approach and separa-
tion of church and state on the basis of his epistemology. 
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leaders, and these in turn to select the one man most vlttuous to rule 
the people, presupposes that some men., if not all, are virtuous .. l}hat 
_Aquinas forgets is that no man can long remain virtuous, if he ever 
were, excepting those who make a point to cover with outwa.:z:-d vi.rtue and 
piety an inward vileness, since all are prone to sin.1 
On the other hand, Calvin presupposes all men to be of a sinful 
nature. This opposes an optimistic position not with a pessimistic one 
but a realistic attitude. To Calvin, man also has a potential, not a 
tendency, to good.2 There is this difference in that a tendency refers 
to the bent of manta desires; while Calvin holds that only a man in 
which a new work has been begun through the regenerating work of the 
Holy Spirit can do any good) In other words, the potential which lies 
in man is that as an individual each man may be elected by God., regen-
erated, and have his faith caused to believe in the Son of God, Jesus 
Christ, and then caused to do good acts. This causing, of course, lies 
in God and the above is to be recognized as that which God does which 
man does not know of until it has come to pass. This potential, there-
fore, lies only in the sovereignty of God and not in the nature of man. 
1. sin is here used in Calvin's definition. 
. . 
2. The meaning of the word potential, used in this conte:A~, refers to 
an inactive wilL Inactive in relation to God's idea of good. 
Tendency herein refers to that active willing to either good or bad. 
3. Philippians 1::6 - nBeing confident of this very thing, that he which 
hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus 
Christ.tt 
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The final problem that arises concerning man's nature is that of 
hl.s political nature. To Aquinas, stemming from Aristotle, man is tta 
social and political animal. 111 In other words, as in the developme~t 
elsewhere, man needs other men in a society to accomplish their aims 
and to be whole. This is quite opposed to Calvin who finds in man no 
ability to help another in incentive, moral, or social problems and 
which would in no wise make anyone complete in God's sight. Aquinas, 
in separating the state from the church, lists on1y material, earthly. 
values as ends for the state; whereas, Calvin realized, with the in-
struction of Scripture, that nothing was complete without a relation-
ship with God. 2 With eternal values in .mind and as the goal of life, 
men can come to a more complete life.. In this problem one also f::i,.nds 
that Aquinas, as did Aristotle, subjects the individual almost entire~~ 
In the idea of rule nfor the common good.tt this is realized. Calvin, on 
the other hand, puts no such limitation on man. The only limiting con-
cept which Calvin would grant is that steiiliiling from the creature's re-
.. 
lationship to the Creator, God's laws end will as expressed solely in 
God's revelation, the Holy Scriptures. 
With this last contrast, the matter of .Aquinas' civil government must l:e close:i. 
In ooncllls:ioo., Aquinas hdds that a.cCcrdi.ng to G:d's.soverei.gnty, the state must be 
ruled by cne man, a virtuous man, who is even then· subject naturally to the lmm.an 
law, the eternal law, the ethical ends, and the church's approval. 
~. SUpra, p. bl. 
~. Supra, p. 23. The imago dei is only partially restored with regener-
ation ttby the Spirit, but it will obtain full glory in heaven. 11 
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CHAPTER IV 
JOHN iocKE • s DEMOCRATIC THEOCRACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
JAs in other chapters in this study there have been preliminary 
analyses concerning the doctrines of fundamental value, so there will 
be in this chapter. Many books there are that contain Locke 1 s thoughts 
on the subject of civil government, but it is only in his book Of' Civil 
Government that the pertinent material is to be found. Following the 
above analysis, there will be a discussion of the form of government as 
Locke views the matter. That will be followed by a comparative survey 
of his tenets and Calvin's position. 
However, prior to such a study it is necessary to understand the 
nature of the source material. Locke 1 s book is not entirely devoted to 
the positive description of the principles of government. Made up of 
two essays the book was primarily written with the thought of refuting 
Sir Robert Filmer's teachings as read in Patriarchia~ The first essay, 
False Principles, deals entirely with this subject. The second essay 
... . . . . . . . . -
was primarily written to expound the i ~ Original, Extent and End of 
I. 
Civil Government. In spite of this intention there is an unusual 
number of digressions on the part of Locke, which cause the reader much 
consternation. At times it seems that there is to be found no real 
exposition of a governmental form. It is, therefore, rather difficult 
' 
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to arrive at any point in the reading of the second essay with the 
feeling that herein is a constructive outline for the true form of gov-
ernment. It is thus necessary to proceed with cautien as one attempts 
to for.m anything like a definite governmental form from these essays of 
Locke. Nevertheless, as this is the most concentrated piece of work in 
this field it is necessary to view and analyze that which is in agree-
ment with the general outline of Locke's thought. 
It will be noted that the main reason for such a study is not mer~ 
to reherse the well known views of a great political theorist, but to 
have them clearly set before one in order to contrast them with the 
subject. Since this is the extreme opposite to monarchy it was thought 
quite profitable in clarifying the analysis and place of Calvin's teach-
ing. In the contrast the points of differences between Calvin and Locke 
will be evaluated. Thus it is to the above purpose that the following 
thoughts are set down. 
B. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS 
1.. The Principles of Nature 
In every position there are certain basic fundamentals. These are 
\carried out in full throughout the teachings of each writer. Thus it is 
wise to find outwhat these fundamentals are first. In LGcke 1 s writings 
there are a.feN principles which are considered to be the Laws of Nature. 
To Locke these are very plain and easily seen in Nature.l. The basic law 
. . 
l. John Locke, Of Civil Government (N.Y.: E.P. Dutton & Co., Ltd., Every-
man t s Library, 1940), p. 123. 
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is that which nteaches all .mankind who will but consult it, that being 
all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, 
health, liberty, or possession.tt1 Such a state of nature is always 
existent. For unot every compact puts an end to the state of nature 
betw·een .man, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter 
into one community, and make one body politic; other promises and 
compacts men may make with one another, and yet still be in the state r:£ 
nature.u2 Such men are epitomized in the examp~es of rulers or princes 
of 1tindependentn governments or communities.3 Aiso, this could be seen 
-in that business contracts usually involve only the two immediate parties 
and not the whole community. 
One comes to the conclusion from the above statements that theBe 
are general principles. Yet beyond this lies the possibility for .more 
detailed principles to be developed from nature regarding certain rela-
tionships of man to man as they refer to the matter of authority in 
particular. 
Nature gives the first of these - viz., paternal power of 
parents for the benefit of their chlldren during their minar-ity, to 
supply their wants of ability and understanding how to manage 
their property. (By property I must be understood here, as :in 
other places, to mean that property which men have in their 
1. Ibid., p. 119. Cf. pp. 143-4 for adefinition of liberty. ttLiberty 
is to be free from restraint and violence from others, which. cannot 
be where there is no law; and is not, as we are told, 'a liberty for 
every man to do what he lists. t n 
2. How the state of nature resolves into compacts will be explained in 
~~i;.ail later. 
3. Ibid., p. 124. 
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I 
persons as well as goods.) Voluntary agreement gives the 
second - viz., political power·· to governors, for the benefit 
of their subjects, to secure them in the possession and use 
of their properties. And forfeiture gives the third - des-
potical power to lords for their own benefit over those who 
are stripped of all property.l 
For Locke the import of the law of ·nature not only touches on principles 
but also ua great part of the municipal laws of countries, whic.bl are only 
1 so far right as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are 
to be regulated and interpreted._,".2 
.2. The Nature of Man 
General principles are fine to have in hand to guide one to a stable, 
rational conclusion; but in every case there are also second principles· 
which tend to regulate the direct~on of the thinker. suck is the case in 
Locke's writings as these second principles appear in the guise of the 
principles of the nature of man. The basic postulate of Locke's is 
that all men by nature are equal. I cannot be supposed to 
understand all sorts of rrequality .n Age or virtue may give 
man a just precedency. • • • Equality, • • .. being the equal 
right that every man hath to his natural freedom, without 
being subjected to the will or authority of any other man.3 
This is also born out when, in another place, Locke states that 
L 
.2~ 
3. 
to understand political power aright, and derive it from its 
original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally 
in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their 
IbiG.., p .. .206. 
Ibid., p. 1.23. 
Ibid., p. 142. 
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actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as 
they think fit, within the tourrls of the law of Nature, without 
asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man • 
• • • A state also of equality, wherem all the pavers and jur-
isdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another.l 
With this as basic there is one exception to the fact. This is 
the exception in regard to children. IIChildren, I confess, are not 
born in this full state of equality, though they ~e born to it. u2 As 
a result one must see how they are born to the state of equality. Locke 
develops this problem thusly. 
Age and reason as they grow up loosen them, till at length 
they quite drcp off, ani leave a man at his free disposal •••• 
Adam was created a perfect man, his bo:ly and mmd in full posses-
sion of their strength and reason, and so was capable frail the 
f:ll-st instance of his being to provide for his <JNn support and 
preservation, and govern his actions according to the dic-
tates of the law of reason GOi had implanted in him. • •• 
But to supply the defects of this imperfect state t.1ll improve-
ment of growth and age hs.d removed them, Adam and Eve, and 
after them all parents were, bythelaw of Nature, under an 
obligaticn to .rreserve, nouriEh and educate the cl:rildren they had 
begotten, not as their C1Ntl workmanship, but the workmanship of the5r 
own Maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be account-
able for them.3 
It is in this fashion that man's nature guides the principle of Nature. 
Therefore, it is important to s·ee how a third set of principles results, 
those of political power. 
3. The Nature of Political Power 
In this phase of principles one must remember that man is naturally 
in the state of nature as independent. Locke affirms ttthat all men are 
l. Ibid., P• 118. 
2. Ibid., p. 14.2 • 
.3. Ibid., p. 143. That which is olropped os the fact of parental super-
Visions. 
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naturally in that state, and remain so till, by their own consents, they 
make themselves members of some political society.irl It is at this 
point that Locke feels it necessary to point out the nature of political 
power. 
I think it may not be amiss to set down what I take to be pol-
itical power. That the power of a magistrate over a subject 
may be distinguished from that of a father over his children, 
a master over his servants, a husband over his wife, and a 
lord over his slaves •••• Political power, then I take to be 
a right of making laws, penalties of death, ana consequently 
all less penalties for the regulating of the conununity in 
execution of such laws, and in the defense of the conunonwea~th 
from foreign injury, and all this only for.the public good. 
Beyond this level, at a more basic point, Locke finds that man has two 
powers within himself as he is in the state of Nature. 
The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preserva-
tion of himself and others within the permission of the law 
of Nature •••• The other power a man has in the state of Nature 
is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law.3 
On the basis of the latter then 
if anyone in the state of Nature may punish another for any 
evil he has done, everyone may do so. For in that state of 
perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or 
jurisdictio~ of one over another, what any man may do in 
prosecution of that law, everyone must needs have a right to 
do.4 
However, Locke warns that ttthough this be a state of liberty, it is not 
a state ~f license.;·~? Thus it is necessary that the first principle, as 
l. Ibid., P• l24. 
2. Ibid., p. llS. 
3. Ibid., p. l8l. 
4. Ibid., p. 120. 
5• Ibid,, p~ ll9.- ttThus in the state of Nature, one man comes by a power 
~ another,·but yet no absolute or arbitrary power to use a criminal, 
when-he Ras got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats or 
l07 
stated above~ be instituted. 
In conclusion one can see arising from the powers of man~ three 
areas of power. These are: 
First~ then~ paternal or parental power is nothing but that 
which parents have over their children to govern them., for 
the childrents good, till. they come to the use of reason, or 
a state of knowledge., wherein they may be supposed capable 
to understand that rule, whether it be the law of Nature or 
the municipal law of their c-ountry, they are to govern them-
selves by- capable~ I say., to know it, as well as several 
others~ who live as free men under that law •••• secondly, 
political power is that power which every man having in the 
state of Nature has given up into the hands of the society, 
and therein to the governors whom the society hath set over 
itself, with this express or tacit trust, that it shall be 
employed for their good and the preservation of their pro-
perty. • • • Thirdly, despotical power is an absolute, ar-
bitrary power one man has over another, to take away his 
life whenever he pleases; and this is a power which neither 
Nature gives, for it has made n0 such distinction between 
one man and another, nor compact can convey.l 
As anyone can easily see the third area of power is a perversion of the 
first two areas. It is quite important to acknowledge the presence of 
this possibility as it so frequently occurs. Locke deals with this 
problem to some extent. At a later place his explanation of the rise of 
despots and their overthro;r will be touched upon. With these principles 
set d0wn as basic to the development of Locke's position one is prepared 
to view the problem of the development of this view of democratic 
theocracy. 
boundless e:e..'travagancy of his own will, but only to retribute to him 
so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate 
to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation end 
restraint (p. 120). tt 
--
l. Ibid., PP• 204-5. 
lOS 
C. THE SYSTEM OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 
1. The Rise of Governmental Form 
a. History. Before one can proceed to describe the nature of Lockers 
type of government one must see how political societies came into ex-
istence. As a result3 in this first section it will be necessary to 
trace Locke's view in regard to this matter. Whether or not one accepts 
it as basic, Locke seems to recognize some validity in the account in 
Genesis in regard to the beginning of society. For nthe first society 
was between ma.h and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents 
and children, to which, in time, that between 'master and servant came to 
be added,Jrt. With this basic relationship also went the basic first 
power of man, 
wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great Creator, 
who, having given to man an ability to lay up for the future 
as well as supply the present necessity, hath made it necessary 
that society of .man and wife should be more l·a_sting than of 
male and female amongst other creatures, that so their industry 
might be encouraged, and their interest better ·united, to make 
provision and lay up goods for their common issue, which un-
certain mixture, or easy and fre~uent solutions· of conjugal 
society, would mightily disturb. 
In spite of the fact that this basic relationship is usually one of har-
mony there are those times when the husband and wife do have differences 
of opinion, understanding, and wills, too.3 Locke finds th'at ttit there-
fore being necessary that the last determination (!.~·' the rule) shouid 
1. Ibid., p~ 155• 
2~ Ibid,, p. 156. 
3. Ibid.~ PP• 156 & 157. 
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be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the mants share as the abler 
and stronger. 11l 
On the grounds of these statements one can see that Locke recog-
nized that the starting place in the study of civil government had to 
be made at the origia of the world. This origin was admittedly in God. 
Therefore, though the development of Locke's system of civil government 
tends to be humanistic, there is w:Lthin the system a seed of and/or for 
theocracy. It is on this basis that Locke 1s system has been designated 
as a democratic theocracy. 
Evidently, then, this rule that was placed in man over the wife · 
also naturally passed over the "common issue. tt As has been demonstrated, 
the child is born to eq1:1al.ity not in it~ Therefore, any 
power, then, that parents have over their children arises 
from that duty which. is incumbent on them, to take care of 
their offspring during the imperfect state of childhood. 
To infol~ t~e mind, and govern the actions of their yet 
ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place and ease 
them of that trouble, is what the children want, and the 
parents are bound to.2 
The reasoning behind this is that ''whilst he is in an estate wherein he 
has no understanding of his own to direct his will, he is not to have 
ani will of his own to follow. n3 In the ultimate end this power of the 
parents, for they &lara the responsibility of nurturing the children, also 
took on that place of power over servants and slaves. But, one might 
seek as to how this element arose on the scene. It was due to several 
l. Ibid., p .. l57. 
2. Ibid., p. l44. 
3. Id.em. 
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causes that the element of servants could coma into the f~ relation-
ship. One is that of the possibility that some did not wish to take 
their full share of the responsibilities of equality. Others may have 
overstepped the principles of Nature and in trying to subject someone to 
himself he became subject to the other as part of his punishment. Finally, 
some may have not had enough space and out of necessity expanded their 
territory of responsibility literally and figuratively and in the process 
forcefully taken the rights of some. In any case Hthese men having, as 
I say, forfeited their lives and, with it, their liberties, and lost 
their estates, and being in a state of slavery, not capable of aey pro-
perty, cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society, 
the chief end whereof is the preservation of property. ttl What is then 
the area of responsibility of the Master? Locke says 
Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all 
these subordinate relations of wife, children, servants 
and slaves, united under the domestic rule of a family; 
with what resemblance soever it may have in its order, 
offices, and number too, with a little commonwealth, yet 
is very far from it both in its constitution, power, am. 
e%)4; q~ . if it must be thought a monarchy, and the pater--
familias the absolute monarch in it, absolute monarchy 
will have but a very shattered and short power, when it 
is plain by what has been said before, that the master 
of the family has a very distinct and differently limited 
power both as to time and extent over those several persons 
that are in it; for excepting the slave. (~r:td~~~ .f~y 
is as much a family, and his power as paterfamilias as 
great, whether there be any slaves in his family or not) 
he has no legislative power of life and death over any of 
them, ani none too but what a mistress of a family may 
have as well as he. And he certainly can have no absolute 
1. Ibid., p. l5S. 
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power over the whole family who has but a very limited one 
over every individual in it. But how a family, or any 
other society of men differ from that which is properly 
. political society, we shall best see by considering where-
in political society itself consists.l 
In following out the suggestion of Locke's last statement, it is perti-
nent to use his own words.. In the first ·place Locke wishes one to 
remember that ttman hath by nature a power not only to preserve his 
property - that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against the injuries 
and attempts of other men, but to judge of and punish the breaches of 
~hat law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with 
death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, 
requires it.n2 Nevertheless, the latter power became unwieldly for one 
person to handle, and also because there was the tendency to injustice 
when such power resided only in one person. It was deemed wise, where 
there were several men (this idea carries with it the connotation that 
each had families and sometimes this included the other relationships 
above mentioned) to join themselves in one group. Thus nwhen any 
number of men have consented to make one community or government, they 
are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein 
' 1the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.n3 
Several questions may arise in one's mind, such as; What happens 
to the power of each to punish an offender of the natural law? or what 
happens to the power of each one to provide for himself? To a~Ner the 
first question Locke declares that 
because no political society can be, nor subsist, without 
having in itself the power to preserve the property, and 
in order thereunto punish the offenses of all those of that 
1. QE.·. cit. 
2. Ibid., pp. 158-9. 
3• Ibid., PP• 164-5. 
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society, there, and there only, is political society where 
every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, 
resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases 
that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the 
law established by it~l · 
This gives us, in Locke's words, one hint as to wherein lies the nature 
~f political or civil society.2 In answer to the second, Locke contin-
ues to describe the political society. He does so by saying that 
wherever, therefore, a~r number of m.en so unite into one 
society as to quit every one his executive power of the 
law of Nature, and to resign it to the public, there and 
there only is a political or ciYil society •••• And this is 
done wherever any number of men, in the state of Nature, 
enter into society to make one people one body politic 
under one supreme government: or else when any one joins 
himself to, and incorporates with any government already 
made. For hereby he authorizes the society, or which is 
all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him as 
the public good of the society shall require, to the exe-
cution whereof his ovr.n assistance (as to his own decrees} 
is due.3 . 
In conclusion, Locke states, as a »moral II to the logic of the rise of 
government, that 
thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body 
politic under one government, puts himself under an obli-
gation to every one of that society to submit to the deter-
mination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or 
else this original. compact, whereby he with others incor-
porates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no 
compact if he be left free and under no other ties than he 
was in before in the state of Nature.4 
It is from this ttmoralu that Locke affirms his position that all govern-
mentis by the consent-of the-peoples subject to it. Therefore, no 
1. Ibid., P• 159. 
2. Idem. ttThose who are united into one body, and have a common established 
law and. judicature to appeal w, with authority to decide ooni:roversies be-
tween them and punish offenders, are in civil societjr one with another.n 
3. Ibid., p. 160. 
4. Ibid., P• 165. 
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.matter hew often one criticizes this position, by pointing out that most govern-
ments have only one head, Locke can ahlays turn and declare that underlying 
all types of government are the original canmon consents of the people ruled. 
b. Purpose. Briefly, Locke describes the purpose of individuals 
uniting into one co.mmonweal th or community. 
The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into 
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, 
is the preservation of their property; to which in the 
state of Nature there are many things wanting. Firstly, 
there wants an established, settled, known law, received 
and allowed' by common consent to be the standard of right 
and wrong, and the common measure to decide all contro-
versies between them •••• secondly, in the state of Nature 
there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority 
to determine all differences according to the established 
law •••• Thirdly, in the state of Nature there often wants 
power to back and support the sentence when right, and to 
give it due execution.l · 
Technically then, one could say that for the consentors this was a form 
of self-preservation. Not only that, but also that it was a means for 
their own needs to be provided for. This is logical in that n0 one man 
could provide for or lmow all the skills with which to provide his 
wants. Thus, the man that knows farming gives his talents, as does the 
miller, the industrialist, etc. Naturally it could be argued that such 
a method of provision of needs and protection in itself is still demo-
cratic even though controlled under one authority. 
c. ~ ~.government. In this concluding section in regard to the rise 
of governmental form one should find out the conclusion to which Locke 
comes as to the problem of the ideal form of government. Therefore, in 
doing this, Locke wishes one to remember that the majority 
1. Ibid., p. 180. 
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having, as has been shown, upon man's first uniting_into 
society, the whole power of the community naturally in 
them, may employ all that power in making laws for the 
community from time to time, and executing those laws by 
offices of their own appointing, and then the form of the 
government is perfect democracy.l 
So it is that 
if the legislative power be at first given by the majority 
to one or more persons only for their lives, or any~ted 
time, and then the supreme power revert to them again, when 
it is so reverted the community may dispose of it again 
anew into what hands they please, and so continue a new 
form of government .. ~ •• For the form of government depending 
upon the placing the supreme power, which is the legisla-
tive, it being impossible to conceive that an inferior 
power should prescribe to a superior, or any but the 
supreme make laws, according as the pO\'rer of making laws is 
placed, such is the form of the government.2 
2. The Magistrate 
It is now possible to pass on to the task of delineating the 
nature of the government in its various parts. In the first place, of 
course, there is the problem of the magistrate. In studying this matter 
the first question most likely to rise would be that of the reason for a 
magistrate. Since Locke holds to a democracy embodied in the legislature 
that is at the disposition of the consentors, why should there be a 
magistrate? Secon~, of what nature is the magistrate? Locke answers 
this by contrasting him with the monarchical ruler. FinaDy, what are 
the duties of the magistrate? 
1. Ibid., p. 182 .. 
2. Ibid., p. 183. ltBy 'commonwealth• I must be understood all along to 
mean not a democracy, or any form .. of government, b~t. ~Y. independent 
community which the Latins signified by the word civitas, to which 
the word which best answers in our language is •commonwealth•, and 
most properly expresses such a society of men which •communi~y' does 
not (for there may be subordinate communities in a government), and 
•city• much less." 
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a. Reason for !_magistrate.. In the long run it. is not that Locke makes 
room for a magistrate ,1 but that he is given the problem of explaining 
his existence.. As has been seen, ttevery man upon this score, by the 
right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it 
is necessary, destroy tlllngs noxious to them, and so may bring such evil 
on any one who hath transgressed that lawn (the law of Nature).2 But due 
to unreasonableness and partiality, Locke finds it necessary to ngrant 
that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the 
state of nature, which must certainly be great where men may be judges in 
their own cases, since it is easy to be imagined that he who was so unjust 
as to do his brother an injurywlll scarce be so just as to condemn him-
self for it.rt3 Therefore, the conclusion is that it is necessary to have 
a magistrate and a legislature which should reflect the common opinion. 
Actually, the rise of such an individual is reflected more clearly in the 
later relationship of parent to child_, or that of the parent to a now 
equal person who was formerly their responsibility. From the point o! 
view of the child, Locke sees that 
the government they had been under during it (pupilage) con-
tinued still to be more their protection than.restraint; and 
they could nowhere find a greater security to their peace, 
liberties, and fortunes than in the rule of a father. Thus 
the natural fathers of families, by an insensible change, 
1.. Ibid., p. 225. rtFor the essence and union of the society consisting in 
haVIng one will,_ the legislative, when once established by the majoriiQr, 
h~ _the declaring, and, as it were, keeping of that will." 
2. Ibid., p. 121. 
3. Ibid., ~· 123. The allusion ought not to be overlooked. It is that 
OT'Cain and his murdering of his brother Abel. 
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became the politic monarchs of them too; and as they chanced 
to live long, and leave able and worlhy heirs for several 
successions or otherwise, so they ]aid the foundations of 
hereditary or elective kingdoms under several constitutions 
and manors, according as chance, contrivance, or occasions 
happened to-mould them.l 
. Therefore, it is easy to see on the one hand how Locke is making room for 
an already existent entity. While on ·the other hahd, one can understand 
why there would be the need for such a person. It is on the basis of 
fulfilling the gap of justice and as the arranger for the protection and 
provision of the commonwealth. 
, . ' . '-
b. The :nature of the magistrate. As one reads this volume of Locke one 
must be aware of the nature of his w:niting. Again it is stated that this 
whole volume is the answer to the persons, in Locke's time, who were ad-
.... 
vacating jure Divino, that is,the doqtrine of the Divine right of kings. 
Their basic argument arose from the paternal phase of control over the 
·child, which later devolved into a quasi-paternal relationship between 
two men, the second having been a son of the first and under the first•s 
strict control for so long that no other relationship seemed to existe 
Locke is vehemently opposed to such a position and describes the errors 
o~ this way from the light of his doctrines of nature and the naturaL 
equality of men. :He declares that 
it is evident that absolute monarchy' which by some men is 
counted for the only government in the world, is indeed in-
consistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil 
government at all. For the end of civil society being to avoid 
l. Ibid., P• 154. 
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and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of Nature which 
necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own 
case, by setting up a known authority to which every one of 
that society may appeal upon any injury received, or con-
troversy that may arise, and which every one of the society 
ought to obey. Wherever any persons are who have not such 
an authority to appeal to, and decide any differences between 
them there, those persons are still in:the state of Nature. 
And so is every absolute prince in respect of those who are 
under his dominion. For he being supposed to have all, both 
legislative and executive, power in himself alone, there is 
no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who 
may fairly and indifferently,'and with authority decide, and 
from whence relief and redress may be expected of any injury 
or inconveniency that may be suffered from him, or by his 
order.l - · 
Again Locke describes such a position because of that which he holds to 
;; 
'be a natural right of every man is denied all but the monarch. In such a 
II 
case Locke says 
that whereas, in the ordinary state of Nature, he has a 
liberty to judge of his right, according to the best of his 
power to maintain it; but whenever his property is invaded 
by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no 
appeal, as those in society ought ,to have, but, as it were 
degraded from the common state of rational creatures, is 
denied a liberty to judge of, or defend his right, and so is 
exposed to all the misery and inconvenience that a man can 
fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of Nature, 
is yet corrupted with flattery and armed with power.2 
This final remark Locke appends with biil:icing criticism, ttthough they neva-
il . . . . 
:[dreamed of monarchy being jure Divino, which we never heard of among man-
kind till it was revealed to us by the divinity of this last age, nor 
ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion or to be the .. 
foundation of all government.i!? 
l. Ibid., pp. l60 & l6l. 
2. Ibid., pp. l6l & l62. 
3. Ibid., P• l74. 
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11 II As a result, one naturally sees that there must ha.ve been some other 
ilreason why one mah received the power from the peoples. It must be 
II 
noted that from this it is quite possible that something of the nature of 
jthe magistrate c~ be seen. In the beginning of history, before any 
records were made, Locke conjectures that 
some one good and excellent man having got a preeminency 
amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his goodness and 
virtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, 
with arbitration· of their differences, by a tacit consent de-
volved into his hands, without any other caution but the 
assurance they had of his uprightness and wisdom.1 
There must have been more development beyond this point, because no person 
can convey to his descendent or successor, as the case might have been, 
1• his qualities. As a result, there must have been some deviations from 
the norm set by that flsome one good and excellent man.lt These 'deviations 
must have been corrected by laws set up by the consentors. Due to this 
process, then, it would be possible to state that those who have the 
above qualities would be the most likely to succeed.· Locke holds that 
all commonwealths, therefore, with the form of government 
established, have rules also of appointing and conveying the 
right to those who are to have any share in the public 
authority; and whoever gets into the exercise of any part of 
the power by other ways than what the laws of the community 
have prescribed hath no right to be obeyed, though the form 
of the 'commonwealth be still preserved, since he is not the 
person the laws have appointed, and consequently, not the 
person the people have consented to.2 
In the long run, then, it is not the right of the magistrate to determine 
the extent of his power, but the right of the people who have consented 
l. Ibid., p. 163. 
2. Ibid., pp. 217 & 218. 
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'to give him the power to execute those powers which they themselves can~ 
not because of the time factor. 
c. The duties of the ~agistrate. This naturally brings us to the next 
• phase of this study. Ho~ever~ there is again the need of this caution, 
I 
:that in Locke 1s position the magistrate is idealy not one person, but a· 
' legislative body. .Another factor to be remembered is that tsthe great 
1 end of man t s entering into society bei.hg the enjoyment of their proper-
\ ties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that 
being the laws established in that soc:i.ety, the first and fundamental 
[ positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative 
/ 
power, as the f~st and fundamental natural law which is to govern even 
th 1 . 1 t· ·ul e eg:1.s a :1.ve .,· ·. 
Part of the power of the legislative that is put into the group's 
hands, as a result of the consent of the individual, is that of the 
"common right of punisbment.~12, This, however, is conditioned in that 
nthe legislative or supreme authority canno't assume to itself a power to 
rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice 
and to decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and 
known authorised judges .'ii~ Even in the earliest known condition of 
nature, the relationship of husband and wife, there cannot be found any-
thing but the above relationship, in that marriage was within certain 
bounds of the law. ttif it were otherwise, and that absolute sovereignty 
1. Ibid., p. 1S3~ 
2. Ibid., P• 122. 
3. Ibid.) pp. 1S5 & lS6. 
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and power of life and death naturally belonged to the husband, and were 
necessary to society between man and wife, there could be no matrimony 
in any of these_ countries where the husband is allowed no such absolute 
I
. authority .nl The ~gistrate .. s duty, even in the ~elat~onship 
matrimony, is cons~gned only to the matter of arb~trat~on. 
For all the ends of .marriage being obtained under politic 
government, as well as in the state of Nature, the civil 
magistrate doth not abridge the right or power of eithe~, 
naturally necessary to those ends - viz~, procreation and 
mutual support and assistance whilst they are together, 
but only decides any controversy that may arise between 
man and wife about them.2 
of two in 
The above may be only a ufringe benefittl of the magistrate to the 
community, but in actuality that is the most 'important duty of the body 
of magistrates - to arbitrate. To be more precies in terms, Locke 
declares four basic duties of the legislative power.3 These are: 
the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the soci-
ety and the law of God and Nature have set to the legisla-
tive power of every commonwealth, in all forlllS of government. 
First: They are to govern by pro~ulgated established laws, 
not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule 
for rich and poor, for the favorite at Court, and the coun-
tryman at plough. Secondlyt These laws also ought to be 
designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the 
people. Thirdly: They must not raise taxes on the property 
of the people without the consent of the people given by 
themselves or their deputies. And this properly concerns 
only such governments where the legislative is always in 
being, or at least where the people have not reserved any 
part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to 
time chosen by themselves. Fourthly: Legislative neither 
must nor can transfer the power o:f .making laws to anybody 
else, or place it anywhere but where the people have.4 
1. Ibid., p. 157. 
z. rcrem. 
3. Ibid. , p. 190. ttThe legislative power is that which has a right to 
direct how the force ofthe oommonwealth shall be employed for preserv-
~ng. the community and the members of it." 
4. Ibid., pp. 189-90. 
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Therefore, 
whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any common-
wealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, 
promUlgated and known ·to the people, and not be extemporary 
decrees, by indifferent and upright judges, who are to 
decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force 
of the community at home only in the execution of such laws, 
or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries and secure 
the community from inroads and invasion. And all this is to 
be directed to no other end but the peace, safety, ani 
public good of the people.l 
A natural result of this duty is that the magistrate is an appellant. 
In other words, as the magistracy is one which entails the carrying out 
of justice, the individual has the right to appeal to the magistrate in 
all cases as the final authority. 2 
One of the guiding principles in the deciding of all action to be 
taken by the magistrate is that of ttfor the good of the peoplee n .Ac-
.. '. . . . 
cording to Locke, the principle of sal us populi suprema ~ "is certainly 
so just and fundamental a rule, that he who sincerely follows it cannot ( 
dangerously err.u3 In light of this one might see that 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
the legislators not being able to foresee and provide by 
laws for all that may be useful to the community, the 
executor of the laws, having the power in his hands, has 
by the common law of Nature a right to make use of it for 
the good of the society, in many cases where the munici-
pal law has given no direction, till the legislative can 
conveniently be assembled to provide for it.4 
Ibid9, P• 182. 
Ibid., P• 160. 
Ibid., P• 197. 
Ibid., p .. 199. 
! 
Locke says that 11this power to act acc0rding to discretJ,..on for the public 
good~ without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it, 
II is that which is called prerogative.·tt1 
\: 
This problem of the assembling of 
II 
II 
the legislature to enact the necessary laws is brougat up by Locke. 
declares that 
the power of assembling and dismissing the legislative, placed 
in the executive, gives not the executive a superiority over it, 
but is a fiduciary trust placed in him for the safety o.f the 
people in a case where the uncertainty and· variableness o.f 
human affairs could not bear a steady fixed rule.2 
He 
However much one is cautious in this matter~ Locke feels that one might 
be bombarded with serious problems. He feels that the worst of these is 
the old question ••• asked in this matter of prerogative, 
'But who shall be judge when this power is made a right use 
of? r I answer: Between an. executive power in being, with 
such a prerogative, and a legialative that depends upon his 
will for their convening, there can be no judge on earth.3 
No matter how many duties devolve upon the magistrate in regard to 
the matters of the 'interior' there are always problems in regard to the 
'state.r4 In fact 
in Israel itself, the chief business of their judges and first 
kings seemed to nave been to be captains in war and leaders of 
their armies, which (Besides what is signified by ttgoing out 
before the people, ·u which was to march forth to war and home 
again at the heads of their forces) appears plainly in the 
story of Jephtha.5 
l. Idem. 
" 2. Ibid~, p; 196 •. 
3. Ibid., p. 203. 
4. These two terms are used in the modern sense and .may not have been 
used-in Locke's day in the same sense. 
5. Ibid., p. 171. 
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)So it is that this idea_, carried over by Locke, ttcontains the power of 
i war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all 
:persons and communities without the commonwealth_, and may be called 
federative if any one pleases.,tJ Locke elaborates on this by stating that 
these two powers, executive and federative, though they be really 
distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the 
municipal laws of the society wi~hin itself upon all that are 
parts of it_, the other management of the security and interest 
of the public without which all those that it may receive 
benefit or damage from, yet they are always almost united. 
And though~ this federative power in the well or ill management 
of it be of great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much 
less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing_, positive 
laws than the executive, and so must necessarily be left to 
the prudence and wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be 
managed for the public good.2 
Nevertheless, one must be c~utioned, as Locke himself sees it to be 
• necessary, that 
though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every 
community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are 
hardly to be separated and placed at the same time in the 
hands of distinct persons. For both of them requiring force of 
the society for theil7 exercise, it is almost impracti:cable to 
place the force of the commonwealth in distinct and not sub-
ordinate hands, or that the executive and federative powe~ 
should be placed in persons that might act separately, w~ereby 
the force of the public would be under different commands, 
which would be apt some time or other to cause disorder and 
ruin) 
With this last_statement this section can be closed. Suffice it to 
I 
say that the several duties with which the magistrate is saddled include 
in essence the making of laws, the executing of them, and the conclusion 
of alliances~ federations, etc. with.other commonwealths according to 
l. Ibid., p. 191. 
2. Idem. 
3. Ibid., P• 192. 
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the basic principle of salus populi suprema. lex. This then is the 
magistrate: an individual of no more standing than the executive head 
1 of the legislative body of the commonwealth which carry out the same 
. duties as a result of the consent of the people.-
3. The Law 
It is by now hardly necessary to point out again the importance of 
the first principle or the principle of the state of Nature.· However, 
for one to understand the meaning and origin of any of the laws of the 
commonwealth one must again go back to this original principle. In it 
, Locke finds that "the state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, 
which obliges everyone, and reason, which is that law, teaches all roan-
! 
kind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no 
one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possession.~l. 
The converse aspect of this law would be that when a man does commit a 
crime up0n another, such as murder, he has 
declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be des-
troyed as a lion or tiger •••• And upon this is grounded 
that great law of Nature, 11whoso sheddeth man • s blood, by 
man shall his blood be shed. tt .And Cain was so fully con- · 
vinced that every one had a right to destroy such a criminaL, 
that after the murder of his brother, he cries out, "Everyone 
that findeth me shall slay me,tt so plain was it writ __ in the 
heart of all mankind.2 
Truly this is the basic law, the law. of Nature, in Locke's position, 
but a secondary, and quite as important, law is the law of re~son.3 To 
i l. Ibid., Po 119e 
2. Ibid., p. 122~ 
3. If:>id., p .. 143. 1tThe law that was to govE!rn Adam was that same that was 
togovern all his posterity, the law of reason.tt 
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!Locke this seems an obvious necessity 
for nobody can be under a law that is not promulgated to 
him; and this law being promulgated or made known by 
reason only, he that is not come to the use of his reason 
cannot be said to be under this law; and Adam 1 s children 
being not presently as soon as born under this law of 
reason, were not presently free.1 
Locke, therefore, reasons that law is in general a boon to those who 
live under law~2 
In all of this there are two possible approaches to the problem of 
law. There is that of the individual's relationship to it; and the other 
is that relationship which the magistrate has to the people in the area 
of law .. In the first place one returns to the problem of the rise of 
governmental form and finds the doctrine of consent. This is just as 
important in this matter of law. lf]Jvery man being, as has been showed, 
naturally free, and nothingbeing able to put him into subjection to any 
earthly power, but only his own consent, it is to be considered what shall 
be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man's consent to make 
him subject to the laws of any governm.ent.u3 It is, therefore, necessary 
that consent be given before law can a'rise.. In other words, the individ-
ua1 must consent to a body to govern him and then that body 1 s action must 
be approved by consent. In all of this force is son:ething, if used, that 
could upset the very existence of the governing body. On the other side 
1. QE.~ cit. 
2. Idem. nso that however it may be mistaken, the end of law is not to 
abolish.or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom.. u 
3. Ibid., p. 177. 
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this body also has a relationship that is seen in that it is the law 
making body. For them the basic principle is based on a law which 
already has been described as salus populi suprema ~9 Without this 
concern for the needs, safety, and preservation of the people the legis-
lative body would surely not function properly. This then can be viewed 
also as the basic law which is to guide all the legal provisions which 
the afore mentioned body makes for the people. Thus it is that Locke 
feels that his position is one of democracy. No longer is any action 
taken by a body of legislators answerable to a clique or a prince, but 
it is a:nswerable only to the people for whom, by whom, they have the 
right to carry out their duties. 
4. The Individual 
It will probably seem redundant to go over some of this material 
again, but it is pertinent to do so in order to get a clear picture of 
the problem of civil government. Under this heading, which itself is a 
catch-all term, for it may mean not only the ruled but also the ruler, 
three topics shall be discussed. .After a brief review of the nature of 
man, the problem of man's position within the state shall be viewed. 
Finally the problem of the downfall of government shall be studied 
primarily from the standpoint of the responsibility of the individual to the state • 
. . . . . . . . 
a. The nature of ~· Again let it be understood that all. men are equal, 
except, of course, the chll..d who has not the capacity for reason. There-
fore, ttin the state of Nature every one has the executive power of the 
t.l law of Nature.lt::· Entailed in this power is that of punishment as well 
as the power of provision. However, the former power is one which has 
been used abusively. As a result, men joined together by consent in 
order to protect their various interests. A natural question t0 be 
asked at this point is that of 
why will he part with his i'reedom, this empire, and subject 
himself' to the dominion and control of' any other power~ To 
which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of 
Nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of' it is very 
nncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; 
:for all being kings as much a~ he, every man his equal, and 
the greater part no strict observers of' equity and justice, 
the enjoyment of' the property he bas in this state is very 
unsa:fe, very insecure.2 
It is for this reason that Locke opines that aD. forms oi' society seemed 
to have formed from the general consent. It is therei'ore, not without 
the :fact of the individual that society exists. Not only is he the most 
integral part of' it by the i'act that he consented to its, the coi!Im0n-
wealths., existence; but also he is part o:f it in other way!! 0 
be Man•s £osition.~~ Bomrnonwealth. One o:f the :foremost way~ in which 
he is a part of' civil society is that 11bo man in civil society can be 
er..empted :from the laws o:f it6:ii.3. This principal relationship is not con-
tingent upon any other i'orm of relationship which the individual may ha~ 
or contract to have. 
l. Ibid., P• 123. 
2. Ibid., P• 179· 
3. Ibid., P• 164. 
12S 
u 
Nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or any 
domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the soci-
ety from his obedience_ to the legislative, acting pursuant to 
their trust, nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the 
laws so enacted or farther than they do allow, it being ridi-
culous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any 
power in the society which is not supreme.l 
1 Without this as basic to the actions of each individual, it is certain 
. that a moral anarchy or a falsely interpreted state of Nature would 
exist. 
What then is the actual relationship? In Locke's words this is 
idetailed thusly: 
'.:1 The first power •••. the preservation of himself and the rest 
of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by the laws made by 
the society •••• Secondly, the power of punishing he wholly 
gives up, and engages his natural force, which he might before 
employ in the execution of the law of Nature, by his own 
single authority, as he thought fit, to assist the executive 
power of the society as the law therefore shall require.2 
In such a condition, then, of having given over one's power to the 
legislative, there might be the occasional voice that would. no.t under-
stand this in its proper b·alance. Locke cautions one by saying that 
llwhereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute ar-
bitrary power and will of a legislator, they have disarmed themselves, 
and armed him to make a prey. of them when he pleases .Jt? This could 
happen, but is not the pernU.ps:ible ac,tion of the legislator as he is 
1 responsible to the people that established him, or l~gislative. There-
II 
!I 
I 
fore, the people do have a certain power over it. 
1. Ibid.,. p. 1S4. 
2. Ibid., P• lSL 
3~ Ibid., P• 1S'7. 
This is brought out 
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most clearly by Locke when he states that 
though in a constituted commonwealth standing upon its own 
basis and acting according to its own nature - that is, act-
ing for the preservation of the community, there can be but 
one supreme power, which is the legislative, to which all the 
rest are and must be subordinate, yet the legislative being 
only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains 
still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the 
legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to 
the trust reposed in them.l 
This is the broad picture of the individual and the civil society. 
hat happens, and what remedy is to be found, when the individuals consent 
!i..s not honored for one reason or another'? In the following section the 
~act of the individual may be lost temproarily, but at all times he is the 
rne who is basically involved in this problem. 
!f• Concerning the dissolution of ~:society. One is not to be deceived 
I 
., . 
: y the term civil society. This term seems to have been interchangeable 
' 
· th the term commonwealth as far as Locke was concerned.. In the first 
lace one must see what is meant by the dissolution of the government, or 
ow it comes about. Secondly, what remedies can be suggested that can be 
,ielded by the individual to overcome the errors of those in whom he has 
I 
I! 
rusted or been forced to trust. 
I In gereral there are two basic ways in which a civil society may be I 
issolved. In Locke's words these are 
Ibid., P• 192. 
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1) Force. This in itself has two phases: 
a) From the o~t~id.~ -
Whenever the society is dissolved, it is certain the gov-
ernment of that society cannot remain. Thus conquerors • 
swords often cut up governments by the roots, and mangle 
societies to pieces, separating the subdued or scattered 
multitude from the protection of and dependence on that 
society which ought to have preser~ed them from violence. 1 
b) :From t.Ji~ ~id.~ -
Whosoever uses force without right - as every one does in 
society who does it without law - puts himself into a state 
of war with those against whom he Jo uses it, and in that 
state all former ties are cancelled, all other rights cease, 
and every one has the right to defend himself, and to resist 
the aggressor.2 
2) Legislative misconduct. 
There is, therefore, another way whereby governments are 
dissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the 
(prince, either of them act contrary to their trust •••• 
When he who has the supreme exeeuti ve power neglacts and 
abandons that charge, so that· the laws already made can 
no longer be put in execution; this is demonstratively to 
reduce all to anarchy, and so effectively to dissolve the 
government. • • • The reason why men enter into society 
is the preservation of their property; and the end while 
they choose and authorize a·legislative is that there may 
be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the 
properties of all the society, to limit the power and 
moderate the dominion of every part and member of the 
society.3 
1. Ibid., p. 224. 
2. Ibid., pp. 234-5. 
3 .. Ibid., pp. 228, 227-S. 
131 
3) Remedies. Sane of these, though quite similar, have different answers e,r. 
! remedies. In general all the remedies depend upon the act~on taken, as 
. already has been hinted, by everyone in the civil society. Herein the 
:remedies that are prescribed shall cor,respond to the various methods of 
:dissolution of the government. However, force, either external or in-
.ternal, shall be considered as one type of problem. Therefore, Locke 
sees these possibilities: 
a) ~force -
Self-defence is a part of the law of Nature; nor can it be 
denied the community, even against the king himself; but to 
revenge themselves upon him must, by no means, be allowed 
them,) it being not agreeable to that law •••• This I am 
sure, whoever, whether ruler or subject, by forcfJ goes about 
to invade the rights of either prince or people, and lays 
the foundation for overturning the constitution and frame 
of any just government, he is guil"j:,y of the greatest crime 
I think a man is capable of, being' to answer for all those 
mischiefs of blood, rapine,· and desolation, which the break-
ing to pieces of governments bring on a country; and he whe 
does it is justly· to be esteemed tne common enemy and pest 
of mankind, and is to be treated accordingly.l 
. . . . . . 
b) To legislative misconduct -
In these, and the like cases, when the government is dissolved, 
the people are at liberty to provide for themselves by erect-
ing a new legislative differing from the other by the change 
of persons, or form, or both, as they shall find it most for 
their safety and good. For the society can never, by the fault 
of another, lose the native and original right it has to pre-
serve itself, which can only be dop~ by a settled legislative 
and a fair and impartial execution Of the larvs made by it •••• 
Whenever the legislators endeavor to take away and destroy the 
property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under 
arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with 
the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, 
• l. Ibid., pp. 236 & 234. 
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and are left to the common refuge which God hath provided 
for all men against force and violence. • • • By the es-
tablishment of a new legislative (such as they shall think 
fit), provide for their own safety and security, which is 
the end for which they are in society. • • • Thus to regu-
late candidates and electors, and new model the ways of 
election, what is it but to cut up the government by the 
roots, and poison the very foundation of public security? 
For the people having reserved to themselves the choice of 
their representatives as the fence to their properties, 
could do it for no other end but tl:lat they might always be 
freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act and advise as the 
necessity of the commonwealth and the public good should, 
upon examination and mature debate, be judged to require.l 
With this demonstration of the above problems and their remedies 
one can come to the conclusion of the ana.J..ysis of the form of civil 
gove.rnment in Locke's position. .All that remains to be done is to 
examine the contrast of Locke's position and Calvin's system. 
D. CONTRAST 
1. Of Presuppositions 
a. Of starting points. First, let it be understood what is meant by 
starting point. This idea here employed is that which denotes the 
material used as the source of information. In Locke 1 s position this 
is usually called the law of nature and can b~ equated with reason. 2 
Arising out of this law, Locke found all men "equal and independentn 
1. Ibid., pp. 22S-30. 
2. Supra, p. 106. 
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land also the basis for all authority.1 In contrast to this source of 
information, Calvin states that his source is authoritative. His in-
formation as to the nature of the universe and man, in particular, is 
drawn from the Holy Scriptures. These two sources, from Calvin's view 
point, are in conflict. If one is to base the first mentioned position 
1 on that which nteaches all mankind who will but consult itu2 in order 
i ' 
l to find the principles for the development of a system of civil govern-
ment, he will find that there are other systems which are contradictory 
yet arising from the same source~ For Calvin, narrow as it is, all 
:.thought must start from and end in one authoritative source.3 In other 
, words, the contrast can be said to consist in Calvin's God-centered 
i scheme of life as opposed to Locke • s immanence philo~ophy. 4 
b. The nature of~· Locke begins his definition of the nature of 
.man with the statement ttthat all men qy nature are equai.n5 If one is 
. to compare this with Calvin•s view of .man one must remember first the 
nature of equality in these two positions. Locke understands in the 
1. Sypra, p. 104. 
2. Idem. 
i 
!). 
-
supra, pp .. 94 & ff. cf. van Til, Defense _of ~.Faith, p. 87. van 
Til. quotes from B.B. Warfield's Plan of Salvation, p. 21, and says 
that ttCalvinists aim at holding a position, according to Warfield, 
that shall be •uncolored by intruding elements from without. • tt 
. -: . . ~ . . . . . . . ' . . . ' ~ . . . ' . . . . . . ~ . . . 
Dooyeweerd_, ! ~Critique 2f. Theoretical Thought, I, 12-3~ Imma-
nence~. "hilqsophy is that based upon nthe prevailing. Tmoder"£Y concep-
tion Whicrr/accepts the self-suffici~ncy of philosophic thOught in 
accom.p ishi'ng its task.u 
! 5. Supra, p.· 105. 
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concept of equality that "equality • • • IJ.iJ the equal right that every 
man hath to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or 
authority of any other man.nl Calvin says that equality is not natural 
nor has anything to do with this temporal sphere. The only equality 
that is man's is that man is universally subject to God's universal 
laws and th~t he will be judged by the equality of thes~ laws.2 In 
ether words, man is equal only in the sight of God. Whether the reader 
... 
' will grant this as a contrastirl.g point must be based on the thought 
i I that equality must be related to a contrast of temporal ani supra-tem-
poral relationships. This does not divorce either position from the 
realm which is not its base. In other words, Locke does recognize the 
supra-~emporal realm - the realm of man t s ttown Maker, the A.lndghty, to 
whom /Jie -iif to be accountable; n3 ani C~ vin would state that the pil-
grim must use the temporal. re~ as an aid to his life.4 Then, where 
is the contrast? Lockets equality arising from the law of nature, with-
out regard to the problem. of the fall of man, is specifically a limited 
temporal equality; whereas, Calvin's concept of equality is based on a 
universal. supra-temporal. authority, thus making it operative in the 
temporal realm. 
One other thing might be asked, and that is, t'Wha.t is this tnaturai.. 
ffeedomt?n According to Locke, this might be seen in that man can 
.... ; .· ·~ 
1. OP~ _Cit. 
2. su;era, P• 34. 
3. Sup;~;a, P• 106. 
4· SuEra, P• 37. 
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provide and execute justice in the state of nature without any guide 
posts to speak of, except that of that law written in the heart. Here-
in there is a marked contrast between Calvin and wcke.. For Locke one 
could say that the natUl~al freedom is the freedom to do the good thing. 
Yet, for Calvin, as stated above, this is impossible. Calvin would 
view freedom in two ways. Man is either free under the law of sin or 
free under the law of righteousness. Locke does admit that there is a 
~aw for one in the state of nature, but does not clarify it. ealvin 
sees that the sinful man can do no good but sin only; whereas, the man 
made regenerate, still being a man with the tendency to sin, has also 
an increasing tendency to righteousness and, as a result, good acts. 
This, like .Aquinas t position, can be termed optimistic in outlook 
as far as man's nature is concerned. This thought arises from the fore-
going and elementally makes every man equal and independent. Even 
though there is the element of subjection of one man to another, it 
does not naturally follow from Locke's analysis of man. Calvin, on 
the other hand, is positive in his analysis of the problem of subjection, 
slave-master relationships, in that he cites it as the result of the 
fall of man. In this light then, man is held to be sinful, for Calvin, 
and therefore in need of a directive force, gover1~ent. On the other 
hand, Locke finds government is only necessary to fulfill the needs and 
the protection of property in a harmonious community which one individ-
ual is incapable of doing for himself. 
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2. Of Systems 
a. Sc:>cial contract. Locke describes· the rise of civil gc:>vernment as 
the decis~on of man to end his precarious nstate of Nature between man 
. Lbif· .. agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, 
an:l .make one body politic~nl !As the basis for government-this must be 
recognized as a limited concept. As has been seen, 
the .state was supposed to have no other a:im than the or-
ganized protection of the •innate absolute human rights' 
of all its citizens to fre~dom., property ani life. It . 
should not in'be_.r.f'er:e with the Ron-political society which 
by the liberal economic theory was viewed under an exclu-
sively economical aspect and sharply distil'lguished from 
the body politic.2 
FarCalvin this .matter was no problem. As was cited earlier, Calvin 
views government as necessary because of man's sinfulness. In addition 
to this we must add that God, from Calvin's point of view, also ordained 
government. This latter would .make government of every kind necessary, 
inevitable and unlimited except by the laws of God. 
Another problem that arises ia this phase of the development of 
civil government is that, on the basis of the foregoing analysis of the 
difference between Locke's and Calvin's definition of equality, mutual 
agreement, if based on the equality of man ttin the state of Nature, n 
" does not allow for a physical and mental difference in man. In other 
words, Lockian theory being based on an humanistic foundation must 
1. Supra, p. 104~ 
2. Dooyeweerd, 9£• £.?:!:.•, III, 426. Cf. supra, pp. ill & ll6. 
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allow for human differences.. Whereas~ Calvin, as was shown, basing his 
theory on a supra-temporal universal authoritative concept need not 
explain the differences of man's natural assets and the resulting dif-
ferences in governmental form. 
In the same vein of thought one must also note Lockets lack of 
universality. This again results from the limited humanistic source 
upon which government is founded. .Again Calvin answers this with the 
concept of universal sovereignty of God ani Solomon's words: 1'The 
king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water: he 
turn~th it whithersoever he will. ur In all of this the main contrast 
between Locke •s ttsocial contract, 11 or mutual agreement, and Calvin's 
Divi...l'lely ordained, ndelegated,tt governments is that of the lack of 
universality in scope. 
b. Law. 
1) Nat.ll-ai ought. In brief, Calvtn recognizes only one eternal 
universal law as valid, that of God's decrees. In the particular case 
,. 
all problems may be subsumed under this law. For Locke, on the other 
hand, Hthe stf!_te of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which 
obliges everyone, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind 
1. Proverbs 21:1. Cf o Psalm. 2:1-4. t!Why do the heathen rage, and the 
people imagine a vain.thing? The kings of the earth set themselves, 
and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord, and against 
his anointed, saying, Let us break their bands asunder, and cast 
away their cords from us. He that sitteth in the heavens shall 
laugh: the Lord shall have them in derision.n 
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I 
:who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one 
i 
ought to harm another in life, health, liberty or possession. 111 Again, 
! being a limited rational ideal there is little room for any lack of 
; com;pliance on the part of an irrational member of society. In regard 
to Calvin's theory, then, this position is found to be lacking iR that 
. . . 
there are differences on the levels of reasoning willingness and abilitz • 
.As to the .matter involved in the moral impetus provided by the 
1 natural nought, u one can only see the inability implicit in its nature, 
in any shape or form., to be com;pelling. Due to the fact that willing 
and reasoning, though often connected in the minds of many of the 
' modern philosophers, are entirely separate entities, one can see that 
reasoning an ought does not cause the will to implement that ought • 
.Also, an ought that is reasoned by an individual .may not coincide with 
the moral ought of the society. Rather, as Calvin sees it, could not 
it be something that comes from outside nature, from some outside power 
who could cause this ought to be so plainly rtwrit in the heart of all 
.mankind?n2 This is that to which Calvin doe~ give allegiance. Calvin 
realized, on the basis of Revelation, that there lies in .man no innate 
ability to either think or do the good due to his total depravity a_~d 
alienation from God.. Only the .man who is regenerate, that not of man r s 
doing, is able upon followL11g the laws and commandments of God to do 
that which is good - good being that which God has decreed as good. 
. . . 
1. SUpra, p. 125. 
2. Idem. 
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2) The supreme law.. In this final problem one becomes involved in 
the development of the governmental form explicitly.. It will be reme.m-
bered that the distinct guiding principle involved in the duties of the 
magistrate, or legislative, was that o:f sa.ius popUii. suprema iex.l For 
Locke there seems to be no higher law where the ci vll society is con-
cerned. There -are a few questions that could be asked that would put 
this conception of the supreme law to the test. A questioR asked by 
Locke was that of t'Who shall be judge when this power.Lj)rerogative to 
act for the r good of the public t where there are no la-wrs prescribing 
any actio if is made right use of?tt2 He answered that, nthere can be no 
judge on earthtt in this matter. But in another place Locke also says 
that prerogative may be enacted 1twithout the prescription of the law 
and sometimes even against it.u3 ~ What is the meaning of this, when, 
in so many other places, Locke has stated that the law of the civil 
society is that which was consented to by the people, auspiciously for 
their own good? This, then, resolves into two contrary arguments of 
»for the good of the people .. u One argument from the side of the magis-
trate and one from the point of view of the public. Which is right? 
Another question to be asked is, ffiWhat actually is the meaning of the 
term tfor the good of the public?-tt The public does not always agree 
amo:ng themselves, so who is to determine the answer? .Another problem 
is that of the limitation of the concept of salus publica. "Where does 
1. $upra,_pp. 122 & 127 .. 
2. Supra, p. 123. 
3. Idem. 
it end? There is much leeway given to.the magistrate in such a concept, 
'as was seen above. As a result it was' «an almost unrestrained threat 
to individual freedom. n As was later developed by «Christian Wolfe t s 
. ' 
theory of the police- and welfare state (although it was based on the 
Lockian idea of innate rights and devoted much attention to the non-
political forms of association)., individual freedom in the last instance 
ic9mpletely fell a victim to the saius :e.liblica in this absolutist and 
utilitarian sense. trl 
On the other hand, Calvin posits no law that is based on any 
' human relationship. Rather, he adheres to that which has been stated 
·by God as supreme, that which avoids human frailties am shortcomings .. 
I Calvin acknowledges only the law as revealed by God in His Son and in 
the Holy Scriptures. This makes all mankind responsible not only to 
himself and his fellowmen, but also to God, his Creator. As such this 
law can not be eternally abrogated, although there are those who do 
not accept it temporally. Justice shall be wrecked upon all who violate 
it. This then, is the difference in the supreme law as Locke sees it 
and as Calvin sees it. Locke bases his supreme law on the human re-
lationships; while Calvin recognizes the fact that God is the eternal 
and sole giver of the supreme law. 
1. Dooyeweerd, ~· cit., p. 237. 
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CHAPtER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Under study is an examination of theocracy, in the light of God's 
universal sovereignty as Calvin understands it in the word ndelegation.n 
In differentiation there is an analysi;s of the difinition of Upure, tt 
sole rule of God; ttincarnate,u the pr$sence of a ruler descended from a 
. divine being; and lldelegated, » governmental officials being ordained, 
,empowered and appointed by God. 
The method of study is that of studying basic doctrines of each 
position; analyzing the particular governmental form; finally, contrast-
ing Calvin's position with the Old Testament, .Aquinas• monarchical and 
Locke's democratic theocr~cies. 
A. JOHN CALVIN'S DElEGATED THEOCRACY 
Though Calvin's main e.wphasis was theological his views touched 
upon problelllS of sociological and educational import. Civil govern-
ment, in Calvin's view, rises from. t~ee of his basic doctrines. 
The first of these is the doctrine of creation. .In nature man sees 
wonders hard to explain. This problem, existence, is satisfaetoril)! 
explained by a Divine Creator who has given a self-revelation i.n what we 
know as the Holy Bible. Secondly, there is the doctrine of the sover-
142 
.tignty of God. God having created by His spoken Word, also sustains 
nature through divinely decreed natural laws. Sovereignty, for Calvin, 
also pr~valent in everyone's li.fe thro~gh God's common grace, is the 
blessing of health, reason and wealth. Calvin holds that there is a 
planned, predestinated course for eaca· person. Thirdly, there is 
Cal vi.n • s basic doctrine of man. Man appears . in three states since 
creation. At creation man was eternal, reflected God's image, had an 
~ 
understanding mind and a flexible will to do good or evil. After he 
• fell, man became subject to original Sin and lost his natural assets. 
Finally, through redemption in Christ ,man can partially regain these 
assets; promising a full restoration in the day of the Lord. 
Calvin 1 s system of ·civil administration breaks into three problems: 
. the magistrate, laws and individuals. Concerning all magistrates he 
. understands them all to be ordained of ·God. Their extent of power is to 
· order society, provide justice and protect the church; being responsible 
to God, fellowmen and the church. The foundation of government is law 
and its foundations are moral ani political decrees of God in the Holy 
Scriptures. There are two attitudes which are assumed oy individuals: 
either antinomian -·against law, ~-~·, against God and state; or a 
positive one of service to God and the state. 
This can be contrasted w:i:.th the Old Testament theocracy. Techni-
cally, this theocracy was a church-st:ate in which magistrates were 
judges dispensing God's edicts. Individuals were required to keep the 
law and foJ.J.ow God's commands. The contrast lies in the fact that God was 
directly related to the Old Testament theocracy through an individual 
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by visions, dictated words and by supernatural visitations. Calvin 
views God as being directly related to. his era through His Holy word 
,and by sovereignty. The covenant, theh generally limited, is now 
provisionally universaL .Automatic material benefits then granted to 
·the chosen people are now subject to a~ individual's !3-ttitude t·oward 
spiritual principles. Also since the church-state died with the ful-
: flllment of ceremonial laws by Christ, the church is subject to the 
state. 
B. ST •. THOMAS AQUINAS t MONARCHICJlL THllnCRACY 
Using the same basic outline of discussion found in the prior 
/ 
chapter, Aquinas• theory is contrasted with Calvin's theocracy .. 
. -
Doctrinally Aquinas builds his view on his definitions of' the cosmos 
and man. He sees a Divine Revelation) not necessarily contradictory to 
human reason, and Divine providence which ordered nature and from which 
natural laws arose.. Man • s nature was conditioned by a moral te.mdency 
to good, subject to the necessity of society due to unequal abilities, 
pervaded by religious obligations and guided by reason.. Under all of 
this lies the problems of the scholas'tic definition of state and .Aquinas t 
attempt to harmonize Aristotle and Christian teachings. 
Before proceeding into the discussion of the system of civil govern-
ment, it must be understood that it is the fulfillment of human nature; 
guided from the doctrine of sovereignty, by one who being human could 
pervert the best government, misdirecting its striving to communitas 
perfectae. Therefore, the Church, recipients of royal priesthood, is 
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'able to keep the sovereign in check through excommunication. 
The magistrate's natural source oif authority is the idea that man 
. . 
,is a nsocial animal .u But, due 'to limitation by law and human fallibil.-
ity, all power is from God, signifying the supremacy of the church. 
Aquinas favored a 1tconstitutionaltt virtuous monarchy, assuring unmixed 
'decisions. This, if profaned, was not the most unjust government since 
it was the easiest to remedy. 
Aquinas considered law to be the rational ordering of all things. 
· Arising from natural law is human law regarding specific situations. 
! Underlying both these was eternal law, directing man to his goal by 
I 
r overruling fall~il.ity. 
Regarding the individual, .Aquinas considered him as one within the 
state, each supremely responsible to the church, political prudence 
being required. Ideal government was to be headed by a king, assisted 
by aristocracy and elected by democracy. 
Calvin differs from Aquinas in his idea of the nature of the source 
1 material upon which he bases his position. Aquinas, on the one hand, 
holds that the Revelation is not contrary to the testimony of reason. 
For Calvin only Divine Revelation suffices as his basic source of in-
formation. As opposed to Aquinas, Calvin made a careful distinction 
between pre- and post-fall states of man, thus resulting in a view of 
the total depravity of man unless regenerate by Christ's atonement. In 
.Aquinas' theory man has a nnatural inclination to good. n This causes a 
limitation to be put upon the definition of sin because of man's natural 
and civil relationships. 
Aquinas' dualistic epistemology affects very seriously his civil 
government. Due to man's fallibility and the state's inability to 
reach beyond the goal of virtue, which in the natural realm completes 
man's natural inclinations to good, Aquinas sees the necessity of the 
-· 
church in administrating the higher values, thus making it supreme over 
the state. Calvin, on the other hand, holds that ~hese are separate 
institutions related only by membership, which is fallible and different 
in form across the face of the world, and the fact that the state must 
maintain public worship. 
C • JOHN .tOCKElf S D:EMOCRATIC THEOCRACY 
John Eocke's essay Of Civil Government is pervaded by two problems • 
. . . . . . 
The .main purpose was to answer the jure Divino argument for .monarchy of 
Filmer. .Also there is only a wandering positive development. 
The basic outline of Locke's work revolves around three principles. 
Firstly, the principle of nature in which all .men are equal., independent, 
obliged not to harm another, thus governing most human relationships. 
Secondly, arising:from the nature of man, each has equal right in the 
state of nature to order, dispose and protect himself; excepting 
children who are born to a natural freedom. Thirdly, the executive 
power, for preservation and punishment, arises from nature through 
parental power to political and perverted despotical power. 
In delineating Locke's system of civil government one has to under-
stand its rise. For Locke the family, as the cornerstone of civil 
society, broadened to the paterfamilias concept into the concept of a 
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i group to form a commonwealth to ful:fill man's natural rights. In this 
• type of government the magistrate was an individual., excellent and good, 
whose duties, executed sometimes by prerogative, were, for the good of 
.the public, executive: ruling, making and executing laws, providing 
needs and protecting the commonwealth; and federative: guiding and pro-
tecting in alliances. The law, having the natural noughtu as basic, 
.... ... 
guides individuals by law of reason in state of nature and in society. 
Consent is basic to societal lawmaking and elemental to magistracy. 
The individual surrendered his natural rights to the society, due to 
. inconvenience of the state of nature; however, retained subjection and 
creative responsibility. In case societies were dissolved by legisla-
tive negligence, individuals could remedy the problem by right of self-
defence or re-creation of the legislatureo 
Again Calvin differs with Locke, as he does with Aquinas; as to 
the nature of the source material. For Locke reason is that which 
nteaches all mankind who will but consult ittt and this gives the basic 
- . 
presuppositions of the form of government. Arising out of this; Locke 
holds that men nby nature are equal tt or having equal rights, freedom to 
i preserve, provide and judge based on the natural principles of law writ 
in the heart, in the state of nature. Calvin, on the other hand, posits 
the exclusiveness of Divine Revelation as his presupposition, before 
which all men are equal in God's sight, men having no ability to do 
the good even in the state of nature • 
.As for the rise of government, Locke found at the base a social 
contract which permitted magistrates to rule for the contracting parties. 
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Being limited in form and extent this does not include the validity of 
all forms o:f government, even though based on the social contract, be-
cause this does become obscured. Calvin finds in contrast a universal 
principle based upon God 1 s eternal laws and sovereignty. Law, for Locke, 
rises in part :from a natural nought11 and reaches its highest end in the 
sal us publica. Calvin finds that neither is natural 'loughtn consistent, 
... 
compulsive, nor is the suprema ~ satisfactory as both are subject to 
human frailty. In contrast he sees moral ought stemming from God's 
Divine decrees and being stimulated by His sovereignty which lead to 
eternal glory in God. 
D. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Nature of Man 
In this problem it will be remembered that Aquinas came out very 
optimistically for a conception of .man with good tendencies. Locke ~so took the same general road, but was a great deal lllOre cautious in 
b.s analysis of man's nature.. He felt that man evidenced the tePldency 
fo good and had :rreedom to do good in the state of nature, but he also 
saw that there were those who could not abide by the ideal state. Both 
lf these views are considered to be rather utopian. For one reason, this 
L so because both tend to see in .man the capability to accomplish a 
lood end, or a co.mrnunitas perfectae. For Aquinas this, to be sure, is 
l :future estate o:f man only achieved through the church; but nevertheless 
lo be strived for through the state as it makes the individual complete, 
! 
I 
I 
~·!·, having relations outside himself. Locke, on the other hand, feels 
rhere is the possibility of having an ideal form of government. By im.-
!Plication, if each man were to exercise his natural ttought," or law of 
reason, and do those things for which he has been made responsible by 
his consent; then one could arrive at the ideal democracy. For Calvin, 
no man can, through the state or by hitnself, accomplish any ideal.l 
• This broad statement is made with no reservation, due to the fact that 
by experience one can see this to be quite true.2 Let a man put the 
bit between his teeth and flick his own reigns and one would find him 
':going down the wrong path a.llnost immediately. People who claim. to 
. understand, according to the Scriptures, only have a form of under-
standing. Their wa:ys are those that lead to destruction} 
Already one can see that Calvin grasped the major problem of man's 
nature. To Calvin, whom .many think t«;> be fatalistic in his approach, 
man could not stand before God in the. future communita.s perfectae as he 
1.. Funk ani Wagnalls, New standaXd Di,ctio~ (New York: Funk ani 
Wagnalls, Co~, 1913),p .. 1220.. Ideal: ttA product of thought and 
imagination, to which any corresponding_real existence is not neces-
sarily attributed, but which appeal:'s in consciousness as an object 
worthy of contemplation or aspiration.tt 
- . - . . . . . . 
~ .. Calvin, Institutes, I, 47-8. nsi4ce man is subject to a world of 
miseries, and has been spoiled~of .his divine array, this melancholy 
exposure discovers an immense mass of deformity: everyone, there-
fore, must be so impressed with a consciousne~s.of his own infelicity, 
as to arrive at· some knowledge of . God. Thus a sense of our ignerance, 
vanity, poverty, infirmity, depravity ••• is/j.fl ••• assistance towa-ds 
finding him. II 
3. Proverbs 14:12 - uThere is a way which seemeth right unto a man, but 
the end thereof are the ways of death." 
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p.s and as he could do no good thing. Man, for Calvin is declared to be 
ltota.lly depraved, a sinner capable only for punisbment.1 Both .Aquinas 
I 
land Locke, therefore, fall short of understanding the true nature of 
I 
iman and how evil he actually is. 2 Cal rln alone can still vievr the scene 
iwith equilibrium. and give an answer to the question,. 1'What shall. we do?tt 
2. The Nature of the Magistrate 
Much of the above material could be reiterated here. But, assl.lllling 
the total depravi.ty of man to be fact, then, in what way ca.n .Aquinas 
affirm that the magist.rate is to be the ttmost virtuous1t man, of Locke, 
one wP.& is an nexcellent and good man?tt Aquinas, even though he sees 
the possibility that the individual monarch could become a despot, puts 
his governmental form in dire straits when he is willing to place all 
the power in one man. For him there i.s no check on the practical, or 
~ governmental level, so he must institute a check on some higher level 
1 of influence over the lives of men. In so doing, he turns immediately 
to the church for the protection necessary against the state. In other 
i words, when the magistrate, or monarch, as is the case, violates some 
spiritual law, which could be any law the church thought under its 
jurisdiction even by implication, then the church could put its stamp of 
.... 
1 1 .. Calvin, ~· cit., p. 312. ttTo be carnally minded is death, because 
the cartla.l mind is enmity against God; fc;>~ it is not subject to the 
law of God, neither indeed can bett (Romans 8:6-7). 
2. Jere.IIliah 17:9. liThe heart is deceitful above all things, and des-
perately wicked: .who can know it?tt 
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excommunication upon his head. For Locke there is a better check., one 
that is within the same realm, and that is that the magistrate is 
checked by the legislature which in turn is responsible to the people. 
Locke feels that in this broad base of the many there is bound to be 
found a few level headed people that can wield the proper guidance 
through reason. 
From experience one can see that both of these checks collapse. 
Ih the case of Aquinas one need only to point to the corruption that 
seized the church during the time of the Borgias. ACtually, therefore, 
a check of this nature is no more a check than any other type of safe-
guard. The church, virtuous though the prelates may be, is still falli-
ble and as such is under the same curse of liability to its individual 
weaknesses.: Even though the Roman Catholic Church claims to have the 
line of royal prelates, the line of the Vicar's of Christ, there is 
.. 
still the element of fallibility and it is to be recognized that where•-
er humanity is there is weakness. Even for Ipcke there is the same 
problem. Many are the magistrates who have, for their own desires, 
been able to secure legislation for their benefit by mob rule. This 
dangerous power tends to anarchy, but it is always a prevalent threat. 
This is even true in Locke 's ideal system. During the French revolu-
tion, history received one of its best examples of mob rule. It is not 
unheard of even today. In some of the representative bodies that govern 
some of the labor elements in this country, the minority rules by vio-
lence, sometimes using mob rule~ in meetings to secure their ends. It 
is true that there is greater safety in numbers, but even these can be 
controlled by the artful person. 
In opposition to these dangerously controlled governments, Calvin 
recoghized that only one check could ever be put on a magistrate, or by 
the same token, on ma.nkinde That check is that of sovereign punish-
ment by an eternal God and judge for the one who violates the laws of 
God. Calvin also sees the realistic side, that even this is not enough 
to put a stop to the actions of some men. In order to offset this he 
posits the right of present judgment in Christ • s servants over the one 
who violates God 1 s laws. Beyond this, the person who follows Calvin's 
system of thought has this hope that the wicked shall be brought to 
justice in the day of judgment.1 It will be questioned whether or not 
Calvin lives in not only one realm but also two realms .. ,· This is true 
because he understands from the Revelation of God that man•s life ought 
not to be bound to this present life only; but the spiritual .man., or 
regenerate man, finds no limitation or separation of the spiritual and 
temporal realms in being bound to eternal, future values. This not only 
gives hope to a dark scene, but alone is able to give reason to life. 
Therefore, it is easy to realize that Calvin's position, while being 
realistic is also practical. 
3. The Form of Government 
Aquinas and L.ocke both can be easily tabbed as idealistic in this 
1. :PsB.inls 2:2 & 4 - liThe kings of the earth set themselves, and the rul-
ers take counsel together, against the Lord, and. against his anoint-
ed. • • • He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh: the Lord shall 
have them. in derision. n 
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matter~ For Aq_uinas, on the basis of God's sovereignty over creation, 
' 
lthere was only one just form of government and that is the rule of a 
virtuous monarch~ For Locke a representative legislative body, arising 
I 
from the consent of the people, who forego their rights of the state of 
nature in order to secure peace, is the ideal. form of goverOI®nt. Both 
of these positions must fall under the criticism that they were seeking 
some kind of utopia. Not ctJJ.y is this unrealistic, for utopias are im.-
· possible wherever the human element is, but it certainly does not e:xplam 
• the nature of man's contemporary experience of governmental forms. By 
this it is meant that .Aq_uinas and Locke, in trying to establish what 
1 they thought to be the beat forms of government, recognized the less 
! desirable forms of government but allowed little space for the possibi.~ 
ity that these might permenantly dominate the world scene. In contrast 
Calvin only expresses a preference for a democratic form, while openly 
acknowledging the government of ttFrancis, King of the French.tt Thus it 
., . 
is that one falls into a twofold problem when examining such positions. 
It is, on the one hand, not claimed py Calvin that all these problems., 
such as: the value of the various governmental forms, their tendency to 
failure, and their remedy, are answered specifically, but only in prin-
ciple. Thus, when Calvin states that all; magistrates exist by the 
sovereign ordination of God, one has an answer as to the .matter of' the 
contemporary governmental forms and their origin. Then, when one sees 
that man is sinful and can be changed only by the preaching of the 
Word, one sees the reason for any governmental shortcomings and the 
final remedy for them. This is born out by experience q_uite readily. 
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A .man who holds office, whether by election or by heredity or any other 
means, and has little regard for the laws of God is usually violently 
opposed to justice of any kind. Witness the case history of the tribes 
of Israel and Judah. A good ruler, one obedient to the revealed Word 
of God, generally had a prosperous and often peaceful reign. While one 
who sought his own pleasures usually had a troubled reign that often 
ended in violence. Thus, when Calvin acknowledges the fact that God 
ordains the plan of history, even the people of history, he has a more 
rational. view of the form of government, whether it is totalitarian, 
constitutional, or otherwise. Likewise, Calvin is realistic in his 
view concerning the problem of the overthrow ofU~Uust governments. His 
corrective to false government·is that of actively living righteous 
lives, having first been regenerated, in the sight of God; guiding 
through the spoken word those who are in office, according to Divine 
precepts; and, if opportunity affords, quitting the position of respon-
sibility in government according to the same principles.. In this, 
Calvin sees not only final goals, but also present impetus to a right-
eous and purposeful life. 
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ABSTRACT 
The main emphasis of the thesis is the importance of theocracy as 
a form of government. This is studied in the light of Qodls universal 
sovereignty as Calvin understands it in the word ndelegation.tt This is 
different in form from the ideas of: npureu theocracy - the sole rule 
of God, or rtincarnaten theocracy - the presence of a ruler descended 
from a divine being; in that it is ordained, empowered, appoin.ted by 
God and universal in concept even though different in form. The method 
of study is that of studying basic doctrines of each position; analyzing 
the particular governmental form; and finally, contrasting Calvin•s 
position with the Old Testament, Aquinas' monarchical ani Locke's demo-
cratic theocracies. 
A. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS 
Calvin's doctrinal foundations are three in number. The first is 
•' 
the doctrine of creation, the Divine explanation of existence in the 
Holy Scriptures being his source of information. Secon~,the doctrine 
of the sovereignty of God in regard, first to the natural realm and also 
to the personal realm as conceived in the idea of predestination. 
Finally, the doctrine of man wherein Calvin describes man's appearance 
in three states of being since the creation. 
1) .At creation man was eternal, reflected God's image, had an under-
standing mind and a flexible will to do good or evil. 
2) .After he fell, man became subject to original sin and lost his 
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rnatural assets. 
i 3) Finally, through redemption ill Christ a man can partially regain 
! 
I 
ithese assets; promising a full restoration in the day of the Lord. 
Aquinas acknowledged in his study of the cosmos both the fact of 
Divine Revelation, which he felt did not contradict the findings of 
human reason, and Divine providence, which ordered nature and from which 
natural laws arose. In his study of man Aquinas found man to have a 
tendency t0 virtuous acts, subject to the necessity of society due to 
unequal abilities; yet all of this was pervaded by religious obligation 
which guided rationally and authoritatively. 
The basic outline of Locke 1s work revolves around three principles. 
Firstly, the principle of nature in which all men are equal, independezt,, 
obliged not to harm another, thus governing most human relationships. 
Secondly, arising from the nature of man, each has equal right in the 
state of nature to order, dispose and protect himself; exceptillg 
children who are born to a natural freedom. Thirdly, the executive 
power, for preservation and punishment, arises out of natural law 
through parental power to political and perverted despotical power. 
B. SYSTEM OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 
Calvin's system of civil government breakes into three problemsa 
the magistrate, laws and individuals. Concerning all magistrates he 
understands them all to be ordained of God. Their extent of power is 
to order society, provide justice and protect the church; being respon-
sible to God, fellowmen and the church. The foundation of government 
is law and its .foundations are moral and political. decrees of God in 
15S 
the Holy Scriptures. There are two attitudes which are assumed by 
individuals: either antinomian- against law, !·~·' against God and 
state; or a positive one of service to God and the state. 
For Aquinas the magistrate's natural. source of authority is the 
idea that man is a !tsocial. animaJ...n But, due to limitation by law and 
human fall~bil.ity, all power is from God, signilyi.ng the supremacy of 
the church. Aquinas favored a nconstitutional.H virtuous monarchy, 
" 
assuring unmixed decisions. This, if profaned, was not the most unjust 
government because it was the easiest to remedy. Law was the rational 
ordering of all. things. Arising from natural. law is human law regarding 
specific situations. Underlying both was eternal. law, directing man to 
his goal by overruling fal.l.ibil.ity. Individuals were considered as one 
within the state, each supremely responsible to the church, political. 
prudence being required. Ideal. government was to be headed by a king, 
assisted by aristocracy and elected by democracy. 
Lockets system of civil government builds upon family relations, 
broadens into the paterfamilias concept and results in the consent of a 
group to form a commonwealth to fulfill man's natural. rights. In this 
. 
scene the magistrate was an individual, excellent and good, whose duties, 
executed sometimes by prerogative, were, for the good of the public, 
executive: ruling, .making and executing laws, providing needs and 
protecting the commonwealth; and federative: guiding and protecting in 
alliances. The law, having the natural ttoughttt as basic, guides indi-
vidual.s by law of reason in state of nature or in society. Consent and 
nfor the good of the publictt are basic to societal lawmaking and el.emen-
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tal to magistracy. The individual surrendered his natural rights to 
the society, due t.o inconvenience of the state of nature; however, 
retained subjection and creative responsibility. In case societies 
were dissolved by legislative negligence, individuals could remedy the 
problem by right of self-defence or re-creation of the legislature. 
C. CONTRASTS 
Calvin's position can be contrasted with the Old Testament theoc-
racy. Technically, this theocracy was a church-state in which magis-
trates were judges dispensing Godts edicts. Individuals were required 
to keep the law and follow God:1s co.lllmB.nds. The contrast lies in the 
fact that God was directly related to' the Old Testament theocracy tluro~ 
an individual by visions, dictated words ani by supernatural visitations .. 
Calvin views God as being directly related to his era through His Holy 
Word and by sovereignty. The covenant, then generally limited_, is now 
provisionally universal. Automatic material benefits then granted to 
the chosen people are now subject to an individual's attitude toward 
•' 
spiritual principles.. Also since the church-state died with the fulfill-
ment of ceremonial laws by Christ, the church is subject to the state. 
In regard to the source .material Calvin holds to the exclusiveness 
of Divine Revelation. Aquinas posits the idea that this is not contrary 
to the testimony of reason. Based on this epistemological dualism, man 1s 
.. 
nature as well as the concept, o:f sin undergo limitations to the temporal 
and spiritual realms. As a result there is in Calvin's position a clear 
,• 
differentiation between pre-·and post-fall states of man. Aquinas finds 
in the realm of the state a .man with an inclination to good, yet limited 
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due to fallibility and in need of a supreme guide to the connnunitas 
...... 
per:fectae which is found in the church. Calvin views man as only being 
able to find final goals in God, yet the church is subject to the state 
and has relationship with it only as to its membership and the fact 
that the state must maintain public worship. 
Calvin also finds Divine Revelation in contrast with Locke's 
reason in the state of nature.. They also are to be contrasted in their 
concepts of equality. Calvin holds man to be equal only in the sight 
of God, while Locke posits an equality in man's rights as found in the 
state of nature. For !peke the social contract is the basis of the 
right to make laws for the commonwealth, this being based on the 
i natural ttought.n Its final expression is that which is known as ltfor 
... 
the good of the people.n In Calvin's position the above is considered 
to be relative and unsatisfactory because they are based on human 
frailty. In contrast he sees moral ought stemriting from God's .Divine 
decrees and being stimulated by His sovereignty which all lead to 
eternal glory in God. 
D. CONCLl,JS~ONS 
When viewing the three positions in the light of the rational 
approach one finds that in the nature of man both .Aquinas and Locke 
.. 
hold optimistic views; while Calvin, e:xperientially ani :Revelationally, 
understands man as proceeding to destruction. As for the nature of the 
magist~ate, :Aquinas and Locke consider him, upartiallyJt virtuous and 
subject to the checks of Church or legislature. Checks failing, from 
experience, Calvin's deterrent is Divine decree and judgment. Also, 
161 
the form of government as is seen by Aquinas and Locke revel ve around 
idealistic utopias which are una.ttain.able ani not answerable to con-
temporary governmental i'orms. Calvin: realistically sees contemporary 
just and unjust governments as subject to God's sovereignty and man's 
sinfulness; correction residing in the righteous life of Christ's 
followers. 
